Direct and indirect effects of public policies. by De Giorgi, G.
2809663686
REFERENCE ONLY
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON THESIS
Degree Year Name of Author j')  EFs 6 r \ 0 ^ G - 1 
^  \
COPYRIGHT >C\  C O  VAa o
This is a thesis accepted for a Higher Degree of the University of London. It is an 
unpublished typescript and the copyright is held by the author. All persons 
consulting this thesis must read and abide by the Copyright Declaration below.
COPYRIGHT DECLARATION
I recognise that the copyright of the above-described thesis rests with the author 
and that no quotation from it or information derived from it may be published without 
the prior written consent of the author.
Theses may not be lent to individuals, but the Senate House Library may lend a 
copy to approved libraries within the United Kingdom, for consultation solely on the 
premises of those libraries. Application should be made to: Inter-Library Loans, 
Senate House Library, Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU.
REPRODUCTION
University of London theses may not be reproduced without explicit written 
permission from the Senate House Library. Enquiries should be addressed to the 
Theses Section of the Library. Regulations concerning reproduction vary according 
to the date of acceptance of the thesis and are listed below as guidelines.
A. Before 1962. Permission granted only upon the prior written consent of the
author. (The Senate House Library will provide addresses where possible).
B. 1962-1974. In many cases the author has agreed to permit copying upon
completion of a Copyright Declaration.
C. 1975-1988. Most theses may be copied upon completion of a Copyright
Declaration.
D. 1989 onwards. Most theses may be copied.
T  * "  s is  com es within category D.
LOANS
This copy has been deposited in the Library of
This copy has been deposited in the Senate House Library, 
Senate House, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HU. Bound By 
Blissett Bookbinder: 
020 8992 3965 
www.blissetts.com





A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
(Economics) 
in The University College London 
2006
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Richard Blundell, Chair 
Professor Martin Browning 
Professor John van Rcenen 
Assistant Professor Pedro Carneiro
UMI Number: U592727
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U592727
Published by ProQuest LLC 2013. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
I, Giacomo De Giorgi, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where infor­
mation has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.
I would like to dedicate this Dissertation to my Mother, my Father, Paola my wife and my sisters
Giusy and Marta.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
A special thank goes to my advisor Richard Blundell whose continuous sugges­
tions and encouragement have been invaluable. Richard has been incredibly sup­
portive in the various phases of my doctoral studies and hopefully I have learnt a 
great deal from him. I have deeply benefitted from several conversations with Pedro 
Carneiro. I would also like to thank Orazio Attanasio for his substantial insights 
across continents. Costas Meghir motivated me in a number of occasions. A particu­
lar acknowledgement goes to Manuela Angelucci, indeed Chapther IV is the result of 
our collaboration. Imran Rasul has generously and thoughtfully reviewed part of this 
work, his comments have greatly improved this dissertation. I am grateful to Wendy 
Carlin for her encouragement. I also wish to thank the IFS for hosting me during 
part of this project. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Fondazione 
Einaudi and the Royal Economic Society. I would also like to thank my colleagues at 
UCL, especially Andreas, Giovanni, Ifty, Katrien, Marco, Mario and the UCL staff. 
A special thank goes to the Clapham Uncommons (my football mates) and to  my 
friends Alessandra, Chris, Elena, Mihalis, Paolino, Piergiorgio and Vladi.
I have to express here my deepest gratitude to my wife Paola for the incredible 
support and fundamental remarks on my work and life.
Finally, I am most indebted to my father and my family who made this possible.
ABSTRACT




This dissertation analyzes two im portant recent public policies and sheds light on 
the direct and indirect impacts of both; and more in general on the need of sound 
evaluations to carefully consider possible spillovers as a fundamental component of 
programs.
In the first two essays I focus on the “New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in the 
UK” , a multiple treatm ents policy launched in 1998. Such analysis is conducted on 
two main margins: i. employment; and ii. job quality as wage returns. I discuss 
possible indirect effects as substitution of workers and general equilibrium effects on 
wages. The main results are tha t the policy enhances the (re)employment proba­
bility of participants by 5% and the effect lasts over several cohorts. Further, no 
evidence of displacement as well as general equilibrium effects is found. On the rela­
tive effectiveness of the different treatments: IV estimates of the treatm ent effect of 
the subsidized employment option clearly point towards a negative and significant
penalty of roughly 20%, due to stigma or worsening of the matching function. The 
other treatments do not seem to have a significantly differential impact.
Chapter IV analyzes an aid policy implemented in rural Mexico: PROGRESA. 
The focus of the chapter is the identification of the spillovers of the policy to those 
households who just happen to live in treated communities, but are not eligible for 
the program. A formal definition of the Indirect Treatment Effect ( I T E ) param eter is 
given. Focusing on consumption the mechanisms generating such indirect effects are 
discussed. Those mechanisms need not be limited to the specific policy. In particular, 
in developing Countries policies are likely to affect all residents of the areas where 
they are implemented, especially when village economies and social networks create 
strong links between a limited number of households. The large liquidity injections 
into small communities increase the consumption of the non-treated through changes 
in the credit and insurance markets. Thus, the total effect of the policy is larger 
than its effect on the treated. Further, the results confirm th a t a key identifying 
assumption - tha t the program has no effect on non-treated individuals (SUTVA)- 
is likely to be violated in similar policy designs.
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This dissertation analyzes two im portant recent public policies and sheds light on 
the direct and indirect impacts of both; and more in general on the need of sound 
evaluations to carefully consider possible spillovers as a fundamental component of 
programs. Furthermore, whenever possible the mechanisms through which such ex­
ternal effects occur are analyzed. It is crucial for policy evaluation and design to 
understand what are the complex effects of the policy at hand. There are a number 
of reasons why one should not focus only on the direct or targeted outcomes of a 
given program. Firstly, in case of substantial spillover or general equilibrium effects 
the validity of the evaluation might be undermined by the violation of a fundamen­
tal identifying assumption, i.e. Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption or SUTVA 
formulated by Rubin (1980 and 1986).1 If such assumption is violated and wrongly 
assumed to hold the param eter estimated might be meaningless. Furthermore, a 
thorough understanding of the process generating particular spillovers is crucial in 
the design of public policies. In addition, policies judged not to be worthwhile in a 
cost and benefit analysis based on direct impacts might be worth implementing if 
positive spillovers are found; obviously the reverse argument might be true in other
1 Briefly, SUTVA rules out any interaction between treated and control units, i.e. the potential outcome of a unit 
only depends on her treatment status and not on the other units.
1
circumstances. Indeed, in this work I present two possibly opposite cases of indirect 
effects: one positive, one negative. In Chapter II the type of externality which might 
arise is negative to those individuals who did not participate in the policy, i.e. an 
employer who employs a program participant might receive a subsidy, which renders 
such individual cheaper than an otherwise identical non-participant; this might in 
turn generate a displacement effect to the non-treated individual since she would 
have possibly got the job had the program (subsidy) not existed. On the other hand, 
in Chapter IV, I analyze a case of a positive externality given by a substantial cash 
injection in poor rural communities. In tha t particular case credit constraints are 
eased and therefore Consumption increases for those households who do not partic­
ipate in the program.
Calmfors (1994) highlights the importance of general equilibrium effects in a cost- 
benefit analysis of a public policy. I test for general equilibrium effects w ithout 
imposing structure on the data, while on the other hand I am only able to pin down 
a limited number of mechanisms in a not so long time-horizon. I am not able to 
analyze two different equilibria, but rather a possible transition between two different 
states of the world. Therefore the exercises I propose here are somewhere between a 
partial approach and a general equilibrium setting, although not as ambitious from 
the structure side as Heckman et al., 1998; or Lise et al., 2005a and 2005b.
In general, public policies have been evaluated either using a randomized ex­
periment or a quasi-experimental approach often claiming that the parameters es­
timated through small scale programs could be considered valid if the policy were 
to be extended to a much larger scale. However, it is likely tha t policies of global 
implementation have general equilibrium effects and in such sense it is plausible tha t 
the SUTVA might not hold when the program is extended. On the other hand the
SUTVA might not hold even in small scale programs if the policy at hand hits partic­
ular mechanisms or relaxes pre-existing binding constraints, as discussed in Chapter 
IV.
There is a large and growing literature on the direct effects of public policies; 
Heckman et al. (1999) provide a number of references on such strand of the literature.
There are however only a limited number of papers in the indirect effects literature. 
Such literature can be roughly grouped into papers that use sources of exogenous 
variation to identify peer effects, and papers tha t set up and calibrate structural 
models to estimate general equilibrium effects. The first group includes Philipson 
(2000), Katz et al. (2001), Sacerdote (2001), Duflo and Saez (2002), and Miguel 
and Kremer (2004). Bobonis and Finan (2005) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2005) use 
PROGRESA data  to estimate peer effects in schooling decisions. The second group 
includes, among others, Blundell et al. (2003), the already cited, Heckman et al. 
(1998) and Lise et al. (2005a and 2005b).
In the first two essays I focus on the “New Deal for Young People (NDYP) in 
the UK” , the battle-horse employment policy launched by the newly elected labor 
government in 1998 and still ongoing to date; Blundell et al., 2004. Such analysis is 
conducted on two main margins: i. employment; and ii. job quality as wage returns. 
Possible indirect effects are discussed and analyzed in Chapter II. The hypotheses 
tested in such respect, are substitution of workers and general equilibrium effects on 
wages arising from a substantial increase in the effective labor force participation.
Chapter IV analyzes a public policy intervention to alleviate poverty, improve 
health and foster human capital accumulation in Mexico (Skoufias et al., 1999a and 
1999b): PROGRESA. The focus of the chapter is the identification of the spillovers 
of the policy to those households who just happen to live in treated communities, but
4are not eligible for the program. A formal definition of the Indirect Treatment Effect 
( ITE)  parameter is given; and the analysis centers on the consumption spillover while 
a detailed analysis of the mechanisms generating such indirect effects is presented.
The analysis of the first two essays fits in the large and still growing literature on 
Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) evaluation. In the past fifteen years there has 
been a renewed interest both in Europe and the US on such policies. Many European 
countries have experienced a vast array of programs addressed to fostering human 
capital, search intensity and job attachm ent. In Sweden (Sianesi, 2004) a series of 
policies, contemplating all the above features, were implemented in response to the 
deep crisis of the beginning of the 1990s. In Switzerland (Gerfin and Lechner, 2000) 
there are examples of subsidized employment and job creation schemes. The US 
experience on ALM P’s is also vast. Hotz et al. (2000) in revising the influential 
GAIN program in California shed some light on the effectiveness of human capital 
accumulation and job first approach in a long term  perspective. Other US evidence 
focuses on subsidies to those unemployed who move out of welfare as the EITC 
(see Eissa and Liebman, 1996; or the survey of different subsidies to employment by 
Katz, 1998). Other policies, such as the JTPA, focus on the improvement of human 
capital; the work of Bloom et al. (1997) provide evidence on the effectiveness of 
classroom and on-the-job training as well as of job search assistance. Nonetheless, 
despite the large amount of work on ALMPs there is still no consensus on whether 
such policies help youths to get out of welfare and back to work (Heckman et al., 
1999). Furthermore, it is not clear which one of the above mentioned approaches is 
the most successful.
An earlier paper on the NDYP by Blundell et al. (2004) covers the initial launch 
of the program focusing mainly on the job search assistance component of the policy.
They found a positive effect of about 10% on the (re)employment probability within 
the Gateway for the first cohort of participants, while half the effect was found for 
some later cohorts. It is then crucial to extend such analysis to a long-term horizon 
considering as well the various aspects of the policy. Therefore, in the first essay I 
analyze the multiple treatm ents offered as a whole (while the different components 
are the topic of Chapter III).
The main questions answered in Chapter II are: is the policy really improving 
employment prospects for young males? Are the effects of the policy lasting over 
different cohorts? Are there substantial spillover to untreated individuals in terms 
of substitution on the job or equilibrium wages?
The NDYP is the m ajor welfare-to-work program in the UK, and targets the 18- 
24 year old unemployed (on Job Seeker Allowance, JSA for at least 6 months). The 
policy is mandatory, and the sanction for non compliers is the withdrawal, a t least 
temporarily, from the benefit. It is composed of two main parts: i. intensive job 
search (Gateway), common to every participant; and ii. an option period spanning 
from education/training to  an employment subsidy or some public placement to be 
compulsorily taken if a regular job is not found within four months in the Gateway 
stage.2
According to  politicians and program administrators we are looking at a success 
story in roughly all its components. Here is part of a piece written by Andrew Smith 
(2004) the former Secretary of State at the Department for Work and Pensions:
“The Government investment in the New Deal and Jobcentre Plus has helped to 
deliver one o f the most effective labour market programmes in the W orld....”.
While a program participant states (www.newdeal.gov.uk):
2The details of the policy are given in Section 2.2.
“I f  it weren’t for New Deal, I  wouldn’t be here now. They helped me and they 
pushed me when I  needed it. I ’ve got a lot more confidence and I ’ve got skills.”
The analysis is limited to males as the vast majority (75%) of participants are; 
furthermore, the NDYP is basically the only program available to young males, while 
there are other programs for females difficult to tell apart with the available data. 
There are several potential outcomes, one could in principle look at, i.e. probability 
of being employed at some point in time or probability of gaining employment in a 
given interval. I concentrate on the (re)employment probability within one year of 
entering the program. Such an outcome allows to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
entire program not distinguishing among different types of treatm ent. Treatm ent is 
here understood as a combination of job search assistance, training, subsidies and 
some work experience (voluntary sector or environmental services).
As standard in the evaluation literature the problem reduces to tha t of missing 
outcome (Heckman et al., 1999; Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000). A given individual 
cannot be in two different states at the same time. He/she is either in the program 
or out of it. Therefore I have to identify a suitable missing counterfactual. In a non 
experimental study exercise, such a problem is exacerbated due to the nonexistence 
of an administered control group and in the specific case due to the global implemen­
tation of the program: everyone in the UK who is younger than 25 after 6 months 
in open unemployment is mechanically pushed through the program. The approach 
(Section, 2.3) followed in this Chapter is th a t of a Regression Discontinuity (RD) 
design since it seems to be rather appropriate given the sharp eligibility rule (six 
months of JSA, plus younger than 25). The intuition behind such an approach is 
tha t participation changes according to a known deterministic function at a discon­
tinuity point. Unemployed slightly younger than 25 are in, while those slightly older
7are out. There are not other differences, apart from the treatm ent status, between 
treated and untreated in the neighborhood of the discontinuity. This gives rise to a 
natural comparison, nonparametrically recovering a Local Average Treatm ent Effect 
parameter (LATE), i.e. the effect of the policy for those near the cut-off point, under 
a very weak continuity assumption.3
Consistently with the non parametric identification strategy, the estimation (Sec­
tion, 2.5) is implemented by Local Linear Regression (LLR) known to have desirable 
boundary properties (Fan, 1992; Porter, 2003). I am ultimately estimating at a 
boundary point, where the size of the discontinuity is the param eter of interest. 
The difference between the two conditional mean functions from both sides of the 
discontinuity will recover the LATE.
There is convincing evidence (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) tha t individuals who were born 
only few days apart one another are fundamentally identical, and would have had 
the same performance in the labor market had the program not existed (Figure 2.5).
The appealing feature of the RD design, in this work, is tha t it allows comparing 
similar individuals who only differ slightly in their date of birth. However, the 
high comparability on the one hand permits to relax the identification strategy and 
on the other hand might raise concerns on the possible substitutability of those 
individuals, i.e. participants could displace controls. If it is the case tha t participants 
do substitute controls the SUTVA would be violated and the param eter estimated 
would not recover the causal effect of the program, but rather an upward biased 
estimate of it as in equation 2.3. A considerable part of the essay is devoted to the 
analysis of possible indirect effects as the substitution bias (Section 2.3 and 2.8) and 
no evidence of possible substitution effects is found (Section 2.7).
3Non-treatment potential outcom e to be continuous at the cut-off point.
In the large class of indirect effects one could consider standard General Equi­
librium (GE) effects of a policy, i.e. the effective labor supply could increase (par­
ticipants really look for a job) easing the wage pressure and therefore delivering a 
lower equilibrium wage and as a consequence an increase in overall employment. 
However, such phenomenon requires a rise in the overall labor supply. Although 
the NDYP is a policy of global implementation, the number of individuals involved 
relative to the active male population does not seem capable of initiating im portant 
GE mechanisms (Figures 2.12 and 2.13). For the particular parameter estim ated the 
GE effect mentioned should not be relevant given tha t for those individuals at the 
margin between participation and non-participation the possible rise in employment 
should be symmetric. Furthermore, given the cohort specific approach, I am able to 
add evidence on negligible GE effects; the GE mechanisms should kick in the more 
individuals are involved overtime, however the point estimates (Table 2.5) do not 
support the claim of relevant GE effects since they are quite stable overtime though 
the number of individuals involved changes.
The main result is th a t the combination of treatm ents offered in the NDYP en­
hances the (re)employment probability by 5%, at least in the neighborhood of the 
cut-off point. The effect lasts over several cohorts of new dealers even after 5 years 
from its launch. Further, no evidence of displacement as well as general equilibrium 
effects is found.
Having analyzed the program as a whole in terms of its effectiveness in enhancing 
employment chances for young unemployed, and discussed possible spillovers of the 
policy in such context, it seems natural to extend the analysis in order to shed some 
light on the impacts of the different treatm ents offered as well as on the quality of 
the jobs gained by the participants. Such task is accomplished in chapter III. The
9NDYP is a prototypical example of a multiple treatm ent program. It combines, at 
different stages, job search assistance, training/education, subsidies and reinstate­
ment in the labor force through governmental or voluntary sector jobs (Section 3.2). 
Such particular framework has been employed in several labor market programs (see 
Katz, 1998; Sianesi, 2001 and 2004; Frolich, 2004). It is widely acknowledged tha t 
Active Labor Market Policies (ALMPs) have to be flexible and capable of improving 
employability. However, it remains an open issue whether different treatm ents are 
generally beneficial or only some of them are, while others are a pure burden to the 
system. Chapter III addresses the following questions: are the different treatm ents 
offered by the NDYP equally valuable in terms of returns? Or it is rather the case 
that a particular option is delivering a higher return in terms of wage once the treated 
is out of the program? It is crucial to understand how to shape a successful ALMP 
given the government budget constraint and the limited availability of resources. On 
the other hand given the heterogeneity in the nature of the unemployed population 
a certain degree of flexibility is necessary in order to give a valuable treatm ent to the 
particular individual.
There is some evidence th a t the subsidy to employment is the ‘s ta r’ option of 
the NDYP with respect to enhancing the (re)employment probability of participants 
(Dorsett, 2006) however there isn’t any available study th a t looks into job quality 
and namely wages. The mere employment is not per se an indicator of the success 
of a program, especially when there might be concerns over the quality of jobs. In 
the particular case the star option could be successful in getting unemployed out 
of dole, but the point is: are these jobs worthwhile? A subsidy to employment is 
relevant when the productivity of the worker is possibly below his/her cost. How­
ever, such subsidy cannot last forever. If the subsidy takers who found a job are
10
of lower quality than the average in the population then this should be reflected in 
their salary once a regular job is found. On the other hand it is also possible tha t 
the subsidy is wrongly signalling to the market the type of the agent and there­
fore such lower wage should disappear once the employer learns about the quality 
of the participant; unfortunately it is not possible with the available da ta  to test 
such hypothesis. Since option assignment cannot be considered a random process a 
convincing identification strategy has to be devised if one wants to infer the causal 
impact of the different options on regular wages. In principle the assignment pro­
cess should have been a joint decision between the caseworker and the participant. 
However, this was not the case for two main reasons: firstly, certain options were 
simply not available in certain areas, i.e. some local units of delivery did not have 
the possibility of placing a participant in the environmental task force, while others 
did not have voluntary sectors job available and so on (rationing). Secondly, there 
is a clear pattern of preference for a particular treatm ent in certain units, this might 
depend on the fact that placing someone in a subsidized job is simply more expen­
sive than sending someone to school, both in terms of effort to be exerted by the 
caseworker and monetary cost (costs). There is a large variation in option take-up 
across different UoD’s substantiated by anecdotal and formal evidence later in the 
paper (Section IDENTIFICATION). Such variation remains even when a number of 
confounding factors are partialled out. Furthermore, there is evidence of non-random 
option allocations in Table 3.2. It is clear how better quality participants were as­
signed to the subsidized employment option. In fact, they are significantly better 
in terms of schooling, ability (reading/m ath problems), work history (although they 
have surprisingly longer unemployment) than their counterpart who engaged in an 
extended job search treatm ent. If one where to take option assignment as a random
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process and consequently estimate the option effects through a simple OLS, the re­
sults would be that the average effect of a subsidized placement is not distinguishable 
form an extended search period. However, when non-random selection both at the 
options stage and in the employment node is taken into account a dramatically dif­
ferent picture emerges. IV estimates clearly point towards a negative and significant 
penalty of roughly 20%. Such results is in line with earlier findings on subsidized 
employment by Katz (1996). The intuition for a negative return is th a t of a stigma 
effect attached to those participants who got a subsidy in order to be employable. 
It seems therefore that the specific option is rather signalling to the market (might 
be wrongly) the low productivity type. It might also be tha t such option forces 
unemployed into low wage jobs or jobs tha t are not particularly suited for the given 
unemployed altering then the matching process. Unfortunately, I could not test the 
hypothesis of a temporary effects given the available data.
The third essay analyzes the indirect effects of PROGRESA, a public aid policy 
implemented in poor rural villages in Mexico. It sheds light on the relevant mech­
anisms generating such externalities; those mechanisms might not only be limited 
to the specific policy, they might be relevant in a number of other contexts where 
certain conditions apply as detailed later.
Policy interventions in developing countries are likely to affect all residents of 
the areas where they are implemented, especially when village economies and social 
networks create strong links between a limited number of households. The unique 
randomized design of PROGRESA is exploited to estimate its indirect effect on con­
sumption for non-eligible households who live in treatm ent areas, and to understand 
the mechanisms through which this indirect effect occurs. Liquidity injections into 
small rural communities increase the consumption of the non-treated through changes
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in the credit and insurance markets. Thus, the total effect of the policy is larger than 
its effect on the treated. Further, the results confirm tha t a key identifying assump­
tion - that the program has no effect on non-treated individuals (SUTVA)- is likely 
to be violated in similar policy designs.
Conditional cash transfers are a popular type of aid program, which provides 
monetary transfers to eligible recipients, provided they send their children to school, 
attend nutrition classes, and have periodic health checks. Programs with this format 
are currently implemented in numerous countries, including Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Nicaragua. There are talks of 
implementing similar programs in Cina and New York City as well.4
The design of the experimental trial and the data  collected for the evaluation have 
some unique features. First, the randomization was implemented at the village level. 
Second, program administrators collected data  on all households, both poor and non­
poor, although only poor households were eligible for the treatm ent. Thus, we have 
information on four groups: poor and non-poor households in treatm ent and control 
villages. Non-poor households in control villages provide a valid counterfactual for 
the non-poor in treatment ones.
We focus on consumption because it provides an indicator of household well-being. 
We find that there is a positive, significant, ad sizeable indirect program effect on 
consumption for non-eligible families. Further, we study the mechanisms th a t lead 
to this increase in consumption. For example, the implementation of PROGRESA 
may modify labor supply, altering equilibrium wages, or it may increase goods prices 
through higher demand. We find tha t there are no significant indirect effects on 
labor earnings, prices (with the exception of increases in few food items in 1998),
4See recent article (October 9, 2006) by Bob Herbert in the New York Times: Cash with a Catch,
http://top ics.nytim es.com /top/opin ion/ed itorialsandoped/oped/colum nists/bobherbert/index.htm l78qa.
and welfare receipt, and th a t sales of agricultural products decrease. Therefore, we 
rule out the hypothesis tha t the indirect program effect on consumption is generated 
by an increase in current income. Instead, we show tha t non-poor households in 
treatm ent villages consume more by receiving more transfers, by borrowing more 
money - almost exclusively from family, friends, or informal moneylenders - and by 
reducing their stocks of grains and animals. In addition, we show th a t the indirect 
program effects on consumption and loans are larger for households hit by a negative 
idiosyncratic shock. Thus, we conclude th a t cash transfers in treatm ent villages indi­
rectly benefit non-treated households by improving consumption smoothing. These 
results correspond to our knowledge of developing countries, where credit and in­
surance occur through informal networks of family, friends, and neighbors. Positive 
income shocks to some households benefit the whole network, whose other members 
receive larger loans and transfers, especially the ones hit by negative shocks. The 
availability of additional liquidity in the network enables households to reduce their 
savings.
While it is often difficult to predict the effects of a nationwide program using data  
from limited geographic areas, the effects on the credit and insurance market should 
not be a function of the number of treated villages, as long as social networks are 
village-specific.
It is possible to learn from this exercise th a t when the distance (economic, social or 
geographic) between treatm ent and control group is small, and when the treatm ent 
group is a large fraction of the local economy, the SUTVA may be less likely to hold.
In sum, the essay contributes to different literatures: i. consumption smoothing 
and credit and insurance markets in low-income economies. W here the main refer­
ences in the risk-sharing literature are the work of Deaton (1991), Townsend (1994,
1995a, 1995b), Udry (1994, 1995), Banerjee et al. (2003), and Banerjee (2004), 
among others, ii. The essay contributes to the program evaluation literature in 
multiple ways: first, it shows tha t a class of widely implemented aid policies has im­
portant positive externalities; second, a substantial attem pt is made to extrapolate 
the indirect effects of a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in the credit 
and insurance market. Third, the essay provides an example of the failure of the 
SUTVA, which is usually non-testable.
CHAPTER II
Long-Term Effects o f a M andatory M ultistage Policy: 
the New  Deal for Young People in the UK
2.1 Introduction
In the past fifteen years there has been a growing interest both in Europe and the 
US on active labor market policies (ALMPs). Many European countries have expe­
rienced a vast array of policies addressed to fostering human capital, search intensity 
and job attachment. In Sweden (Sianesi, 2004) a series of policies, contemplating 
all the above features, were implemented in response to the deep crisis of the begin­
ning of the 1990s. In Switzerland (Gerfin and Lechner, 2000) there are examples of 
subsidized employment and job creation schemes. The US experience on ALM P’s is 
also vast. Hotz et al. (2000) in revising the influential GAIN program in California 
shed some light on the effectiveness of human capital accumulation and job first ap­
proach in a long term perspective. O ther US evidence focuses on subsidies to those 
unemployed who move out of welfare as the EITC (see Eissa and Liebman, 1996; or 
the survey of different subsidies to employment by Katz, 1998). O ther policies, such 
as the JTPA, focus on the improvement of human capital; the work of Bloom et al. 
(1997) provides evidence on the effectiveness of classroom and on-the-job training as 
well as of job search assistance. Nonetheless, despite the large amount of work on 
ALMPs there is still no consensus on whether such policies help youths to get out of
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welfare and back to work (Heckman et al., 1999). Furthermore, it is not clear which 
one of the above mentioned approaches is the most successful.
In the UK, the newly elected Labor government launched in January 1998 the 
New Deal initiative, of which the New Deal for Young People (NDYP) is the largest 
component: so far it has involved over 1 million youths at a total cost of more than 2 
billion British pounds (about 3.6 billion USD). The NDYP was initiated in selected 
areas (Pilot Period) and extended to the entire UK by April 1998 (National Roll- 
Out). The policy is targeted at 18 to 24 year old unemployed who have been receiving 
Job Seeker Allowance (JSA) for at least 6 m onths1. It is a mandatory program in all 
its components imposing a significant sanction to non compliers: the withdrawal, at 
least temporarily, of the unemployment benefit. The design of the program (Figure 
3.1) illustrates how the policy was conceived to be flexible enough for tackling specific 
difficulties in getting a job. In the NDYP design (Section 2.2) individuals should have 
been in principle screened and helped according to the particular needs. The option 
period should have accomplished this duty, e.g. training and education supposedly 
devoted to those youths who were lacking basic skills.
An earlier paper by Blundell et al. (2004) covers the initial launch of the program 
and focuses on the job search assistance component of the policy, while I analyze 
the multiple treatments offered as a whole. Here treatm ent is understood as the 
combination of job search assistance, education and training, subsidized employment 
as well as job experience through voluntary sector or governmental (environmental 
task force) placements. The main question addressed in this work is whether the 
combination of the treatm ents above is effective in getting young unemployed back 
to work. Therefore I focus on the (re)employment impact of the NDYP within 12
D S A  is basically the only unemployment insurance in the UK, available to  anyone who is able to  work, ie. no 
previous employment history is required. Prior to the introduction of the New Deal there were no stringent conditions 
applied in order to receive it in principle indefinitely.
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months since entering the program. The analysis is developed for males, the large 
majority of participants (75%), and does not cover the Pilot period2. Blundell et 
al. (2004) found a positive and significant impact of the job search component of 
the policy: the scheme enhanced the (re)employment chance of participant males by 
10% for the Pilot group while such estimate halved to 5% for the first months of 
the National Roll-Out. The decaying effect could suggest a significant introductory 
effect due to vanish over time. Therefore I consider 5 different cohorts of 9 months 
each, defined according to the date of entry in the NDYP, spanning from April 1998 
to December 2001.
The eligibility rules informing the program show a clear discontinuity in the par­
ticipation function: only those unemployed younger than 25 by the time they reach 
the sixth month of JSA claim are eligible and treated3. The “sharp” discontinuity 
(Hahn et al., 2001) is exploited for identification of a meaningful policy param eter 
under very weak assumptions (see Section 2.3). It is possible, by comparing unem­
ployed arbitrarily close to the discontinuity point, to  (non-parametrically) identify 
the causal impact of the program for at least those individuals in the neighborhood 
of the cut-off point4.
The intuition behind the identification strategy in the RD design is pretty sim­
ple: since treatment changes discontinuously at a threshold, as a step function of a 
continuous underlying variable (age), the only difference between those unemployed 
marginally below or above the cut-off is the treatm ent status and therefore in the 
neighborhood of the discontinuity point assignment to treatm ent is almost random. 
There is convincing evidence (Tables 2.2 and 2.3) tha t individuals who were born
2The long-term nature of the outcom e considered would not allow a meaningful use of the initial Pilot.
3The program is mandatory in all its com ponents.
4The local parameter could be “the” parameter if the idea under scrutiny is that of extending the program 
marginally or if the interest lies exactly on that subgroup of unemployed. The local parameter extends to an average 
treatment effect under the assumption of constant treatm ent effect.
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only few days apart one another are fundamentally identical5, and would have had 
the same performance in the labor market had the program not existed (Figure 2.5).
The appealing feature of the RD design, in this work, is tha t it allows comparing 
similar individuals who only differ slightly in their date of birth. However, the high 
comparability on the one hand permits to relax the identification strategy and on the 
other hand might raise concerns on the possible substitutability of those individuals, 
ie. treated could displace controls. If it is the case tha t participants do substitute 
controls the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), as defined in Rubin 
(1980 and 1986), would be violated and the param eter estimated would not recover 
the causal effect of the program, but rather an upward biased estimate of it as in 
equation 2.3. A consistent part of the paper is therefore devoted to the analysis of 
the substitution bias (Section 2.3 and 2.8) and no evidence of possible substitution 
effects is found (Section 2.7).
Often neglected in the program evaluation literature is the discussion on possible 
General Equilibrium (GE) effects of a policy6, eg. the effective labor supply could 
increase (participants really look for a job) easing the wage pressure and therefore 
delivering a lower equilibrium wage and as a consequence an increase in employment. 
However, such phenomenon requires a rise in the overall labor supply. Although 
the NDYP is a policy of global implementation, the number of individuals involved 
relative to the active male population does not seem capable of initiating im portant 
GE mechanisms (Figures 2.12 and 2.13). For the particular param eter estimated the 
GE effect mentioned should not be relevant given th a t for those individuals at the 
margin between participation and non-participation the possible rise in employment
5As we will see later there are a large number of observations close to the cut-off point. The above statem ent has 
to be considered in an average sense.
6There are few exceptions as the dynamic GE model proposed in Heckman et al. (1998) or to somewhat a lesser 
extent the recent work by Lise et al. (2005) or on a different approach Angelucci and De Giorgi (2005).
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should be symmetric. Furthermore, given the cohort specific approach, I am able to 
add evidence on negligible GE effects; the GE mechanisms should kick in the more 
individuals are involved overtime, however the point estimates (Table 2.5) do not 
support the claim of relevant GE effects since they are quite stable overtime7 though 
the number of individuals involved changes.
The main result is tha t the combination of treatm ents offered in the NDYP en­
hances the (re)employment probability by 5%, at least in the neighborhood of the 
cut-off point. The effect lasts over several cohorts of new dealers even after 5 years 
from its launch.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2.2 describes various features 
of the program; Section 2.3 covers the identification strategy adopted; 2.4 carefully 
describes the data used; 2.5 describes the estimation strategy; 2.6 provides some 
montecarlo evidence on the performance of the estimator; 2.7 presents the results; 
2.8 addresses the substitution puzzle and 2.9 concludes.
2.2 The Program
As from Figure 3.1 the NDYP is a sequential program, where different treatm ents 
are offered to the participants. Following a period of 6 months8 in open unem­
ployment 18 to 24 year olds (JSA recipients) are automatically transferred into the 
program in order to be still eligible for the benefit. It is therefore a m andatory 
policy administered to everyone in the UK who, after 6 months of unemployment, 
are aged between 18 and 24. The age composition of the participants (Figure 2.3) 
is fairly uniform between the established age bracket9; job seekers with a t least 6
7But for the last one.
8Only a very small number of unemployed, not included in the analysis, can access the program earlier than the 
sixth month. This particular group is com posed by ex-offenders, disable and unemployed lacking very basic skills 
(writing and reading difficulties).
9The age distribution of participants is constructed from administrative data (N D ED ) containing virtually all 
participants (Section 4.2), 18 year old unemployed included in the figure are however excluded from the empirical
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months of unemployment history are placed in the program even shortly before their 
twenty-fifth birthday. During the open unemployment period there are not strict 
requirements imposed on the job seeker. However, at the sixth month deadline, it 
is not possible to avoid program participation and still receive the unemployment 
benefit. For the group of unemployed considered in this work, i.e. young males, 
the opportunity cost of loosing the JSA is rather high, given tha t this is the main 
available subsidy10.
The first four months of treatm ent (Gateway period) are nominally11 devoted 
to intensive job search assistance and some basic skill training, eg. CV writing. 
Participants are obliged to meet a personal mentor once every two weeks and they 
have to report and prove the actions taken in order to gain employment. Such actions 
typically consist of job applications, direct contact between possible employers and 
caseworker. Failure to comply with any of the program requirements may result in 
a benefit sanction and eventually the withdrawal of it.
While in the gateway participants receive a benefit equal to the JSA (about 40 
British pounds12 per week). If a regular job is not found during the gateway, a 
second phase follows: the options. On the basis of personal considerations, given 
individual characteristics, the caseworker agrees with the participant on the option 
to be taken13. The option period can last from 6 to 12 (full time training or educa­
tion) months and is compulsory, ie. participants can not refuse to enter an option. 
Common practice among units of delivery was to try  placing the unemployed in a 
subsidized job during the second month of treatm ent. In case of a subsidized place­
analysis given that they might still be in high-school.
10There sire some forms of social assistance, whose relevance is however not comparable with the JSA.
11 Nevertheless, in the data, some individuals enter an option during the gateway period. The first guidelines given 
by the government stated clearly that one could exit the gateway period only toward a regular job. Later, they were 
adjusted according to the de facto  behavior.
12Roughly 74 USD.
13This is not always the case since certain units of delivery tend to “favor” a particular option.
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ment (at least a 30 hours per week job), the treated receives the salary paid by the 
employer who gets, for a maximum of 6 months, a subsidy of 60 British pounds 
(about 110 USD) per week plus 750 British pounds (about 1400 USD) as a one-off 
payment for the compulsory (minimum) one day a week training to be provided14. 
The second option, education or training, is targeted at youths lacking basic skills 
and it can last up to 12 months. While attending such courses the unemployed still 
receives his JSA payment. Typically a program participant attends the local college 
and, in most cases, there is no distinction between a vocational course attended by 
a treated or anyone else in the community.
A third option is tha t of a voluntary sector job where the participant receives 
an amount at least identical to the JSA plus 400 British pounds (about 740 USD) 
spread over the 6 months. A typical placement would be shop assistant in a charity 
shop.
The same monetary treatm ent is granted in the fourth option: Environmental 
Task Force, basically a governmental job, meant to be the last possible placement. 
A participant would typically be involved in the maintenance of public parks.
Participants are allocated to these last two options in the third and fourth month 
of the gateway.
Eventually a third phase follows: the follow-through, essentially maximum of 13 
weeks similar to the initial gateway. It consists of intensive job search as well as 
training courses to maintain the skills acquired during the option period.
14Such subsidy seems quite generous when compared to the sort of hourly rate (close to the minimum wage 4.5 
British pounds or 8 USD) a typical participant would get. In a crude com putation, the weekly subsidy plus the  
one-off payment would amount to about 50% of a weekly pay for a minimum wage worker, however the 750 British  
pounds would have to repay for the loss of production due to  the minimum of one day training. Under very simple 
assumptions (perfectly com petitive markets) those 750 British pounds would not be enough to com pensate for that 
loss. In fact, taking the latter into account the subsidy would not be greater than 30%, but still generous though. 
However, job turnover could be itself quite costly making such an option not as appealing as it looks like at a first 
glance. This point seems to be confirmed by the low take up rate in the data, only a sixth of those entering an option  
would go for the subsidized job.
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The program was launched in January 1998 in selected areas (pilot period) and 
then extended to the rest of the nation in April of tha t year (national roll-out). 
About 1 million young britons have been involved since the beginning to December 
2003, of which roughly 75% are males.
As mentioned earlier the aim of this work is to quantify the long run impact of 
the program in terms of (re)employment probability. The outcome of interest is 
defined as a treatm ent effect in the “Black box” (the shaded area in Figure 3.1). 
This is because I do not distinguish among different stages of the program (gateway 
or options), but I concentrate on the program effect as a whole. Therefore, the focus 
is on the (re)employment probability within 12 months since entering the program 
(or 18 months since claiming JSA given at least 6 months of unemployment). The 
choice of such an outcome is determined by the interest in the causal impact of the 
whole program15 and its long run effects. While Blundell et al. (2004) focused on 
the effect of job search assistance during the first year of the policy implementation. 
The 12 months limit arises from the fact tha t the control group I exploit is forced in 
a similar program (New Deal for Long Term Unemployed) after 18 months of open 
unemployment16. The latter would make a comparison on a longer time interval 
misleading.
Another important aspect to notice is th a t the program is one of global imple­
mentation and therefore there could be concerns about possible general equilibrium 
effects, dictated by the increase in the overall labor supply, denied by a partial equi­
librium approach. However, if such effects are relevant they should be increasingly 
so as the program broadens and involves more and more individuals. I tackle this
15The vast majority (about 90%) of participants would have completed their first option by the twelfth months.
16Possible anticipation effects have been investigated for the controls and based on the results o f a before/after  
the program comparison of the first 18 m onths of unemployment, I could not find evidence of such behavior in the 
control group. The strategy followed for testing such hypothesis is the same followed for the treated individuals as 
from Figures 2.8 and 2.9. Results are available on request.
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issue relying upon a cohort specific approach, namely I analyze the impact of the 
program for 5 evenly spaced cohorts (of three quarters each) entering the program 
from April 1998 to December 200117. An initial test of the importance of general 
equilibrium effects is given by the simple time path of the program impacts. On 
the other hand I have also to consider possible substitution effects, if 18-24 year old 
are good substitute for 25-30 then we should see the former replacing the la tter and 
therefore the program effect would be amplified by the substitution effect. I approach 
this potential source of bias by looking at treated and controls before and after the 
program (Sections 2.3 and 2.8).
2.3 Identification Strategy
As explained in the previous sections, participation in the program is compulsory 
and established by a deterministic rule: 6 months of JSA plus younger than  25. It 
is not possible to remain in open unemployment further than 6 months and still 
receive the benefit. While no one who is older than 24 is allowed in as from Figure 
2.3. At the completion of the sixth month of unemployment the eligible job seeker is 
automatically transferred in the program. This gives an immediate comparison group 
or a so called “sharp” Regression Discontinuity (RD) design (Hahn et al., 2001) where 
the discontinuity in the treatm ent is given by the age rule informing the program 18. 
The RD design was introduced in the evaluation literature by Thistlethwaite and 
Campbell (1960), who analyzed the effect of student scholarships on later career 
and has been recently employed in Hahn et al. (1999) in the study of financial
17This limit is imposed by the available data.
18Provided that the individual behavior does not change due to the existence of the program, ie. this rules out any 
anticipatory effects. This issue is analyzed in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 where the non-parametric survival probabilities are 
plotted for potentially eligibles before and after the start of the program. As evident from those figures they cannot 
be consistent with anticipatory behaviors o f any relevance. The exit rates from JSA are not different for potential 
participants after the program began. Formal tests on the equality of the survival functions cannot reject the null 
at conventional significance levels.
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aid on college attendance and in DiNardo and Lee (2004) to identify the effect of 
unionization on several firm’s outcome: business survival, productivity, wages, etc. 
The RD approach is a quasi-experimental design where the known discontinuity is 
exploited for identification. If we believe th a t unemployed in the neighborhood of 
25 years of age are pretty similar in their characteristics (Tables, 2.2 and 2.3), both 
observable and unobservable, we can safely assume tha t without the program they 
will perform the same in the labor market (Figure 2.5). This allows to identify the 
effect of the program at least for those near the discontinuity under a local continuity 
assumption.
In a very simple chart the treatm ent function in a “sharp” RD design would look 
something like Figure 2.2, where below the threshold the probability of treatm ent is 
equal to 1 and above is exactly 0. In the specific case of the NDYP the sharp design 
is guaranteed by the m andatory nature of the program.
The advantage of such a method relies on the minimal set of assumptions required 
for the identification of a local param eter19.
Formally, let D  be the program participation status: D  =  1 for participants, 
D = 0 for non-participants. Y ^ Y 0 be two potential outcomes, resulting from 
participation/non-participation respectively and Y =  Y°  D ( Y 1 — Y°) the observed 
outcome. The impact from participation is defined as (3 =  Y 1 — Y°. The eligibility 
rule D = 1(A < a) is a known deterministic step function of A  (age, continuous) and 
steps from 1 to 0 at a (25 years).
Taking the mean outcome difference for those marginally below (a- ) and above
19The local parameter can be on its own right an interesting parameter or even ‘the’ parameter of interest if the 
idea under scrutiny is that of extending the program marginally or to capture the effect of the program on the  
particular subgroup. Obviously it does not translate into an ATE unless constant treatment effect is assumed or 
under some particular sm oothness conditions. It is also worth noticing that the parameter identified in the current 
context is not the same as the LATE defined by Angrist and Imbens (1994), their parameter is analogous to the one 
presented by Hahn et al. (2001) in the case of a fuzzy design.
25
(a+) the threshold a:
(2.1) E[Y\a~] -  E[Y\a+} = E[Y°\a~} -  E[Y°\a+] +  E[D(3\a~] -  E[D(3\a+]
' -------------y, ^
= 0  by design
ASSUMPTION(l): £ [y°|A ] continuous at a. Then the mean program effect on the 
treated20
(2.2) E[P\a~] = E[Y\a~} -  E[Y\a+}
is identified in the neighborhood of the threshold a.
However, I might observe Y 2 (non treated outcome) instead of Y°  (non program 
outcome) since there might be substitution effects21, treated might substitute controls 
at the threshold because they might be “cheaper” .
Replacing Y 2 to Y°  in the observed outcome and proceeding as before, instead of
(2.2), by adding and subtracting the same quantity (ASSUMPTION (1)), I get:
(2.3) E[Y\a~] -  E[Y\a+} = E [ Y V " ]  -  E[Y°\a~] +  £ ( y ° |a +) -  E ( Y 2\a+)
 ^ s,  ^ V v /
E[f3\a~] S B
Where E[(3\a~] is the param eter of interest and S B  the substitution bias. The 
substitution bias is potentially im portant if the subsidized employment option has 
a large take-up and if treated are effectively cheaper than controls. However, I can 
provide some evidence on the absence of any substitution bias.
By considering a cohort approach. Let me rewrite (2.3) as:
E (Y \a - , c )  -  E{Y \a+, c) =  E { Y l \a~, c) -  E{Y°\a~,c)  +  E (Y° \a+, c) -  E ( Y 2\a+, c)
20If the interest is on the average treatm ent effect in the neighborhood of the discontinuity, assumption (1) has to  
be extended to: J5[y*|y4] for i =  0 ,1  continuous at a.
211 left aside the discussion on possible general equilibrium effects because for the parameter I am identifying those 
effects should not be relevant. In the neighborhood of the discontinuity, even if there is an increase in the effective 
labor supply (given the number of participants involved) easing the wage pressure and the equilibrium wage, such 
an effect should be common to treated and controls and therefore should roughly cancel out.
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where c is a cohort after the program. Let me rewrite E ( Y 2\a+, c) =  E(Y° \a+ , c) — 
S B  and assuming: ASSUMPTION(2a): E (Y ° \a+,c) =  E(Y° \a+, d)  where d  is a 
cohort before the program. If E(Y° \a+ ,d )  = E ( Y 2\a+, c) —> S B  = 0. And E[j3\a~) 
is identified22.
It remains to justify why cohort d  is not affected by substitution. There are a 
number of reasons why this might be the case. Cohort d  is obviously taken before the 
program started, the last cohort prior to the program will be the most similar to the 
one after the program given the economic environment. However, since the outcome 
I am considering spans over a year after the 6 months of unemployment, d  could in 
principle compete with cohort c and some of the others. In fact, substitution happens 
in the first 4 months of treatm ent, through subsidized placement, among similar 
individuals, if treated are cheaper than non treated, but for these two cohorts there 
are not similar individuals, since those in cohort d  have a different unemployment 
duration then those in cohort c when they are supposed to compete for the same job.
2.4 Data
A ready made dataset does not exists for the purposes of this work. However, it is 
still possible to recover most of the information needed by combining an adm inistra­
tive dataset (New Deal Evaluation Database, NDED) purposely built and containing 
virtually all participants, and the publicly available 5% longitudinal sample of UK 
unemployed (JUVOS). In the latter, it is possible to identify treated and control 
groups referring to the eligibility rule. Only unemployed aged between 18 and 24 
who have received JSA for 6 months constitute the eligible and treated, given the 
compulsory nature of the policy, population. The JUVOS data  contain the exact
22It might be argued that substitution could happen as well as a result of the other treatm ents and not only 
because of the subsidy, however it might be the case that enhanced job search and the other options improve the 
matching function by filling in the vacancies more efficiently without negative effects on controls.
date of birth, geographical region of residence, starting and end date of JSA spell, 
gender, usual and sought occupation and destination on exit from JSA, but has no 
information after the end of the JSA spell23. The sample selected for the analysis 
only includes job seekers with an unemployment spell of at least 6 months. Since 
August 1996 the JUVOS data  contain a detailed series of exit categories recorded 
for those who ceased the JSA claim: found a job, other benefit, retired, prison, a t­
tending court and education and training. The last two exits are in fact one of the 
option of the NDYP while no equivalent exists for the control group, at least in the 
time interval considered. The controls who exit JSA for such destinations are almost 
certainly involved in small scale programs or simply decided on their own to acquire 
some training or education. In fact, such exit has less than half of the relevance for 
controls compared to treated.
Given the presence of such exit categories and the structure of the JUVOS data  
I would not know whether an unemployed (whose reason for ending the JSA spell is 
training or education) will find a job within the relevant period. Therefore, for such 
observations I have to complement the JUVOS data  with the adm inistrative data  
set (NDED). The NDED contains a number of extremely detailed information on 
participants, i.e. date of entry and term ination of New Deal spell, date of birth, region 
of residence, unit of delivery, type of actions taken to find a job, number of letters sent 
to potential employers, option attended, status after ending the treatm ent, reasons 
for leaving the New Deal and so on. From the NDED, I can recover the exact24 exit 
rates to employment for participants (in the particular period of interest). Therefore 
by using this complementary information, I can input such exit rates for the treated in 
the JUVOS data. An example might be helpful in clarifying this point, suppose some
23 All the information on dates are recorded at maximum level of precision, i.e. d ay/m o nth/year.
24As mentioned the NDED records information on all participants.
treated (identified in the JUVOS data) end their JSA spell to improve their education 
or attend some training (education/training option) I would not know, from JUVOS 
only, whether they found a job within a year since entering the program. However, 
I can get such information from the NDED, where I know exactly how many of 
them actually found a job in such a time interval and I can therefore input such 
information to the JUVOS data. Unfortunately, such a complementary information 
is not available for the control group, no controls are included in the NDED, however I 
can still define three different estimates of the param eter of interest by hypothesizing 
three alternative scenarios:
1. symmetric exit rates by age and cohorts for treated and controls;
2. all controls, who enrol in a training/education program, get a job in the time 
horizon considered;
3. none of the controls who attended some education/training course gets a regular 
job by the time interval of interest.
These strategies will allow to define a best estimate, a lower and an upper bound 
respectively. The best estimate scenario could be itself a sort of lower bound given 
tha t the type of courses attended by treated and controls are basically the same. In 
fact those individuals might seat in the same class, most of the vocational courses 
are provided by local colleges and are not differentiated depending on whether an 
individual is participating in the new deal or not. However, treated individuals 
are obliged to look for a regular job while attending training/education, the same 
is not true for controls. Therefore assuming identical exit rates for treated and 
control might produce a lower bound for the param eter estimated. It is likely tha t 
new dealers have a higher chance of getting an employment given the requirements
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imposed on the education and training option. For similar reasons the scenario 
classified as lower bound it is an extreme one. It is highly unlikely th a t otherwise 
identical individuals (those for which the param eter is defined) would have such 
different exit rates from very similar vocational courses, especially if one considers 
the further condition of actively looking for a job imposed by the program on the 
treated. On the same line the upper bound is an extreme in the other direction.
In order to avoid the inclusion of high-school kids 18 year olds are discarded 
from the analysis. I define five (post-program) even cohorts, according to  the date 
of entry in the program, spanning from April 1998 to December 2001 (Table, 2.1). 
Each cohort counts at least three thousands observations and coherently with the 
RD design there is an almost identical number of treated and controls in each one. 
As written earlier the key of the identification relies on the discontinuity in the 
participation rule and on the a-priori belief tha t in the neighborhood of such point 
unemployed are almost identical but for the treatm ent status. Such belief can be 
confirmed by looking at the occupational (usual and sought) distribution in the 
proximity of the discontinuity (Tables, 2.2 and 2.3). There is a clear pattern  of 
convergence in those occupational distributions: the closer to the 25 years of age the 
more similar they are.
As far as the pre-program analysis is concerned only one cohort is available due 
to the fact tha t prior to August 1996 the exit categories were not recorded a t the 
same level of precision.
2.5 Estimation
The estimation of the param eter of interest is performed non-parametrically by 
Local Linear Regression (LLR)25. The LLR method consists in running several lo­
25Fan, (1992).
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cal linear weighted regressions where the weights are assigned according to a kernel 
function (satisfying some regularity conditions) and a bandwidth. In general, obser­
vations close to the estimation point are given larger weights while decreasing weights 
are assigned to those further away. The estimation in an RD design boils down to 
estimating at a boundary point, where y~ and y+ are estimated using observations 
from the left and right of the discontinuity respectively. The estimate of y~ is given 
by a  :
(a,/?) =  argmina>f3y~](yi -  a -  P(a{ -  a))2K  ^  H ai < a)-
Where K(.) is the Kernel function, h an appropriate bandwidth and a = 25. There­
fore in estimating y~ only observations to the left of the discontinuity are used. 
There are in principle other estimation methods, in the class of nonparam etric esti­
mators26, available for the exercise proposed in this work, ie. Kernel regressions or 
Wald estimator. However, it is a known result tha t constant kernel methods have 
poor boundary performances due to the lack of observations on one side of the bound­
ary. Such a problem could even be exacerbated in the current context, given th a t 
I would compound the bias from both sides of the discontinuity. The LLR method 
proposed attains the optimal convergence rate due to the local linear approximation 
(Porter, 2003) under fairly weak assumptions. A standard issue in nonparametric 
kernel or polynomial methods is th a t of choosing the “appropriate” bandwidth, or 
complexity of the model (Fan and Gjibels, (1996)), there is an obvious trade-off be­
tween bias and variance of the estimators in such context determined by the choice 
of the smoothing parameter. A too small bandwidth would cause an increase in the
26In an earlier work (De Giorgi, 2005) the estim ation is performed parametrically by OLS using flexible functional 
forms. In the same spirit is the work of DiNardo and Lee, 2004. However, as shown in Section 2.6, the bias arising 
from a particular parametric assumptions can be substantial.
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variance and might capture too much of the noise in the data, reducing the estimate 
to a simple interpolation of the data. On the other hand a large bandwidth would 
oversmooth the data, denying im portant features of the underlying data  generat­
ing process. Such issue is resolved here by a plugin method for LLR elaborated in 
Ruppert et al. (1995). The resulting bandwidths are reported in Table 2.6, and a 
sensitivity analysis is performed to ensure the robustness of the results obtained27. 
The simple montecarlo study (Section 2.6) provides support for the use of the plugin 
rule-of-thumb over the computationally far more expensive alternative direct plugin. 
The last estimation step reduces to applying the LLR to the left and right of the dis­
continuity and taking the difference of the two conditional mean functions estimated. 
Standard errors have been obtained by bootstrap (300 replications28) for each cohort 
and for the whole sample.
2.6 Montecarlo Study
In this section I implement a simple montecarlo study on the performance of 
the estimator employed in the paper by comparing it with some alternatives both 
parametric and non parametric. The size of the discontinuity to  be estim ated is given 
in the Table 2.4 as (3 while the data  generating process (dgp) is y = m(x)  +  (3D(x < 
.5) -I- e. Where x  ~  U[0,1], D — 1 if the condition between brackets is satisfied, 
e ~  iV(0, cr2) (ae given in Table 2.4).
The proposed estimator (/3j ^ )  is matched with a very close substitu te the
only difference between the two derives from the bandwidth selection criterion: while 
the former uses a direct rule-of-thumb, the latter relies on the direct plugin method
27All estim ations are also performed according to a direct plugin m ethod as in Rupert et al. (1995) and to  
hs =  \ .06an~  2, Silverman’s rule, and half and twice the bandwidth used. Naturally, the Silverman’s rule is not 
suited for the LLR but it has been used only for a robustness check. The parameter estim ates vary very little 
whatever selection criterion is adopted. Com plete set of results is available from the author on request.
28The number of replications has been limited to  300 after few checks on the stability of the results. The estim ation  
process for the figures produced in Table 2.5 takes about two weeks on a powerful server.
32
both defined in Ruppert et al. (1995). Furthermore the performances of two simple
OLS estimators (/3lOLS) and (PqLS) are analyzed, the superscripts I and q stand for
a linear and quartic functional form in x  respectively. Finally, a Wald estimator
(0w) on 10% of data  around the discontinuity is also presented. Four different data
generating processes are employed, whose complexity in estimation is proxied by the 
2
noise to signal ratio
The study is based on 500 replications and performed for two different sample 
sizes (n = 1000,3000). The montecarlo evidence suggests a clear superiority of the 
proposed estimator in terms of precision with respect to the proposed Wald and OLS 
estimators29. While no ranking can be made between the two LLR estimators, they 
both perform quite well and are always close to the true parameter. Comparing 
the order of the bias involved in the use of the Wald estimator, as defined in the 
experiments, gives striking results: it goes from as little as 11% (first dgp, n = 1000) 
to an astonishing 400 times (second dgp, n = 3000).
The simple intuition on the quality of the point estimates obtained by LLR relies 
upon the locality of the latter. W hen the underlying function giving rise to  the 
discontinuity is still quite regular but characterized by a highly non linear behavior 
fitting a local constant in the proximity of the discontinuity, a straight line or a 
quartic polynomial on the whole sample is not a great idea. On the other hand, 
the decision to use a Wald estim ator on 10% of the observation in the neighborhood 
of the discontinuity is arbitrary, I could have proposed different candidates all of 
which would still be based on an arbitrary selection method. In this respect, the 
advantage of the LLR estim ator applied at the discontinuity point is due to the fact 
that the bandwidth is selected according to a consistent and objective criterion. It
29The comparison with the OLS on the entire sample is per se not that meaningful given the idea behind the RD  
design.
33
arises from the data  generating process itself and it is therefore more reliable and 
accountable than in the former case. The advantage of selecting the bandwidth 
through a direct rule-of-thumb with respect to a direct plugin method relies entirely 
on the computational burden involved in the latter while point estimates are fairly 
close as confirmed30 here.
2.7 Results
It is possible to summarize the results by referring to Table 2.5, where I present 
three sets of estimates named Best, Lower and Upper. As explained in Section 2.4 
the three different sets of estimates derive from the fact tha t I had to “construct” 
three alternative scenarios given the available data. It is possible to recover the exit 
rates to employment for those participants who went through the education and 
training option (about 35% of those who took an option or about 15% of to tal par­
ticipants) but for the lack of information on unemployed older than 25 who had left 
the JUVOS dataset for some training or education I have to rely on some assump­
tions. The “best” estimates assume exactly the same employment probability for 
treated and controls when the recorded exit from JUVOS is education and training. 
This could itself be a lower bound since treated should be expected to have a higher 
(re)employment chance from th a t option, given tha t they are supposed to actively 
look for a job as part of the policy and are subjected to some form of monitoring 
from the new deal adviser. Treated individuals who enter the training/education op­
tion most typically enrol in a vocational or academic course at the local college and 
attend the same classes as the rest of the students or apprentices. On this respect 
there is no difference in what participants and control learn. Therefore assuming an
30This result is consistent with the evidence presented in Ruppert et al. (1995). They also found the rule-of-thumb 
to  perform quite well in all their experiments.
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identical employment rate for treated and controls seems a conservative option.
The second scenario “lower” relies on the assumption tha t all controls, who a t­
tended some training/education course, found a job in the reference period. It there­
fore qualifies as an extreme lower bound. In the third scenario, “upper” , none of the 
controls found a job in the reference period, which seems to be an extreme in the 
other sense. The fact tha t the “best” estimate scenario is a conservative estimate of 
the true program effect allows concentrating on those estimates as the main results 
of the paper, while the lower bound guarantees tha t in no case there is significant 
negative impact of the policy. The estimated (re)employment probabilities are plot­
ted, for the “best” scenario case, in Figures 2.6 and 2.7; it is evident a clear jum p of 
those functions exactly at the cut-off point. Furthermore the shape of such condi­
tional means is fairly flat. It is im portant, as mentioned in DiNardo and Lee (2004), 
to check whether the jumps obtained by the proposed estimation strategy are true 
program effects or only arise from the particular nature of the estim ator proposed. 
All figures on pre and post program (re)employment probabilities contain a series of 
dots representing the mean outcome values by age (yearly averages), the pattern  of 
those dots provide support for the estimates produced. The jum ps only appear were 
they ought to31.
It does not seem tha t the program effect is dying out as the results in Blundell et 
al. (2004) might have suggested. On average over the whole period considered it is 
possible to estimate a very precise param eter of 5%. The time profile of the estimates 
does not seem to suggest relevant general equilibrium effects with possible differential
31As mentioned, in an earlier work (De Giorgi, 2005), the analysis is performed by OLS using flexible functional 
forms and the same sort of jumps appear there. Furthermore, as a robustness check, I have also tested whether a 
significant difference in the post-program (re)employment probabilities appears at any other age (ie. 20,21,22 and 
so on): I could never find any significant discontinuity but from the true cut-off point (25 years). In principle such 
test can be performed at any point between 19 and 31 years, this would be obviously unfeasible given the continuous 
nature of the underlying variable, therefore I only focused my attention to integers (20,21,22..) or half year intervals 
(19.5,20,20.5...). The test is practically implemented by a dummy variables approach and not by LLR given the  
extreme computational burden that would be involved by the latter.
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impacts on the two groups (at least in local terms). This point is also confirmed by 
looking at the (re)employment probability for the two groups separately, they do not 
vary much and certainly not to be consistent with large general equilibrium effects.
On the other hand substitution does not seem to be relevant either. In case of large 
substitution effect we should see in the conditional mean functions a behavior similar 
to Figure 2.4. The closer to the discontinuity the more substitutable individuals 
should be and therefore at the discontinuity the distance between the (re)employment 
probabilities should be larger32. However, this is not the case given Figures 2.6 and 
2.7; on both sides of the discontinuity the functions are almost completely flat. This 
suggests, combined with Figure 2.5 ((re)employment probability before the program), 
a “global” interpretation of the param eter estimates. However, such an extended 
interpretation obviously implies a stronger identification structure (i.e. constant 
treatment effect or particular smoothness). A test on the difference between non 
treated outcomes before and after the program is also performed formally and in 
Figures 2.10 and 2.11, the null of equality cannot be rejected at any conventional 
level of significance. A note of caution is also necessary in interpreting the results 
from the pre-program analysis for which it is not possible to design any sort of 
bounds as described above. Nevertheless, this does not undermine the comparability 
of outcomes between treated and controls in the pre-program case33, since for none 
of them a particular education and training program was available. At the same 
time when controls are compared overtime, before/after the program, as in Figures 
2.10 and 2.11, as long as I treat the exit to education/training consistently such 
comparability is still safe and meaningful. A similar argument can be used when
32Obviously, the shape of the (re)employment probability suggested in Figure 2.4 is not the only one com patible 
with relevant displacement effects, there are other functions of age able to  deliver a larger gap at the discontinuity  
then in any other point.
33However it is not possible to  safely compare the outcom e for controls between Figures 2.5 and 2 .6 /2 .7  since in 
this case the assumption made to draw the post-program (best estim ate) and the pre-program outcom e are different.
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discussing Figures 2.8 and 2.9, since before entering the program, ie. in the first 6 
months of open unemployment, no education/training programs are available.
The lack of evidence of general equilibrium and substitution effects can be ex­
plained by a number of factors. Firstly, the sort of general equilibrium effects I have 
in mind, arising from an increase in the labor supply lowering the equilibrium wage, 
require a substantial rise in the overall supply of labor, however, though the imple­
mentation of the program is global, it is not so massive to affect in a significant way 
the overall labor supply in the UK. Support for such claim is given in Figures 2.12 
and 2.13 where the number of participants, at any one month starting in January 
1998, are graphed as a percentage of active males. It is clearly visible an increase 
in the number of young britons involved in the program since it started, with picks 
in the spring of 1999 when about 110 thousands young males were administered the 
policy. However, relative to  the number of active males it never overcame 1%. The 
limited (if at all) influence on the overall labor supply and equilibrium wage is given 
by the evolution of hourly wages for males’ employees (Figure 2.13). I focused only 
on the lower end of the distribution since those are presumably the sort of rates a 
typical participant would get. A vertical line denotes the start (national roll-out) of 
the program, there is no evidence of a differential trend before and after the program. 
Obviously, these indirect tests cannot rule out some GE effects; however, if anything, 
they are not supportive of an im portant general impact of the policy.
As far as the substitution is concerned, it requires th a t treated individuals are 
cheaper than untreated, but this might not be the case if the cost of turnover is 
relatively high. Furthermore, treated are cheaper only in the case of the subsidized 
employment option, but the take-up rate of such a feature of the program is sur­
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prisingly low34. In fact only one over 6 treated who went through the option stage 
were allocated in a subsidized job adding to less than 7% of the new dealers. I have 
not covered possible general equilibrium effects arising from distortionary taxes de­
volved to the funding of the program for the simple reason th a t the program has 
been funded through the revenues from the privatization processes initiated in those 
years.
2.8 Is There a Substitution Puzzle?
As mentioned throughout the paper the relevance of possible substitution effects 
among treated and control individuals is central to the identification structure. The 
program I consider here has a particular feature (subsidized employment option) 
that could raise concerns regarding the violation of the SUTVA and therefore the 
validity of the identification strategy. I have spent a considerable part of the work 
trying to assess such an issue, and I do not find support for any m ajor concern on the 
evaluation exercise I propose. Why is it then tha t there is not any substitution effect? 
In principle, the presence of a significant subsidy to employment should generate an 
incentive to substitute workers. Is the subsidy given to participants enough to create 
such an effect? As explained earlier, by comparing the sort of hourly rate participants 
should get to the amount of the subsidy granted (weekly plus one off payments) this 
adds up to about 50% of the salary in the 6 months period for which such subsidy 
could last for. However, when considering the relevance of the subsidy there are 
few more things to be accounted for. Firstly, the one off payment has to cover the 
minimum one day per week of training participants must receive. On its own this 
would notably lower the previous percentage to 30%. Secondly, the subsidy only last 
for 6 months and might not be enough to compensate for the turnover costs. Thirdly,
34Even the program administrators were surprised by such a low take up.
in a targeted program, as the one considered here, there might be an im portant 
stigma effect (Katz, 1998) attached to receiving a subsidy. The only way such a 
participant is able to get a job is through a discount on the wage received. He is 
probably not as productive as someone else in the population and while the subsidy 
could help him getting a job, it would signal to the market his bad type. These 
are three potential explanations on the absence of relevant substitution effects in the 
particular program under scrutiny. Are they convincing? I should now go back to the 
evidence. The very low take up rate for such an option (only 16% of participants who 
actually went through an option) was surprising even to the program adm inistrators 
who were expecting a much higher one. The amount of evidence put forward in this 
respect seems to be clear cut in excluding relevant substitution bias (Figures 2.4, 2.6, 
2.7 and 2.10), either comparing cohorts of controls before and after the program, the 
actual outcomes in terms of employment probability with a prediction of how they 
should look like in case of any relevant substitution effect.
2.9 Conclusions
Previous US evidence on ALMPs targeted at young unemployed has been rather 
disappointing (Bloom et al., 1997; Heckman et al., 1999). Those studies did not find 
any significant impact of job search assistance and training on disadvantaged youths 
both in terms of employment and wages. On the other hand Heckman et al. (1999) 
surveyed a series of European studies mainly focusing on young unemployed where in 
some cases a positive and significant effect was found in terms of employment while 
an even less clear cut evidence exists on wages.
The evidence presented in this work is somewhat reassuring. A targeted policy 
such as the NDYP is able to increase the (re)employment chance of young unem­
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ployed by a small but significant amount. However, it remains to investigate further 
whether it is a particular component or the whole structure of the policy tha t is 
working effectively.
It has to be pointed out th a t part of the previous evidence was based on voluntary 
programs or on policies aimed at particularly disadvantaged youths (ex-offenders). 
While the target group of the NDYP is constituted by all young unemployed, besides 
a 6 months unemployment spell for such an age group is not th a t uncommon in the 
UK.
It has also been shown (van Den Berg et al., 2004) th a t policies where non com- 
pliers incur significant sanctions are on a theoretical and empirical ground capable 
of producing beneficial effects in terms of employment, for the simple fact th a t they 
push up the level of effort exerted by the unemployed. The mechanism being quite 
intuitive a worse outside option (withdrawal of the benefit) constitutes a large incen­
tive. Katz (1998) in reviewing different ALMPs found th a t policies combining wage 
subsidies with job development, training and job search assistance appear to have 
been somewhat successful in improving the labor market conditions (employment 
and earnings) of specific groups.
Table 2.1: Cohorts. Treated 19-24, Controls 25-30 years old
Treated Control Total
Apr. ’98-Dec. ’98 4,256 3,916 8,172
Jan. ’99-Sept. ’99 4,261 3,956 8,217
Oct. ’99-June ’00 3,885 3,563 7,448
July ’00-Mar. ’01 3,311 3,038 6,349
Apr. ’01-Dec. ’01 3,282 2,910 6,192
Total 18,995 17,383 36,378
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Tabic 2.2: Usual Occupation by Treatment Status and Age (%)
U sual occupation 19-30 22-27 24-25
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Managers 0.35 2.17 1.12 2.05 2.10 1.78
Professional 0.42 2.21 0.88 2.21 1.39 2.16
Associate Prof., Technical 2.98 4.14 4.08 6.04 5.34 5.76
Admn. Secretarial 13.16 10.70 14.01 11.27 12.02 11.13
Skilled trades 10.91 16.53 11.84 13.37 13.91 12.65
Personal Service 5.44 4.06 6.00 4.77 5.59 5.76
Sales and Customer service 11.19 3.86 7.04 5.11 6.98 5.60
Process, Plant and Mach. operatives 7.76 11.83 8.40 11.31 9.79 10.75
Elementary occupation 47.80 44.49 46.62 43.86 42.88 44.41
Note: The first two columns compare 19 to 30 year olds; third and fourth 22 to 27 and the last two 24 to 25 year olds. 
All cohorts are used in this tabulation.
Table 2.3: Sought Occupation by Treatment Status and Age (%)
Sought occupation 19-30 22-27 24-25
Treated Control Treated Control Treated Control
Managers 0.38 2.15 1.72 2.09 2.61 2.10
Professional 0.71 2.07 1.22 2.26 2.28 2.53
Associate Prof., Technical 3.60 5.06 5.40 6.93 6.06 7.43
Admn. Secretarial 15.18 11.39 14.96 12.33 13.67 12.23
Skilled trades 12.74 16.60 12.39 13.31 13.34 12.61
Personal Service 6.26 4.51 6.35 5.02 5.98 4.90
Sales and Customer service 12.27 4.33 8.00 5.64 7.69 6.22
Process, Plant and Mach. operatives 7.22 12.81 8.91 11.60 9.64 11.08
Elementary occupation 41.64 41.06 41.05 40.80 38.72 40.89
Note: The first two columns compare 19 to 30 year olds; third and fourth 22 to 27 and the last two 24 to 25 year olds. 
All cohorts are used in this tabulation.
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Table 2.4: Montecarlo Experiments
m(x) P noise/signal ArotPRD
Sdp
PRD Po ls Pols P b
Ax  +  .2x2 — .7x3 +  . lx 4 .1 .1 .14
E3 11^ O O o .0851 .0865 .0651 .0855 .0835
(.0192) (.0328) (.0144) (.0171) (.0204)
n=3000 .09154 .0900 .0622 .0809 .0787
(.0119) (.0215) (.0083) (.0099) (.0118)
.5sin(6x) .1 .1 .06
n=1000 .1213 .1110 .6824 .1730 .5826
(.0266) (.0338) (.0231) (.0174) (.0163)
n=3000 .0988 .0972 .6799 .1672 .5938
(.0167) (.0127) (.0130) (.0101) (.0097)
4>(.5sin(6x)) .1 .1 .28
n=1000 .1077 .1046 .3217 .1234 .1582
( .0224) (.0133) (.0088) (.0171) (.009)
n=3000 .0999 .0990 .3197 .1182 .1549
(.0137) (.0086) (.005) (.0099) (.005)
exp(x2) +  .5sin(6x) .1 .1 .13oooi—HIIa .1011 .1019 .7457 .1431 .1428
(.0314) (.0333) (.0293) (.0174) (.0347)
n=3000 .0829 .0949 .7509 .1375 .1291
(.0231) (.0216) (.0167) (.0100) (.0183)
Note: <t> is the standard normal cdf; and /3 q l s  x  controlled for linearly and as a quartic polynomial
respectively, a) Wald estimator takes only observations for which .45 <  x  <  .55.
Table 2.5: Treatment Effects (and Bounds), Bandwidth: Plugin
Best Lower Upper
Cohort Effect Std.Err. Effect Std.Err. Effect Std.Err.
Apr. ’98-Dec. ’98 .0559 (.0245) .0068 ( .0 0 0 1 ) .0911 (.0239)
Jan. ’99-Sept. ’99 .0499 (.0223) -.0081 (-.0126) .1145 ( .0241)
Oct. ’99-June ’00 .0110 (.0238) -.0389 (-.0431) .0588 (.0234)
July ’00-Mar. ’01 .0433 (.0250) .0067 (  .0102) .0979 (.0257)
Apr. ’01-Dec. ’01 .1056 (.0277) .0347 ( .0360) .1447 (.0269)
All .0499 (.0107) .0019 (.0112) .0995 (.0118)
Note: Bootstrap standard errors based on 300 replications. Bandwidth selected with plugin m ethod.








Apr. ’98-Dec. ’98 1.3558 1.0745 1.2502 1.2152 1.2825 1.2548
Jan. ’99-Sept. ’99 1.1630 .9591 1.1071 1.0027 1.1254 1.2804
Oct. ’99-June ’00 1.8981 1.6938 1.6272 1.4243 1.2371 1.2958
July ’00-Mar. ’01 1.7775 1.2709 1.3457 1.1804 1.6974 1.1001
Apr. ’01-Dec. ’01 1.2906 .9653 1.5243 1.4744 1.1075 .8699
All 1.1805 .9566 1.1135 1.0732 1.1857 1.2357
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Figure 2.2: The “sharp” RD design
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Figure 2.3: Age profile of New Dealers (Males only) 
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Figure 2.5: Pre-Program (re)employment probabilities by cohort and age 
Note: Dots are average (re)employment rates by age in year.
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Figure 2.6: Post-Program (re)employment probabilities by cohort and age 
Note: Dots are average (re)employment rates by age in year.
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Figure 2.7: Post-Program (re)employment probabilities by age (all cohorts) 
Note: Dots are average (re)employment rates by age in year.
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Figure 2.8:
Kaplan-Meyer survival probabilities and 95% confidence intervals for 2 cohorts of 19-24
year olds in the first 6 months of unemployment 
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Figure 2.9:
Kaplan-Meyer survival probabilities (unemployment) and 95% confidence intervals for
2 cohorts of 24 year olds in the first 6 months of unemployment 
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Figure 2.11: Kaplan-Meyer survival probabilities and 95% confidence intervals (25 year olds) 
Note: pre-program, solid line; post-program, dotted  line.
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Figure 2.12: New Deal participants (males)
N ote: as % of active males, solid line; number, dotted line.
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Figure 2.13: Males’ hourly earnings (1995Q1 prices), employees only 
Note: the vertical line denotes the start of the NDYP. Source: Office of National Statistics, Labour Force Survey.
CHAPTER III
Relative Effectiveness o f Differential Treatments: 
the Options in the N ew  D eal for Young People in the UK
3.1 Introduction
The New Deal for Young People in the UK is a prototypical example of a pro­
gram with multiple treatments. It combines, at different stages, job search assistance, 
training/education, subsidies and reinstatem ent in the labor force through govern­
mental or voluntary sector jobs (De Giorgi, 2005). Such particular framework has 
been employed in several labor market programs (see Katz, 1998; Sianesi, 2001 and 
2004; Frolich, 2004). It is widely acknowledged tha t ALMPs have to be flexible and 
capable of improving employability. However, it remains an open issue whether dif­
ferent treatments are generally beneficial or only some of them are, while others are 
a pure burden to the system. This work addresses the following question: are the 
different treatments offered by the NDYP equally valuable in term s of returns? Or 
it is rather the case tha t a particular option is delivering a higher return in terms 
of wage once the treated is out of the program? It is crucial to understand how to 
shape a successful ALMP given the government budget constraint and the limited 
availability of resources. On the other hand given the heterogeneity in the nature 
of the unemployed population a certain degree of flexibility is necessary in order to 
give a valuable treatm ent to the particular individual.
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There is evidence th a t the subsidy to employment is the ‘s ta r’ option of the NDYP 
with respect to enhancing the (re)employment probability of participants (Dorsett, 
2006) however there isn’t any available study tha t looks into job quality and namely 
wages. The mere employment is not per se an indicator of the success of a program, 
especially when there might be concerns over the quality of jobs. In the particular 
case the star option could be successful in getting unemployed out of dole, but the 
point is: are these jobs worthwhile? A subsidy to employment is relevant when the 
productivity of the worker is possibly below his/her cost. However, such subsidy 
cannot last forever, further it can attach an im portant stigma to the takers as well as 
forcing participants into worse match accepting jobs at lower wages than otherwise. 
I exploit a purposely built survey dataset collecting a large number of information, 
including wage data, on a particular cohort of participants. As standard in the evalu­
ation literature the main issue is th a t of having a convincing identification structure 
of a meaningful policy parameter. This work exploits a particular feature of the 
treatment process, namely the option assignment, in order to identify the effect of 
a particular option on those who went through it. In principle the assignment pro­
cess should have been a joint decision between the caseworker and the participant. 
However, this was not the case for two main reasons: firstly, certain options were 
simply not available in certain areas, i.e. some local units of delivery did not have 
the possibility of placing a participant in the Environmental Task Force, while oth­
ers did not have voluntary sectors job available and so on (rationing). Secondly, 
there is a clear pattern of preference for a particular treatm ent in certain units, this 
depends on the fact that placing someone in a subsidized job is simply more expen­
sive than sending someone to school, both in terms of effort to be exerted by the 
caseworker and monetary cost (costs). There is a large variation in option take-up
across different UoD’s substantiated by anecdotal and formal evidence later in the 
paper. Such variation remains even when a number of confounding factors are par- 
tialled out. Furthermore, there is evidence of non-random option allocations in Table
3.2. It is clear how better quality participants where assigned to the subsidized em­
ployment option. In fact, they are significantly better in terms of schooling, ability 
(reading/math problems), work history (although they have surprisingly longer un­
employment history) than their counterpart who engaged in an extended job search 
treatment. If we were to believe in the random assignment to different options the 
simple OLS estimates would suggest tha t on average no options had a differential 
impact in terms of hourly wages in regular employment. However, when non-random 
selection both at the options stage and in the employment node is taken into account 
a dramatically different picture emerges. IV estimates clearly point towards a neg­
ative and significant penalty of roughly 20%, almost 1 GBP (1.9 USD) less. Such 
result is in line with earlier findings on subsidized employment by Katz, 1996. The 
intuition for a negative return is consistent with a stigma effect attached to those 
participants who got a subsidy, while otherwise they would not be productive enough 
to pay for their wages. Further, it might be tha t participant would be worse off in the 
matching process by the acceptance of jobs at lower wages or not particularly suited 
for them. It seems therefore th a t the specific option might signal to the market the 
low productivity type or simply impeding the development of a frictionless matching 
process. Unfortunately, I could not test the hypothesis of a tem porary effects given 
the available data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 describes the 
nature of the program; Section 3.3 details the identification strategy adopted. A 
description of the data employed is given in Section 3.4; while results and treatm ent
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effects are presented in Section 3.5. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Program
As from Figure 3.1 the NDYP is a sequential program, where different treatm ents 
are offered to the participants. Following a period of six months in “open” unem­
ployment 18 to 24 year olds are forced into the program in order to be still eligible 
for the unemployment benefit (JSA). It is therefore a mandatory policy administered 
to everyone in the UK who, after six months of unemployment, are aged between 18 
and 24 (further details on the program can be found in Blundell et al., 2004; and De 
Giorgi, 2005).
The first four months (Gateway period) are nominally devoted to intensive job 
search assistance and some basic skill training, i.e. CV writing. Participants are 
obliged to meet a personal mentor once every two weeks and have to report and 
prove the actions taken in order to gain employment. Failure to comply with any 
of the program requirements might result in a benefit sanction and eventually the 
withdrawal from it.
While in the gateway participants receive a benefit equal to the JSA (about 40 
pounds per week). If a regular job is not found during the gateway, a second phase 
follows: the options. This second stage is the focus of this work, in particular 
the option assignment mechanism will be discussed in great detail in Section 3.3. 
Reading through the institutional rules for such stage it emerges that: on the basis 
of personal considerations, given individual characteristics, the caseworker agrees 
with the participant on the option to be taken. However, as we will see later, this is 
not always the case since certain units of delivery tend to favor a particular option 
for two main reasons: i) rationing, i.e. not all options are available at a given time
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in the particular UoD and; ii) costs, i.e. some options are more expensive in terms 
of budget and effort.
The option period can last from 6 to 12 months (full time training or education). 
Common practice among units of delivery was to try  placing the unemployed in 
a subsidized job during the second month of treatm ent. In case of a subsidized 
employment, the treated receives the salary paid by the employer who gets, for a 
maximum of six months, a subsidy of 60 pounds per week plus 750 pounds as a one- 
off payment for the compulsory (minimum) one day a week training to be provided1. 
The second option, education or training, is targeted at youths lacking basic skills 
and it can last up to 12 months (although it is common for such courses to last 
only 10 months). While attending such courses the unemployed still receives his JSA 
payment. Typically the courses attended by a program participant would be given by 
the local college, and in most cases, those are not specially provided to newdealers. 
There is no obvious distinction between a vocational course attended by a treated 
and by anyone else in the community.
A third option is that of a voluntary sector job where the participant receives an 
amount at least identical to the JSA plus 400 pounds spread over the six months. A 
typical placement would be shop assistant in a charity shop.
The same monetary treatm ent is granted in the fourth option: Environmental 
Task Force, basically a governmental job, meant to be the last possible placement. In 
this option the participant would typically be involved in public parks maintenance.
Participants are allocated to these last two options in the third and fourth month
^ u ch  subsidy seems quite generous when compared to  the sort of hourly rate (close to the minimum wage) a 
typical participant would get. In a crude com putation, the weekly subsidy plus the one-off payment would amount 
to about 50% of a weekly pay for a minimum wage worker, however the 750 pounds would have to repay for the 
loss of production due to the minimum of one day training. Under very simple assumptions (perfectly com petitive  
markets) those 750 pounds would not be enough to com pensate for that loss. In fact, taking the latter into account 
the subsidy would not be greater than 30%, but still generous though. However, job turnover could be itself quite 
costly making such an option not as appealing as it looks like at a first glance. This point seems to be confirmed by 
the low take up rate in the data, only a sixth  of those entering an option would go for the subsidised job.
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of the gateway.
It emerged a fifth, non-contemplated by the program, option: the extended gate­
way, i.e. a continuing job search assistance. As we will see later this practice was 
not uncommon.
Eventually a third phase follows: the follow-through, essentially maximum of 13 
weeks similar to the initial gateway. It consists of intensive job search as well as 
training courses to maintain the skills acquired during the option period.
The program was launched in January 1998 in selected areas (pilot period) and 
then extended to the rest of the nation in April of tha t year (national roll-out), it is 
still ongoing and it is by far the largest active labor market policy in the UK. About 
1 million young britons have been involved since the beginning to December 2003, 
of which roughly 75% are males.
3.3 Identification Strategy
The NDYP is a prototypical example of a multiple treatm ents program. It com­
bines job search assistance with training/education, job creation and subsidies to 
employment. In this work the focus is on the relative effectiveness of the different 
treatments offered in terms of wage returns when a regular job is found. As in any 
evaluation exercise the main difficulty is th a t of recovering a missing counterfactual 
outcome.2 An individual cannot be in two mutually exclusive treatm ents a t the 
same time. On the other hand simply using a different set of individuals to recover 
a counterfactual outcome is not advisable given tha t individuals self-select into dif­
ferent treatments being this a decision and not a random assignment. However, the 
option assignment mechanism does here provide a meaningful tool to  disentangle the 
causal effect of a particular treatm ent.
2For an extensive discussion see Heckman et al., 1999; and Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2000.
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Options in the NDYP are delivered by a local office (Unit of Delivery) tha t deals 
as well with benefit payments and a number of activities for different types of unem­
ployed. The assignment to a particular one cannot be assumed as random. In fact 
there is evidence (Table 3.2) th a t better quality unemployed were more often assigned 
to the subsidized employment option than to the extended gateway. Furthermore, 
the assignment rules themselves contemplated the selection into a particular trea t­
ment. In principle, the assignment process is a joint decision of the caseworker and 
the unemployed. They are supposed to discuss different possibilities and then agree 
on the one that should have been the most beneficial to the particular subject. This 
would mean that all possible options should have been at least mentioned during 
the compulsory meetings, with the limitation (not followed in practice) th a t the 
training/education option should not be offered to ‘highly’ educated unemployed.
However, there is consistent evidence (section 3.5) tha t some UoD’s tend to favor 
a particular option either because not all the options are available in a given area at 
a given time (rationing) or because of differential effort/cost linked to the specific 
treatment (cost). It is more costly in this respect to contact potential employers 
(subsidized employment option) than simply sending participants to school (full time 
education and training option), in the same line the monetary costs of the former 
are much higher than for the la tter.3
Therefore after controlling for a number of possibly confounding covariates (both 
at the individual and location level) the UoD would constitute a suitable instrument: 
1) partially correlated with the particular treatm ent and 2) rightly excluded from 
the outcome equation.4
3In a simple back of the envelope com putation a full tim e education/training option would cost roughly 160 G BP  
a month (40 GBP*4weeks) or 300 USD while the subsidized employment option 365 G BP a month (60 G BP*4  
w eeks+750/6 months) or 690 USD. Even if we were to consider the possible different durations maximum six months 
for the subsidy and maximum 10 (formally 12 however courses last maximum 10) months for the education/training  
the ratio would still be to one half.
4Ideally one would like to control for UoD specific characteristics, i.e. tenure of caseworkers, education, budget, etc.
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It is here informative to report some quotations from a qualitative survey con­
ducted on NDYP participants (Woodfield et al., 2000):
David has always wanted to train as printer...N D YP was unable to find a 
subsidized placement fo r  him in the printing field and he did not recall being 
offered full time education as an Option. He was eventually placed on the 
Voluntary Sector Option.... He believed that a training course would have 
provided him with longer term prospects and a possible career.
Amjad was a 24 year old graduate He felt that could have been given
much better help whilst trying to find work in his specialist area. Eventually 
he was placed on the F T E T  Option...
...Julie wanted to pursue a photographic career but found that she would 
have to wait at least four months before New Deal could start to find  her 
an appropriate course ...
In this line, there a number of other testimonies.5
It is also informative in this respect to look at Figure 3.2 and Table 3.5 and
3.6 where the crude variation in the differential take-up rates across UoD’s is quite 
striking. For example Tower Hamlets one of the London Boroughs has the lowest 
take-up (8.3%) for the extended gateway, among positive values in all options (given 
a duration longer than four months), while Coventry has the highest take-up rate 
(59%). The same argument goes for the subsidized employment option, where the 
take-up is lowest (2.6%) in Wearside, Nort-East of England, and highest (45.4%)
However this has proved impossible after 3 years of negotiations with the UK Department for Work and Pensions 
(DW P), although since negotiations are still open there is a chance to be blessed and receive such interesting 
information.
5 A program administrator told me of a particular case when the caseworker in an attem pt to place a participant 
in a specific training course phoned the local college only the hear that that specific course was not given in the 
current term and that possibly it would have been available six months later.
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in Dunbarton, Scotland. Reading through the Tables above consistently confirms a 
large variation in option take-up rates. However formal testing is required given the 
mere nature of cross-tabulation. A number of tests on the first stage of the estimation 
will be presented in Section 3.5 when such variation will be analyzed in a regression 
framework.
Formalizing the identification strategy in the familiar potential outcome frame­
work (Rubin, 1986; and Heckman et a l, 1999) and assuming th a t the Stable Unit 
Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA) holds. In a multiple m utually exclusive 
treatment model, omitting individual i subscript, the observed outcome Y  is w rit­
ten:
j
(3.1) Y  = Yo + Y , ( Y j - Y o ) D j
3 = 1
where Yo is the potential outcome for the reference treatm ent (extended gateway) 
and Dj = 1 if treatment j  is realized.
There are therefore a number of treatm ent effects tha t can be defined, however I 
will restrict my attention to the comparison between treatm ent j  and 0 in the class 
of treatment on the treated. Listing them 6:
(3.2) E(Aj\Dj  =  1) =  E(Yj -  Y ^  =  1)
for j  =  1,.., J . It is also very useful to decompose each potential outcome in two 
parts: i) a deterministic function of a number of appropriate covariates; ii) and a 
stochastic one representing the possible heterogeneity in returns.
6Whenever not otherwise specified the expectations are taken with respect to X  as well throughout this section.
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(3.3) Yj — f-ij +  tj
(3.4) Yq = no +  6q
where h is a function of the covariates X  here omitted, while e represents the 
heterogeneity in the returns.
The problem in estimating any treatm ent effect is fundamentally th a t of missing 
data: an individual cannot be in two different states at the same time. Since the 
parameters I am interested in are defined as pair-wise comparison between option j  
and the base case 0, only observations on those pair of treatm ents will be used for 
identification (Lechner, 1999; and Frolich, 2004). It is therefore possible, without 
loss of generality, to rewrite what follows in terms of two potential outcomes where 
the treatment state can be considered binary. So D  =  0 would simply indicate th a t 
treatment is 0 and D =  1 th a t the treatm ent state under scrutiny is realized. These 
simplifications would just make the identification section more readable. Therefore, 
constructing an example based on the comparison between option 1 and 0, rethinking 
of it as a binary treatm ent, it is possible to write:
E(Y\D  =  1) — E(Y\D  =  0) =
(3.5)
E(A\D  =  1) +  E(e0\D =  1) -  E (e0|L> =  0)
Therefore by simple comparison, the treatm ent on the treated would not be iden­
tified without further assumptions. The last two terms on the RHS constitute the 
bias given by the difference in the unobservables in the base state.7
7For a decomposition of the bias term see Ichimura et al. 1998.
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This is the standard evaluation problem of possible correlation between the trea t­
ment state D  =  0,1 and the unobservable eo- In a “proper” randomized experiment
this problem would not arise since the bias would cancel out. However, in a non
experimental setting this is not generally the case, i.e. individuals self-select in a 
particular treatm ent according to possible gains unobserved to the econometrician.8
A possible solution to the problem is th a t of instrum ental variables. However, 
such variables are quite difficult to find. There are several examples where cleverly 
devised instrument at a first glance proved not as convincing later on. This has 
generated a vast literature (Angrist and Imbens, 1994; Heckman, 1997) and some 
controversial debates on what is ultimately identified and what is not under the 
weakest possible assumptions. The final goal of this section is to formally state the 
identifying conditions and discuss the validity of such conditions in the specific case. 
Rewriting the outcome equation 3.1 in terms of equations 3.3 and 3.4:
(3.6) Y  = fio +  E (A \D  = 1 )D  T  {eo +  D[(ei — eo) — E(ei — eo\D =  1)]} .
Therefore in order to identify E (A \D  = 1) the problem arises from the correlation 
between D  and eo- If there is a variable Z  such that:
1. £[{60 +  D[(ei -  e0) -  E(e, -  e0|D = 1)]|Z}\ =  0
2. E[D\Z] = Pr[D = 1\Z] it is a non trivial function of Z.
The two conditions stated above guarantee the identification of the relevant pa­
rameter, however they are non-standard in the sense th a t the whole conditional 
expectation of the error term, in curly brackets, in 3.6 has to be equal to 0, while in
®There is however some recent evidence on how noisy decisions are and on how program participants are often 
bad program evaluators (in certain respects). See Smith et al. 2006.
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a standard dummy endogenous variable model this condition would be in terms of 
conditional mean independence between e0 and D  given the instrum ent Z. Notice 
that the conditions as well as the analysis should be extended to the case where there 
are J  endogenous treatm ents and therefore for identification at least J  instruments 
would be needed.
It is ultimately a m atter of judgement whether a variable is a suitable instrument, 
i.e. can be excluded from the outcome equation while generating independent vari­
ation in the treatm ent status once the other covariates have been partialled out. In 
the particular case the instrum ents I propose are the following: the local units of 
delivery. As explained earlier each participant has to be registered with a particular 
unit in her local area. This is generally a governmental employment office, varying 
in size and resources according to the location. Once the young unemployed reaches 
the sixth month in “open” unemployment, she is forced to  enter the program and 
attend an interview, in the UoD, with a caseworker. If a regular job is not found 
in the first four months of treatm ent the participant should be placed in one of the 
option, however this is not always the case since there are a number of participants 
who will be offered a longer job search assistance. Once again, the assignment to 
different options should be in principle a joint decision between the caseworker and 
the treated. However, as explained above, there are two main reasons why this is 
not always the case: (i) rationing, i.e. not all options are available to each UoD; (ii) 
costs, i.e. caseworkers or the UoD as a whole might not carefully look for potential 
employers (low effort, tight budget or a combination of the two) and therefore they 
would have a limited number of placement available totally unrelated with the unob­
servables of the treated; a tight budget might not allow to create an Environmental 
Task Force (ETF) and so forth.
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There is substantive and anecdotal evidence th a t different employment offices 
tend to favor particular options either because some of the treatm ents were simply 
not available in the area or because it was too costly in terms of effort and budget 
to deliver certain treatm ent. As standard, assumption (2) can be tested in the first 
stage of a standard two stage least square estimation. While assumption (1) is 
generally more controversial, however given the number of instrum ents at hand it 
is possible to indirectly test such assumption as well. Once I control for local labor 
market conditions, i.e. local average wages and a NUTS2 level fixed effect, the unit 
of delivery should be excludable from the outcome equation, where the outcome is 
the hourly wage rate in a non “new deal” placement. A second set of issues are tha t 
of weak instruments and many instrum ents (See Staiger and Stock, 1997; Hansen 
et al. 2006.). Furthermore, wages are only observed for those who actually have 
(or had) a job, after program participation, and therefore this induces the standard 
selection problem (Heckman, 1979). I will address such concerns in Section 3.5.
3.4 Data
The data used in this work combines an ad hoc survey, i.e. The New Deal Survey 
of Participants, with the New Deal Evaluation Database (NDED), an administrative 
dataset of the NDYP purposely built and containing virtually the entire population 
of new dealers.
The former covers a cohort of participants, who entered the program in 1998 
between August 31 and November 27 and were interviewed twice. The first interview 
was held between February 20 and July 30 of 1999; the second and last between 
February 25 and June 1 of 2000. The first interview was held on average less than 
one year after program entry, while the second one and a half years after the initial
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entry.
Such data are combined with the administrative data  (NDED) containing virtually 
all participants and a number of information on activities during the New Deal, 
i.e. type and durations of various treatm ents, actions taken, reason for leaving a 
particular state, etc. While the survey data  contain information on some background 
characteristics, i.e. unemployment history, types of jobs held, education, gender, 
ethnicity, etc.
Table 3.1 gives the distribution of participants in the various options including the 
gateway, column (i) includes in the gateway all those who passed by such stage even 
if they left the program within four months; column (ii) only those who remained in 
the program long enough to reach the option period according to the stated rules, 
i.e. longer than 4 months. It is clear tha t most participants were enrolled in full 
time education and training options where they had to attend  (mostly) vocational 
courses in the local college. Take-up rates for the other options are quite even. It is 
worth noticing tha t the practice of keeping new dealers in longer job search (extended 
gateway) was not exceptional, roughly 30 percent of participants, with a duration 
longer then 120 days, never entered a formal option.
The UoD’s are located in the local area, here defined as a t level NUTS2, e.g. 
Greater London, Cambridge and East Anglia would be a unique local area. Therefore 
in a local area, a limited geographic space, there might be multiple offices. In Table
3.3, the distribution of UoD’s is presented, the median number of units is 4 with a 
maximum of 19 (Greater London). There are in total 105 units in 23 geographical 
areas, therefore the average number of units is equal to roughly 5.9
9Only areas with at least 2 units have been included in the analysis, given the type of variation exploited. It has 
to be remembered that throughout the analysis I am controlling for the local area (NUTS2) and average wages in 
the specific location area of the particular unit, e.g. Hackney, Chelsea, etc. would have specific average wages (for a 
full time employee) as from the UK Labor Force Survey for the year 2000.
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3.5 Results
The source of identification exploited in this work relies on the UoD’s where 
participants are registered. Once again this is not chosen by the participant, but it 
is tied to the location of residence. The idea is th a t the UoD’s will give a source of 
exogenous variation in option assignment once confounding factors are taken care of.
As in any sound use of instrum ental variables, it is crucial to support the validity 
of the instrument proposed on the basis of the available evidence and of an economic 
mechanism exogenous to both the participant and the caseworker. In section 3.3 I do 
present a number of testimonies supporting the chosen instruments. Furthermore, 
there is a clear-cut evidence on the large variation in option take-up across UoD’s. 
Although ultimately untestable, being the identifying set of assumptions, further 
evidence will be here provided in the light of the first step of estimation in a 2SLS 
estimator.10 Various robustness checks have been implemented using only a subset 
of instruments to check for the many instrum ents and weak instrum ents well known 
problems. First stage results support the instrum ent chosen in the following sense: 
i) F-statistics are large (above 10 in the vast m ajority of cases); ii) Hansen-Sargan 
J-test confirms the validity of the instrum ents cannot reject the null at 10%; iii) 
Anderson-Rubin test for endogenous regressors on the same note of the two above 
(rejects the null at 5%).11 The above are also consistent whether a subset of the 
instruments is chosen; notice tha t there are over 100 UoD’s in the data, although at 
most 60 are used in the estimation. Some UoD’s might have very few participants 
sampled and therefore I conducted also the entire analysis excluding those UoD’s 
with fewer than 10 (5% of the sample) or 20 (15% of the sample) and the results still
10Efficient GMM results, available upon request, are qualitatively identical.
n The F-statistics above 10 are actually suggested in Stock and Yogo (2003) for the case of a single endogenous 
variable.
hold true both in the first and second stage. A summary of the first stage results and 
robustness checks is presented in Table 3.7, where first stage of the main analysis 
shows large F-statistics (but for the Voluntary Sector option). Further in column 
3 and 4, I perform the following exercise: estimation of the treatm ent effect of the 
subsidy versus any other treatm ents, in such case the endogenous variable would 
be just one. W hether I use all the available IV’s or just the one with the largest 
significance in first stage, the conclusions on the effect of the subsidy still stands 
robust. Dealing with the number of instrum ents if added instrum ents are irrelevant, 
I select, in column 5 to 7 the eight IV’s with highest explanatory power in the first 
stage (for the 5 endogenous variables), once again the main results are yet confirmed 
and, if anything, the point estimates are larger suggesting even a larger penalty from 
taking up the subsidy. However, such point estimates are not statistically different 
from the main one produced in Table 3.4. Column 8 and 9 confirm the robustness 
of the results once the smaller units are dropped from the analysis.
Further, throughout the analysis a set of covariates are added to control for con­
founding factors. In fact the nature of the instrum ents may induce some concern 
regarding possible differences in the local labor market conditions th a t would drive 
the outcome and clearly bias the analysis. At the local level I am controlling for a 
location fixed effect at NUTS2 level, local wages in the specific sub-NUTS2 level area 
and in certain specifications also for the local unemployment rates. At the individual 
level a number of commonly thought fundamental variables (before program partic­
ipation) are added: unemployment history, dummy for whether a job was found 
within three months of leaving school, education level, gender, and finally a number 
of controls for a ttitude towards work (this questions where asked in the initial stage 
of the new deal and certainly pre-option assignment, however excluding them from
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the analysis does not change the results).
Another issue is th a t of tackling the non-random employment node: wages are 
only observed for those who have or had a job since leaving NDYP. Although at 
a first stance this might not be a m ajor problem since the options did not seem 
to have a large differential impact on (re)employment probability in my sample12 
However, as a robustness check the analysis is also performed with an initial stage 
where the employment node is modeled according to a selection equation where the 
excluded instruments are some of the UoD’s th a t do not appear to have explanatory 
power in the first stage equations. As confirmed in Table 3.4, results are robust to 
such a possible non random selection; and the selection term  is never significantly 
different from zero but in one case. Notice then even when the selection param eter 
is significantly different from zero, the point estimates of the param eters of interest 
vary very little.
Looking through table 3.4 where results are presented for both  samples included 
in the analysis, it is quite evident th a t OLS estimates are of very small magnitude 
and furthermore insignificant.13 This is the result for all treatm ent effects as defined 
earlier. It does not seem th a t any of the options has a differential impact on the 
treated compared to the reference ‘option’ of the extended gateway.
If we were to believe no selection in both option participation and labor supply 
we would then conclude th a t none of the options does on average better than the 
extended gateway in terms of wages once a regular job is found. However once we take 
into consideration tha t option assignment is a decisional process instead of a simple 
random assignment (even based on observables), a whole different picture starts to 
take shape. Regardless of the sample used the worst performer seems actually to be
12This result differs from Dorsett (2006), who finds that the subsidized employment option is the star in this 
context, this is actually the result you would get in a sim ple OLS estim ation.
13Bootstrap standard errors, clustered at the UoD level, are presented in the case of correction for selection.
67
what has been sometimes termed the ‘s ta r’ option, i.e. the employment subsidy.14 
It is so much so tha t a negative return of roughly 22 percent is found.
There is instead no evidence th a t the other options are worse than the extended 
job search in a pair-wise comparison as detailed in Section 3.3.15
Therefore if we can accept the indirect evidence on the validity of the instruments 
used, we can conclude tha t participating in an employment subsidy program is not 
as beneficial as commonly believed, especially in the anecdotal evidence given the 
complete absence of any scientific evidence. Why is then th a t OLS estimates point 
to a no effect when compared to the gateway? It is more than plausible th a t the non- 
random selection in option assignment pushes the more able participants (Table 3.2 in 
such direction while in fact the particular treatm ent has a negative return compared 
to an extended job search period. In the particular exercise performed in this work 
it is not straightforward to believe th a t the object estimated is a Local Average 
Treatment Effect (LATE) as in Angrist and Imbens, 1994. It is quite difficult to relate 
the type of instruments employed here w ith the idea of moving only a particular type 
of treated (compilers). The source of variation here would move participants simply 
because of rationing (or costs) irrespective of their intrinsic characteristics.16
3.6 Conclusions
This paper evaluates the relative effectiveness of different treatm ents offered by 
the largest UK program devoted to young unemployed who experience a six months 
unemployment spell while younger than  25 years of age. There are fundamentally
14The word has been mentioned to me a number of tim es from different program administrators.
15Direct comparison between the four option would be incorrect given that treatment effects are asymmetric in 
this context (Lechner, 1999).
16Use of LIML method, in certain context better performing in the w eak/ many instruments case, has proved 
unrealistic in terms of estim ates in line with the well-known result of Hahn and Hausman (2003) in the analysis of 
“no-moment” conditions estimators. It is not clear that the use of LIML per se is better than the simple 2SLS unless 
particular conditions are satisfied.
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five types of treatm ent offered (i.e. extended job search, full time education/training, 
subsidized employment, voluntary sector placement, and governmental job in the 
Environmental Task Force), while an initial job search assistance is offered to every 
participant. The central question is th a t of identifying the causal impact of each 
treatm ent with respect to the extended job search option. W hat is offered in the 
program is highly heterogenous while the baseline option is centered on improving 
the search technology with little commitment to human capital improvement the 
remaining options focus on different degree of combination between some human 
capital accumulation (through classroom training or learning on the job) and work 
experience (to enhance attachm ent to the labor force and motivation). A high degree 
of heterogeneity also exist on the costs of each treatm ent (Section 3.3). It is therefore 
crucial to understand which one of the options is delivering the best outcome in terms 
of wage returns once a regular job is found. The challenge is then to disentangle what 
is the true effect of each options once possible confounding factors are partialled out. 
The approach followed in this study is th a t of IV, where a suitable set of instruments 
is found in the UOD’s to  which the particular treated is associated. A crucial step 
is that of providing convincing evidence on the validity of the instrum ents used. 
Here I propose and substantiate my claim through a number of formal tests and 
a series of testimonies consistent with a twofold set of mechanisms through which 
the set of instrument could be considered valid: i) rationing, i.e. not all options 
are available at a given point in time in a particular UOD; and ii) costs, i.e. some 
options are inherently costlier both in term s of money and effort. The surprising 
results, however consistent with previous evidence from the US (Katz, 1998), is tha t 
in fact the subsidized employment option is delivering a negative return in terms of 
wages, such effect is actually quite large. Adding up to  almost 40 GBP (75 USD) per
week. It seems th a t once the non random selection into different treatm ents is take 
care of, participants to the specific option are seen as to be of low productivity and 
therefore stigmatized by the regular employer. It might also be tha t the matching 
process employee jobs gets worsened by the fact tha t participants in the subsidy 
option are forced into accepting low wage jobs or jobs not particularly suited for 
those participants. It however remains an open question whether such effect is due 
to die out over time, once the employer learns the true productivity of the individual.
3.7 Tables and Figures
Table 3.1 Options
ALL EXTENDED G ATEW AY
N % N %
Gateway 1,530 45.69 822 31.30
Subsidy 296 8.84 294 11.20
FTET 821 24.51 812 30.92
VS 345 10.30 345 13.14
ETF 357 10.66 353 13.44
N 3349 2626
Note: Figures com puted from Survey data.
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Table 3.2: P a r t ic ip a n t  C h a ra c te r is tic s  by O p tio n
O ptio n S ta ts E d u c . P ro b le m M ale A ge 2nd T em p -jo b W ork U n em p . H ist.
GATE mean 1.93 0.13 0.71 22.50 0.36 0.45 9.76
sd 0.85 0.34 0.46 1.96 0.48 0.50 13.83
SUBS. mean 2.08 0.07 0.72 22.56 0.41 0.55 13.60
sd 0.73 0.25 0.45 1.86 0.49 0.50 16.53
FTET mean 1.95 0.15 0.71 22.42 0.30 0.36 8.64
sd 0.73 0.35 0.45 1.86 0.46 0.48 13.09
VS mean 1.99 0.16 0.58 22.51 0.36 0.34 7.28
sd 0.88 0.36 0.49 1.97 0.48 0.47 11.34
ETF mean 1.71 0.19 0.93 22.48 0.35 0.43 10.74
sd 0.74 0.39 0.25 2.00 0.48 0.50 13.54
Total mean 1.93 0.14 0.72 22.48 0.34 0.42 9.65
sd 0.80 0.35 0.45 1.93 0.48 0.49 13.70
Note: Only participants w ith duration longer then 120 days are included in the table.
Educ. stands for education, a categorical variable taking values 1-5: l= n o  qualifications, 5=higher qualifications. 
Problem: whether ever had reading/m aths problem, l= y e s  and 0= n o . Age 2nd: age at second interview.
Temp-Job: whether had a series of temporary job after leaving full-time education, l= y e s  and 0=no.
Work: whether found a job within 3 m onths of leaving full-tim e education, l= y e s  and 0=no. 
unemp. Hist.: months of unemployment since 1993.
Table 3.3: UoD’s in the Local Area
Median Min. Max N
UoD’s 4 2 19 105
Areas 23
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EXTENDED G ATEW AY  
OLS IV  
(i) (H) (i) (ii)
Subsidy -.0221 -.0217 .2204 -.2191 -.0340 -.0336 -.2221 -.2234
[.0431] [.0403] | .1059] [.1130] [.0505] [.0417] [.0994] [.1063]
FTET -.0083 -.0070 .0187 .0374 -.0265 -.0250 -.0737 -.0550
[.0294] [.0336] [.1058] [.1133] [.0359] [.0399] [.1084] [.1151]
VS .0143 .0162 .0606 -.0327 .0043 .0066 -.1121 -.0822
[.0420] [.0369] | .1378] [.1418] [.0465] [.0398] [.1473] [.1829]
ETF .0341 .0343 .2106 .2446 .0076 .0095 .0944 .1154
[.0469] [.0337] .1810] [.2017] [.0534] [.039] [.1613] [.2133]
A -.0446 -.0465 -.0708 -.0752
[.0476] [.0366] [.0623] [.0368]
Local Area yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
W agea yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Education yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Gender yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
H is toryb yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Attitudec yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 885 635
Note: (i) and (ii) without and with sam ple selection for those who actually work respectively.
Bootstrap [standard errors], colum ns (ii) clustered at the UoD level obtained with 1000 replications.
local wage rate for full-time em ployee (UK LFS, 2000). b: m onths of unemployment since leaving school,
whether had a series o f tem p jobs, whether a job was found within 3 m onths of leaving school. 
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Figure 3.1: The program
3.8 APPENDIX
Table 3.5: Options take-up by UoD’s for low educated 
individuals
UoD Gate Subsidy FTEDT VS ETF
ayrshire 50.00 11.11 27.78 11.11 0.00
dunbarton 23.08 38.46 23.08 15.38 0.00
edinburgh, east and mid lothian 50.00 10.00 10.00 20.00 10.00
fife 54.29 11.43 22.86 2.86 8.57
forth valley 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 — continued from previous page
U oD G a te S u b sid y F T E D T V S E T F
glasgow 33.33 7.84 29.41 9.80 19.61
moray, strathspay and badenoch 57.14 14.29 28.57 0.00 0.00
lanarkshire 52.17 10.14 15.94 5.80 15.94
renfrewshire 63.04 8.70 13.04 8.70 6.52
west lothian 38.46 7.69 7.69 30.77 15.38
argyll and the islands 60.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 20.00
ross and eromarty 80.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
northumberland 20.00 20.00 40.00 20.00 0.00
tyneside north 39.39 3.03 48.48 6.06 3.03
durham north and durham  south 27.94 13.24 38.24 5.88 14.71
wearside 32.56 2.33 34.88 18.60 11.63
tees north and south 32.73 12.73 41.82 7.27 5.45
bolton 66.67 20.00 0.00 13.33 0.00
central lancashire 36.36 9.09 18.18 9.09 27.27
city pride (manchester 60.42 10.42 18.75 4.17 6.25
east lancashire 41.67 16.67 33.33 8.33 0.00
knowsley 19.23 7.69 57.69 7.69 7.69
liverpool 35.19 14.81 37.04 4.63 8.33
north lancashire 27.59 13.79 34.48 13.79 10.34
oldham 42.86 14.29 14.29 14.29 14.29
rochdale 46.15 15.38 15.38 0.00 23.08
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 — continued from previous page
U oD G a te S u b sid y F T E D T V S E T F
sefton 32.14 10.71 32.14 10.71 14.29
st helens 18.18 9.09 36.36 9.09 27.27
stockport 62.50 0.00 12.50 12.50 12.50
w. lancashire 60.00 0.00 30.00 0.00 10.00
wigan 35.71 28.57 14.29 7.14 14.29
south humber 32.14 0.00 21.43 25.00 21.43
calderdale and kirklees 50.00 9.68 27.42 6.45 6.45
barnsley and the dearne 0.00 14.29 57.14 14.29 14.29
bradford 42.22 4.44 35.56 8.89 8.89
hull 30.88 11.76 32.35 7.35 17.65
leeds 50.00 0.00 23.68 18.42 7.89
north yorkshire 38.46 7.69 15.38 23.08 15.38
wakefield and doncaster 27.50 17.50 32.50 10.00 12.50
north wales coast 20.00 0.00 40.00 20.00 20.00
Cardiff and vale 53.85 7.69 7.69 23.08 7.69
bridgend and glamorgan valleys 37.50 25.00 18.75 12.50 6.25
heads of the valley and Caerphilly 26.92 25.00 30.77 3.85 13.46
newport, torfaen and monmouth 55.00 5.00 20.00 15.00 5.00
birmingham 44.87 8.97 34.62 5.13 6.41
solihull 56.25 6.25 25.00 12.50 0.00
Staffordshire 33.33 27.78 16.67 5.56 16.67
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 — continued from previous page
UoD Gate Subsidy FTEDT VS ETF
hereford and Worcester 55.56 11.11 11.11 22.22 0.00
Coventry 65.38 7.69 11.54 7.69 7.69
Warwickshire 60.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 20.00
south derbyshire 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
Cambridge ttwa 46.15 7.69 30.77 15.38 0.00
north derbyshire 44.00 20.00 32.00 0.00 4.00
leicestershire 53.19 4.26 29.79 10.64 2.13
lincolnshire 25.00 0.00 25.00 50.00 0.00
norfolk 11.76 23.53 35.29 11.76 17.65
northamptonshire 75.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 0.00
greater nottingham 45.61 8.77 21.05 19.30 5.26
north nottinghamshire 31.71 7.32 31.71 12.20 17.07
Peterborough 50.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 25.00
Suffolk 37.50 12.50 50.00 0.00 0.00
exeter and east devon 27.27 9.09 36.36 9.09 18.18
north devon 0.00 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00
Plymouth 27.78 27.78 27.78 11.11 5.56
lambeth 75.00 0.00 12.50 12.50 0.00
hackney and city 80.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
brighton 61.54 7.69 23.08 0.00 7.69
canterbury 42.86 7.14 21.43 7.14 21.43
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 — continued from previous page
UoD Gate Subsidy FTEDT VS ETF
Chatham 36.36 4.55 27.27 13.64 18.18
croydon and bromley 40.00 40.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
guildford 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
lewisham 55.56 11.11 22.22 5.56 5.56
maidstone, dartford and mid kent 80.00 20.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
southwark 58.62 3.45 20.69 17.24 0.00
greenwich 33.33 0.00 66.67 0.00 0.00
sutton, merton esher, kingston, epsom 53.85 7.69 23.08 7.69 7.69
wandsworth 61.54 0.00 30.77 7.69 0.00
west sussex coastal plain 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
south essex 60.00 20.00 20.00 0.00 0.00
north and mid essex 50.00 12.50 25.00 12.50 0.00
edgeware and leaside 44.44 11.11 33.33 11.11 0.00
north east london 52.63 10.53 21.05 10.53 5.26
havering, barking and dagenham 20.00 0.00 20.00 60.00 0.00
newham 50.00 0.00 31.25 12.50 6.25
tower hamlets 50.00 9.09 13.64 27.27 0.00
camden and north islington 42.86 0.00 28.57 14.29 14.29
ealing 57.14 0.00 42.86 0.00 0.00
bedfordshire and luton 55.00 0.00 45.00 0.00 0.00
Oxfordshire 25.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 0.00
Continued on next page
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Table 3.5 — continued from previous page
U oD G a te S u b sid y F T E D T V S E T F
Portsmouth and se hampshire 66.67 11.11 11.11 11.11 0.00
isle of wight 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00
slough 79.17 0.00 12.50 8.33 0.00
wembley 60.00 0.00 30.00 10.00 0.00
hammersmith, fulham, kensington, chelsea 57.14 0.00 42.86 0.00 0.00
Total 43.14 10.13 27.86 9.74 9.14
Total 0.39 1.04 0.60 1.06 1.13
Note: .
Table 3.6: Options take-up by UoD’s for low educated 
individuals if new deal lasts more than 120
U oD G a te S u b sid y F T E D T V S E T F
ayrshire 30.77 15.38 38.46 15.38 0.00
dunbarton 9.09 45.45 27.27 18.18 0.00
edinburgh, east and mid lothian 37.50 12.50 12.50 25.00 12.50
fife 33.33 16.67 33.33 4.17 12.50
forth valley 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
glasgow 22.73 9.09 34.09 11.36 22.73
moray, strathspay and badenoch 25.00 25.00 50.00 0.00 0.00
lanarkshire 29.79 14.89 23.40 8.51 23.40
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 — continued from previous page
U oD G a te S u b sid y F T E D T VS E T F
renfrewshire 41.38 13.79 20.69 13.79 10.34
west lothian 27.27 9.09 9.09 36.36 18.18
argyll and the islands 33.33 33.33 0.00 0.00 33.33
northumberland 20.00 20.00 40.00 20.00 0.00
tyneside north 20.00 4.00 64.00 8.00 4.00
durham north and durham  south 15.79 15.79 43.86 7.02 17.54
wearside 26.32 2.63 36.84 21.05 13.16
tees north and south 21.28 14.89 48.94 8.51 6.38
bolton 44.44 33.33 0.00 22.22 0.00
central lancashire 30.00 10.00 20.00 10.00 30.00
city pride (manchester 45.45 15.15 24.24 6.06 9.09
east lancashire 36.36 18.18 36.36 9.09 0.00
knowsley 12.50 8.33 62.50 8.33 8.33
liverpool 22.22 17.78 44.44 5.56 10.00
north lancashire 22.22 14.81 37.04 14.81 11.11
oldham 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
rochdale 22.22 22.22 22.22 0.00 33.33
sefton 13.64 13.64 40.91 13.64 18.18
st helens 18.18 9.09 36.36 9.09 27.27
stockport 40.00 0.00 20.00 20.00 20.00
w. lancashire 50.00 0.00 33.33 0.00 16.67
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 — continued from previous page
UoD Gate Subsidy FTEDT VS ETF
wigan 18.18 36.36 18.18 9.09 18.18
south humber 24.00 0.00 24.00 28.00 24.00
calderdale and kirklees 35.56 13.33 33.33 8.89 8.89
barnsley and the dearne 0.00 14.29 57.14 14.29 14.29
bradford 36.59 4.88 39.02 9.76 9.76
hull 23.33 11.67 36.67 8.33 20.00
leeds 24.00 0.00 36.00 28.00 12.00
north yorkshire 20.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 20.00
wakefield and doncaster 21.62 18.92 35.14 10.81 13.51
north wales coast 20.00 0.00 40.00 20.00 20.00
Cardiff and vale 50.00 8.33 8.33 25.00 8.33
bridgend and glamorgan valleys 28.57 28.57 21.43 14.29 7.14
heads of the valley and caerphilly 11.90 28.57 38.10 4.76 16.67
newport, torfaen and monmouth 35.71 7.14 28.57 21.43 7.14
birmingham 30.65 11.29 43.55 6.45 8.06
solihull 56.25 6.25 25.00 12.50 0.00
Staffordshire 20.00 33.33 20.00 6.67 20.00
hereford and Worcester 50.00 12.50 12.50 25.00 0.00
Coventry 59.09 9.09 13.64 9.09 9.09
Warwickshire 33.33 0.00 33.33 0.00 33.33
south derbyshire 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 -  continued from previous page
UoD Gate Subsidy FTEDT VS ETF
Cambridge ttwa 30.00 10.00 40.00 20.00 0.00
north derbyshire 30.00 25.00 40.00 0.00 5.00
leicestershire 31.25 6.25 43.75 15.62 3.12
lincolnshire 25.00 0.00 25.00 50.00 0.00
norfolk 12.50 25.00 31.25 12.50 18.75
northamptonshire 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
greater nottingham 26.19 11.90 28.57 26.19 7.14
north nottinghamshire 26.32 7.89 34.21 13.16 18.42
Peterborough 50.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 25.00
Suffolk 28.57 14.29 57.14 0.00 0.00
exeter and east devon 11.11 11.11 44.44 11.11 22.22
north devon 0.00 33.33 66.67 0.00 0.00
Plymouth 18.75 31.25 31.25 12.50 6.25
lambeth 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00
hackney and city 75.00 0.00 25.00 0.00 0.00
brighton 44.44 11.11 33.33 0.00 11.11
canterbury 27.27 9.09 27.27 9.09 27.27
Chatham 26.32 5.26 31.58 15.79 21.05
croydon and bromley 0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00
guildford 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
lewisham 46.67 13.33 26.67 6.67 6.67
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 — continued from previous page
U oD G a te S ub sid y F T E D T V S E T F
southwark 42.86 4.76 28.57 23.81 0.00
sutton, merton esher, kingston, epsom 40.00 10.00 30.00 10.00 10.00
wandsworth 50.00 0.00 40.00 10.00 0.00
west sussex coastal plain 50.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00
south essex 50.00 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00
north and mid essex 33.33 16.67 33.33 16.67 0.00
edgeware and leaside 37.50 12.50 37.50 12.50 0.00
north east london 43.75 12.50 25.00 12.50 6.25
havering, barking and dagenham 0.00 0.00 25.00 75.00 0.00
newham 36.00 0.00 40.00 16.00 8.00
tower hamlets 8.33 16.67 25.00 50.00 0.00
camden and north islington 20.00 0.00 40.00 20.00 20.00
ealing 25.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 0.00
bedfordshire and luton 50.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00
Oxfordshire 25.00 0.00 75.00 0.00 0.00
Portsmouth and se hampshire 0.00 33.33 33.33 33.33 0.00
isle of wight 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00
slough 66.67 0.00 20.00 13.33 0.00
wembley 50.00 0.00 37.50 12.50 0.00
hammersmith, fulham, kensington, chelsea 40.00 0.00 60.00 0.00 0.00
Total 28.66 12.69 34.79 12.31 11.55
Continued on next page
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Table 3.6 -  continued from previous page
UoD Gate Subsidy FTEDT VS ETF
c v 0.53 1.00 0.52 0.98 1.03
Table 3.7: First Stage and Robustness Checks
FIRST STAGE ROBUSTNESS
Subsidy Vs Remaining Selected IV Larger UoD’s
R2 Shea F-stats All IV 1 IV All UoD’s 10 UoD’s 20 UoD’s 10 UoD’s 20
Subsidy 0.0950 17.55 -.2328 -.2031 -.3483 -.4254 -.5078 -.2088 -0.2067
[.1043] [.0641] [.1834] [.1834] [.2146] [.1100] [0.1060]
FTET 0.0807 8.88 -.0714 -.0208 -.0396 -.1072 -0.1267
[.1917] [.1989] [.2351] [.1163] [0.1203]
VS 0.0783 1.02 -.2801 -.2708 -.1668 -.1321 -0.0296
[.2799] [.2889] [.2906] [.1466 [0.1578]
ETF 0.0723 14.64 .3116 .2287 .3935 -.1587 0.1814
[.5231] [.5047] [.5553] [.2276] [0.2734]
Anderson
P-value .0751 .0103 .0369 .0338 .0629
Hansen J
P-value .1647 .1391 .1563 .3854
N 885 885 885 856 752 856 752
Note: Same controls as in Table 3.4, [Standard Errors] are heteroscedasticity robust. More than 10 
participants drops 5% (or 5 U oD ’s) of the sample. More than 20 (or 10 U oD ’s) drops 15% of the sample.
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□  F T E D T
Figure 3.2: Options’ Take-Up By UoD’s
CHAPTER IV
Indirect Effects o f an A id Program:




Policy interventions in developing countries are likely to affect all residents of 
the areas where they are implemented, especially when village economies and social 
networks create strong links between a limited number of households. However, the 
program evaluation literature is mainly focused on estimating the program effects on 
the treated, rather than the effects on the non-treated or general equilibrium effects. 
In this paper, we exploit the unique design of a randomized conditional cash transfer 
program in Mexico, Progresa, to estimate its indirect effect on consumption for non- 
eligible households who live in treatm ent areas, and to understand the mechanisms 
through which this indirect effect occurs. We show tha t liquidity injections into 
small rural communities increase the consumption of the non-treated through changes 
in the credit and insurance markets. Thus, the to tal effect of Progresa in these 
communities is larger than its effect on the treated. Our results confirm th a t a key 
identifying assumption - th a t the program has no effect on non-treated individuals - 
is likely to be violated in similar policy designs.
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Conditional cash transfers are a popular type of aid program, which provides 
monetary transfers to eligible recipients, provided they send their children to school, 
attend nutrition classes, and have periodic health checks. Programs with this format 
are currently implemented in numerous countries, including Bangladesh, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Progresa is an on­
going conditional cash transfer program targeted at Mexican poor rural households, 
providing grants to improve education, health, and nutrition.
The design of the experimental trial and the data  collected for the evaluation have 
some unique features. First, the randomization was implemented a t the village level. 
Second, program adm inistrators collected data  on all households, both poor and non­
poor, although only poor households were eligible for the treatm ent. Thus, we have 
information on four groups: poor and non-poor households in treatm ent and control 
villages. Non-poor households in control villages provide a valid counterfactual for 
the non-poor in treatm ent ones, under the assumptions th a t assignment is truly 
random, and tha t control villages are not indirectly affected by the program. Hence, 
this particular experimental design enables us to estimate the indirect effects of the 
program on non-eligible households who live in treatm ent areas using fairly standard 
identifying assumptions.
We focus on consumption because it provides an indicator of household well-being. 
We find that there is a positive, significant, and sizeable indirect program effect on 
consumption for non-eligible families, amounting to two thirds of the increase in 
consumption for the poor, in absolute level. Further, we study the mechanisms tha t 
lead to this increase in consumption. For example, the implementation of Progresa 
may modify labor supply, altering equilibrium wages, or it may increase goods prices 
through higher demand. We find tha t there are no significant indirect effects on
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labor earnings, prices (with the exception of increases in few food items in 1998), 
and welfare receipt, and th a t sales of agricultural products decrease. Therefore, we 
rule out the hypothesis th a t the indirect program effect on consumption is generated 
by an increase in current income. Instead, we show tha t non-poor households in 
treatm ent villages consume more by receiving more transfers, by borrowing more 
money - almost exclusively from family, friends, or informal moneylenders - and by 
reducing their stocks of grains and animals. In addition, we show th a t the indirect 
program effects on consumption and loans are larger for households hit by a negative 
idiosyncratic shock. Thus, we conclude th a t cash transfers in treatm ent villages indi­
rectly benefit non-treated households by improving consumption smoothing. These 
results correspond to our knowledge of developing countries, where credit and in­
surance occur through informal networks of family, friends, and neighbors. Positive 
income shocks to some households benefit the whole network, whose other members 
receive larger loans and transfers, especially the ones hit by negative shocks. The 
availability of additional liquidity in the network enables households to reduce their 
savings.
While it is often difficult to predict the effects of a nationwide program using 
data from limited geographic areas, the effects on the credit and insurance market 
should not be a function of the number of treated villages, as long as social networks 
are village-specific. Hence, we can predict positive indirect effects on consumption 
occurring through changes in local credit and insurance arrangem ents.1 Thus, the 
indirect effects reinforce the direct ones in this class of policies, unlike in many active 
labor market programs.2
1As regards the labor market, there should not be any major changes, as long as the decrease in child labor is 
minimal, compared to the size of the active labor force. The general equilibrium effect on goods prices is instead less 
clear.
2For example, Blundell et al. (2004) and De Giorgi (2005) discuss the possibility that subsidized employment for 
the treated group in the British New Deal program may generate a substitution effects between treated and control
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By estimating significant indirect treatm ent effects, this paper provides a very 
clear example of the violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
(SUTVA). SUTVA states th a t potential outcomes depend on the treatm ent received, 
and not on what treatm ents other units receive (Rubin, 1980, 1986), ruling out any 
effect of the program on non-treated households. As such, our exercise highlights the 
importance of carefully considering the type of data  available and the policy at hand 
before implementing partial equilibrium estimators. For example, when the distance 
(economic, social or geographic) between treatm ent and control group is small, and 
when the treatm ent group is a large fraction of the local economy, the SUTVA may 
be less likely to hold.
In sum, the paper contributes to different literatures. We add to the literature 
that studies consumption smoothing and credit and insurance markets in low-income 
economies by showing the indirect effects of an exogenous liquidity injection. Some 
important references in the risk-sharing literature are the work of Deaton (1991), 
Townsend (1994, 1995a, 1995b), Udry (1994, 1995), Banerjee et al. (2003), and 
Banerjee (2004), among others. We also contribute to the program evaluation litera­
ture in multiple ways: first, we show tha t a class of widely implemented aid policies 
has important positive externalities, and we establish how they operate. Second, 
we try and extrapolate the indirect effects of a nationwide conditional cash transfer 
program in the credit and insurance market. The literature on indirect effects can be 
roughly grouped into papers tha t use sources of exogenous variation to identify peer 
effects, and papers th a t set up and calibrate structural models to estim ate general 
equilibrium effects. The first group includes Philipson (2000), Katz et al. (2001), 
Sacerdote (2001), Duflo and Saez (2002), and Miguel and Kremer (2004). Bobonis
units.
and Finan (2005) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2005) use Progresa data  to estimate peer 
effects in schooling decisions. The second group includes, among others, Heckman et 
al. (1998) and Lise et al. (2005). Third, we provide an example of the failure of the 
SUTVA, which is usually non-testable, and we discuss cases in which this failure is 
likely to occur.
The paper is organized as follows: section 4.2 describes the structure of Progresa 
and the characteristics of the da ta  collected for its evaluation. Section 4.3 discusses 
the identification of the param eters of interest, while Section 4.4 estimates and in­
terprets these parameters. Section 4.5 analyzes the possible channels through which 
consumption increases, and Section 4.6 investigates the role of idiosyncratic shocks 
on consumption and credit market. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Progresa: program structure and data characteristics
Progresa is an ongoing Mexican program targeting poor households, providing 
grants to improve education, health, and nutrition. S tarted in 1998, this program had 
about 2.6 million recipient households in more than 2,000 municipalities by the end of 
1999, at a cost of approximately 0.2% of Mexico’s GDP. Progresa provides grants in 
the form of nutritional subsidies, as well as scholarships for children attending third to 
ninth grade. The recipients of the transfers are women. Grants, paid bimonthly, are 
conditional upon family visits to  health centers, women’s participation in informal 
workshops on health and nutrition issues, and verification th a t children attended 
classes at least 85% of the time during the previous sixty days. Scholarships are larger 
for higher school grades and for females attending secondary school, the bimonthly 
amounts ranging between 160 pesos for third grade to 530 and 610 pesos for males and 
female in ninth grade, in November 1999. These payments correspond approximately
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to one half to two thirds of the wage a child would earn by working full time (Schultz, 
2004), and cannot exceed a to tal of 1500 pesos per household (bimonthly), again in 
November 1999.3 These grants are quite large, corresponding to 20% of pre-program 
consumption.
The experimental da ta  for the evaluation of Progresa contain information on 
households from a sub-sample of 506 poor rural villages from seven different states. 
The randomization is conducted a t the village level, with 186 villages randomized out 
(about 36% of the sampled localities). D ata are collected both before the program 
starts and during the first 18 months of its implementation. Eligibility depends on 
poverty status, and households are classified into poor and non-poor according to 
the information collected in the September 1997 census of localities.4 There were 
two rounds of selection of eligible households in Progresa. On average 52 percent of 
households were initially classified as poor in 1997.5 The households are informed 
that, after they are classified as poor and non-poor, their eligibility status will not 
change until November 1999, irrespective of any income variation. All residents of 
both control and treatm ent villages were then interviewed about every six months, 
first in November 1998 - about a  semester after the beginning of the program, and 
later in May and November 1999. This provides information from three different 
points in time after the beginning of the program, as well as pre-program data.
Eligible households in control villages were not administered the program until 
the end of 1999. Thus, our da ta  can be divided in four groups: poor and non-poor 
households in treatm ent and control villages. Only poor households in treatm ent
3The size of the scholarships were smaller in 1998 and were later adjusted to keep their real value constant.
4For a detailed discussion of the selection criteria both for villages and households see Skoufias et al., 1999b; 
however poverty status is mainly based on measures of permanent income.
5The following year, almost half of the households initially classified as non-poor were added into the beneficiary 
group. However, most of this latter set of families did not receive the transfers for other exogenous reasons (admin­
istrative problems), irrespective of their com pliance w ith the eligibility rules. For this reason, we restrict our sample 
to the households initially classified as poor when we estim ate program effects on the treated.
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areas receive the Progresa transfers. Poor households in control villages know tha t 
they will be included in the program at the end of 1999, provided tha t they are still 
poor and tha t the program is still in place.6 The structure of the data  is shown 
in Figure 4.1. In the following section we discuss how we exploit this particular 
sample design to estim ate the effect of the program on non-eligible households living 
in treatm ent villages, i.e. our indirect program effect parameter.
4.3 Identification
Experimental da ta  often consist of a sample of eligible individuals randomly as­
signed to the treatm ent or to  the control group.7 Instead, the sample for the evalua­
tion of Progresa has some im portant features th a t make its design unique: first, it is 
randomized at the village level. Second, it has data  on all households, both poor and 
non-poor, although only poor households were eligible for the treatm ent. Thus, we 
have information on four groups: poor and non-poor households in treatm ent and 
control villages. Under the assumptions th a t the assignment is truly random, and 
that control villages are not affected by the program, poor in control areas provide 
a valid counterfactual for treated  poor, and non-poor in control villages provide a 
counterfactual for non-poor in treatm ent villages. Therefore, we can estimate the 
indirect effect of Progresa on non-eligible households who live in the same locality 
as treated households using standard identification assumptions. We define this pa­
rameter below as the Indirect Treatm ent Effect (ITE). Estimating significant ITEs 
implies that the treatm ent affects potential outcomes of the ineligibles who live in 
treatment areas. This is a violation of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
(SUTVA). Thus, the sample design enables us to test the SUTVA at the locality
6The existence of the program could not be guaranteed beyond 1999 because Progresa may have been discontinued 
by the new administration, after the 2000 general election.
7See, for example, the evaluation of the GAIN project by Hotz et al. (2000), or the JTPA randomized trial as in 
Heckman and Smith (2004).
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level, which is not normally possible.
Formally, define Yu  as the potential outcome for non-poor (NPi = 1) in treatm ent 
villages (T* =  1) in the presence o f the treatment. Yqi is the potential outcome for 
non-poor (NPi =  1) in treatm ent villages (T* =  1) in the absence of the treatment. 
The observed outcome is: Yi — Yoi+Ti(Yu — Y0i). The treatm ent is Progresa transfers 
to poor households (N Pi =  0) in treatm ent villages (T* =  1). The ITE is the average 
effect of the program on non-poor households living in treatm ent villages:8
IT E  = E(YU -  Yoi\Ti = 1, NPt = 1)
(4.1)
= E(Yu \Ti =  1, NPi = 1) -  E(Y0i\Ti = 1, NPt = 1).
Since we do not observe the potential outcome in the absence of the treatm ent for 
non-poor households in treated communities, E(Yoi\Ti = I, N Pi =  1), the identifi­
cation of indirect treatm ent effects relies on the assumption th a t it has the same 
expected value as the potential outcome in the absence of the program for non-poor 
households in control villages:
ASSUMPTION (1): E(Y0i\Ti =  l ,N P t =  1) =  E(Y0i\Ti = 0,N P { = 1)
Under this assumption, the difference
(4.2) E(Yi\Ti = 1, NPi = 1) -  E(Yi\Ti = 0, NP{ = 1)
identifies the ITE. Note th a t this is a slight modification of the standard assumption 
made for the identification of ATT effects.
Despite the randomization, assumption (1) would be violated if outcomes of non­
poor households in control villages were indirectly affected by the program. However, 
if there are indirect program effects for non-poor households in both treatm ent and 
control villages, the sign of these effects is likely to be the same for the two groups.
8We could rewrite the I T E  in its conditional version as I T E  =  E (Y u  — Yoi\Ti =  1, N P i =  1, X ) .
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For example, suppose th a t the increase in school enrollment of treated children re­
duces child labor. This decrease in labor supply may results in higher employment 
and earnings for non-poor households in both treatm ent and control villages. Note, 
however, tha t the size of these effects is an inverse function of the degree of integra­
tion of the village economies.9 Going back to our example, the fall in relative labor 
supply may be small enough, compared to the total size of the labor market, to 
leave employment and earnings virtually unchanged. On the other hand, if the local 
economies are sufficiently isolated, then the indirect program effects are unlikely to 
extend to neighboring villages. In the presence of a violation of assumption (1) of the 
type described above, the difference E(Yi\Ti =  1, NPi =  1) — E(Yi\Ti = 0, NPi = 1) 
is a lower bound to the ITE.
We obtain estimates of the ITEs (or of their bounds) from the following equation 
for non-poor households:
(4.3) Yi = a  + @Ti +  g(X i) -f- U{
where the subscript i refers to the i — th  household, Yi is some outcome of interest 
(e.g. consumption). Under assumption (1), j3 identifies the IT E .  We add a set 
of conditioning variables, X*, to increase the precision of the estimates. These are: 
poverty index, shock dummy, pre-program income and land, household size, dummies 
for head of household gender, age composition of the household, employment status, 
language (Spanish, indigenous language or both), and literacy, at the household level; 
village marginalization index, average number of shocks in the previous 6 months, 
number of households, number of treated  households, geographic region dummies at 
the locality level. If we estim ate (4.3) for poor households, (3 identifies the A T T
tech n ica lly , what is needed is only integration of the product market in the presence of relatively large number 
of products traded with respect to  factors (M undell, 1966).
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under the assumption th a t E(Yoi\Ti = 1) =  E(Y0i\Ti =  O).10
4.4 Indirect Treatment Effect on consumption
We now proceed to estimate IT E s  for food and non-food consumption. We com­
puted measures of monthly food and non-food expenditure per adult equivalent, using 
an equivalence scale estimated from these data  and constant prices. The Appendix 
provides further details on the creation of these variables.
The means of food and non-food consumption in Table 4.1 show, as expected, tha t the 
non-poor consume substantially more than the poor, despite the Progresa transfers. 
However, the average non-poor household is clearly not very well off, in absolute 
levels: average food and non-food consumption for non-poor in control areas are 
about 20 and 7.5 U.S. dollars per adult equivalent per month. Lastly, consumption 
is higher in treated areas, especially for poor households, but also among non-poor 
ones (in May and November 1999 for food consumption, and in May 1999 only for 
non-food consumption).
We obtain estimates of the Indirect Treatment Effect (and A T T ) for consumption 
expenditures estimating (4.3) by OLS for each time period, using the logs of food 
and non-food consumption (expenditures) as dependent variables (Table 4.2).
The ITE is never significant in November 1998, a few months after the program 
began, while food consumption is significantly higher in 1999, by 5.1% in May and by 
6.7% in November. This corresponds to about 10 and 13 pesos per adult equivalent, 
respectively. Non-food consumption is significantly different in May 1999 only, and it 
is higher by 13.8% in treatm ent areas, i.e. about 10 pesos per adult equivalent, while
10Actually, in this case 0  identifies the average intent to  treat effect, i.e. the effect of the treatment on eligible 
households irrespective of participation. However, in this case the difference between intent to  treat and treatment 
on the treated is negligible, because about 97% of eligible households participate to the program. Therefore, we will 
continue referring to /3 as ATT, when estim ating (4.3) for poor households.
94
the effect is negative but not significant in November 1999.11 Thus, consumption 
increases overall by approximately 100 and 70 pesos per household per month in 
May and November 1999.12 Poor food and non-food consumption, instead, increases 
in all three periods, consistent with the existing evidence (Hoddinott et al., 2000); 
this impact is proportionally larger over time, although constant in absolute value in 
1999, with an average monthly consumption increase of 30 pesos per adult equivalent.
The results above are robust to a variety of checks, as detailed in the Appendix. 
These include alternative ways of dealing with households who reported zero food 
and non-food consumption (2.9% and 1.5%, respectively), alternative treatm ent of 
households with extremely large reported consumption levels, and alternative mea­
sures of food consumption. We also fail to detect any pre-program significant differ­
ence in food and non-food consumption between households in treatm ent and control 
villages.
4.5 Why does Progresa increase non-poor consumption?
We showed tha t Progresa has a positive spillover effect on non-poor consumption. 
This externality has multiple potential causes. First, the increased income of treated 
households, together with the surge in treated children’s school attendance, and the 
decrease in child labor, may cause changes in the goods and labor markets, which 
could result in higher income for non-poor households. Second, non-poor households 
may receive additional aid, as we will explain below. Third, the increased liquidity 
in treatment villages may affect the local credit and insurance markets. Households 
may borrow more for investment or consumption purposes.13 Lastly, households may 
reduce their savings. A decrease in savings would be compatible with better insurance
11Total consumption for non-poor in treatment areas is 5.3% and 4.9% higher in May and November 1999. Both  
differences are statistically significant. Results available upon request.
12The average adult equivalent household size is 5.0 and 5.3 in the two 1999 waves.
13The former effect would result in higher current consumption through higher current or permanent income.
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against risk, which lowers the need for self-insurance, or with a drop in interest rates 
caused by the increased liquidity. Note tha t the higher consumption may be financed 
through a drop in investment, although it is not clear why households would change 
their preferences in this way. We can summarize the above discussion using the 
following accounting identity:
(4.4) AYi +  A Li = AC,  +  A $  +  A I{
where Y  is income, L are net loans and transfers, C  is consumption, S  are savings and 
I  investment for household i, and A is the indirect program effect for each outcome 
of interest. In the next sections we will consider these different channels individually, 
discussing and testing our hypotheses in greater detail.
4.5.1 Labor market effects
The program may affect non-poor consumption levels through higher labor earn­
ings, for example by increasing equilibrium wages or non-poor labor supply. These 
effects may occur if the increase in poor children school attendance and the related 
scholarships decrease the overall labor supply by reducing both child and adult la­
bor. Their magnitude depends on the drop in labor supply and on the degree of 
integration of the local economy: the higher the integration, the smaller the pro­
gram impact. For example, the potential drop in child labor caused by the increase 
in treated children’s school attendance may increase labor earnings through higher 
local wages, if treatm ent villages are economically isolated, while such an effect will 
be small if the village economies are sufficiently integrated.
We investigate this hypothesis by testing whether households in treatm ent and 
control villages earn a different labor income. We compute the household monthly
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labor earnings variable summing income from both primary and secondary occupa­
tions, using the reported wages (which may be daily, weekly, monthly or annual) 
and hours worked. Table 4.3 reports tobit cross-sectional estimates of differences in 
per capita monthly labor earnings, where the first column shows pre-program dif­
ferences. We do not detect any statistically significant difference in labor earnings 
between non-poor households living in treatm ent and control localities. The values 
of the point estimates is also low, compared with the consumption change, with the 
exception of a 64 peso earnings increase in November 1999 estimates, though statis­
tically insignificant. However, this difference becomes smaller once we consider also 
earnings from informal activities: we considered the effect on earnings from informal 
work activities such as the provision of transportation, cooking, sewing, repairs, car­
pentry, and various other paid services, and we found a small and negative program 
effect, although never significant.14 Lastly, we tested for differences in hours of work, 
which never change for the non-poor. Thus, we find no compelling evidence th a t the 
increase in consumption is caused by labor-related indirect program effects.
The program effect on labor income has no clear trend for poor households. The 
difference in earnings is significantly higher in November 1998 and November 1999, 
but lower in May 1999.
4.5.2 G oods market: effects on prices and sales
It is possible tha t the higher expenditure induced by the Progresa transfers may 
increase goods prices. Again, this depends on the degree of integration of the goods 
market. If prices in treatm ent villages increase, and non-poor earnings from sales 
rise, the non-poor in treatm ent villages may use this extra income to consume more.
14We also estimated these regressions by OLS, since tobit estim ates are inconsistent in the presence of heteroskedas- 
ticity. If we interpret the reported zero labor earnings as very low earnings, or as measurement error due e.g. to 
illness, then OLS estim ates Eire consistent. The OLS estim ates are never significant.
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In order to test this hypothesis, we first compare prices in treatm ent and control 
localities to see whether they are significantly different.15 To do so, we consider village 
prices by good over time. We provide details on the creation of the price variables 
in the Appendix, as well as estimates of the price differences between treatm ent and 
control villages. We noted tha t some prices differ before the program begins, in 
March 1998, hence we provide difference-in-difference (DD) estimates of the effect 
of the Program on village prices. This exercise is possible only for food prices, since 
there is no pre-program information on non-food prices. We find a small positive 
effect on 5 out of 36 food prices in November 1998, which we do not expect to increase 
the cost of the food basket substantially, because prices of staples such as rice, beans, 
corn, and chicken do not change. We find no food price change in the later waves, 
nor evidence of price changes from cross sectional variation, when we consider both 
food and non-food prices.
Even if prices do not differ between control and treatm ent villages, the non-poor 
in treated localities may earn a higher income than the non-poor in control villages 
by selling more goods to poor households. We test whether there is a significant 
difference in sales of agricultural products and of animals for poor and non-poor 
households in control and treatm ent villages. We compute net agricultural sales by 
subtracting production costs from the gross sales variable, and the net animal sales 
by subtracting the value of purchases from sales. No data  are available in November 
1999. Table 4.4 shows estimates of the IT E s  and A T T s  for these variables, at 
November 1998 prices. The agricultural IT E s  are mainly negative and significant: 
households reduce production costs by 9 and 18 pesos, and sales by even more, namely 
by 20 and 40 pesos, resulting in lower net sales. While alternative explanations are
15Note that the higher consumption of treated households may increase local goods prices, resulting in higher 
nominal prices. However, this would not explain the observed increased consumption, since we use real prices in our 
measures of consumption.
possible, we suspect tha t part of this reduction in costs and sales is due to  a reduction 
in the grains buffer stock, which are used to sow the land or as consumption of 
home produced goods or both. We will provide further evidence consistent with 
this hypothesis when estimating the program effects on savings. Irrespective of the 
determinants of this behavior, it is clear tha t the extra consumption is not financed 
through higher sales. There is also a small decrease in purchases of animals in 1998, 
together with a small and positive, yet imprecisely estimated, effect on net sales. 
Lastly, note the decrease in net sales for the poor, caused by a contemporaneous 
increase in costs and decrease in sales. We interpret this result as evidence tha t 
treated households increase both their agricultural production (and probably also 
their stock of grains) and their own-consumption, producing more but selling less 
because a larger share of the harvest is consumed (or saved).
4.5.3 A dditional aid program recipience
One additional possible cause for the higher non-poor consumption in treatm ent 
areas may be the higher relative supply of transfers from alternative welfare pro­
grams. This may occur for two reasons. The first reason is th a t one of the aims 
of Progresa is to replace some of the numerous pre-existing welfare program into a 
single one (DIF, INI, Ninos de Solidaridad, Tortilla, and Liconsa). These programs 
range from the provision of food (Liconsa, Tortilla) to the assistance of specific 
sub-samples of the populations (children, in the case of Ninos de Solidaridad, and 
indigenous households for INI, the National Institute for Indigens). This may leave 
some agencies located in treatm ent villages with excess levels of aid (in cash or kind), 
which they may direct to households classified as non-poor. The second reason is 
a reduced need of treated households’ additional welfare assistance because of Pro­
gresa. For example, if Progresa transfers help protect recipients against risk, they
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may be less in need of emergency assistance. This may be directed to some non-poor 
in treatment areas.
We test whether non-poor and poor households in treatm ent and control villages 
have significant different intakes of alternative welfare programs. We first create 
some aggregate measures of program receipt. These are the likelihood of participat­
ing into at least one alternative program; the number of programs the households 
participates into, conditional on receiving at least one alternative type of welfare; the 
total monetary transfers the households received in the previous month. We then test 
for differences in the likelihood of participating to individual programs. We present 
aggregate estimates of these differences in Table 4.5, while we report the difference in 
participation rates program by program in the Appendix. As expected, participation 
into alternative welfare programs is significantly lower for poor households in trea t­
ment communities in all post-program waves (nevertheless, they are still better off 
with Progresa). Thus, because of a reduction in recipients in treatm ent villages, it is 
possible that non-poor households may appropriate some of the resources previously 
targeted to poor households. Indeed, in May 1999 there is a 1.8 percentage point 
increase in the likelihood of receiving cash through Solidaridad, and a 0.7 percentage 
point increase in receipt of free milk for the non-poor. However, these differences 
are very small. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the overall amount of 
monetary transfers received from cash programs, nor in participation rates into any 
other in-kind program in the two village groups.
In the Appendix we provide evidence against the hypothesis th a t welfare receipt 
from alternative programs may have increased for non-poor in both treatm ent and 
control villages. In sum, we do not find evidence tha t the higher non-poor consump­




The final transmission mechanism operates through the credit and insurance mar­
ket. Financial market imperfections in developing countries are well documented in 
the literature: since formal insurance or credit institutions are almost absent, infor­
mal lending and risk-sharing mechanisms often arise, in the form of transfers and 
loans through social networks (see, for example, Townsend, 1995a; Fafchamps and 
Lund, 2003; and Munshi and Rosenzweig, 2005). In this sense, credit and insurance 
markets are in practice merged (see Udry, 1994, among others). As such, in the 
rest of the paper we consider them jointly, and often refer to them  as the “credit 
market” .16 One advantage of these informal arrangements is their low likelihood of 
default, or of not reciprocating with transfers, because of the personal relationships 
between the agents involved, the high amount of available information, and the re­
peated nature of the interactions, which make exclusion from future transactions a 
costly punishment for defaulting.
When social networks and informal lending channels are im portant means to 
smooth consumption and insure against risk, even small liquidity injections into the 
network may have substantial spillover effects through increased loans and trans­
fers. Note that the lender/donor here may be both a treated household, which can 
lend more money and transfer resources to non-treated neighbors because its income 
has increased, and a non-treated household, which may shift resources from poor 
households (less needy of help because they receive Progresa grants) to non-poor
16Our definition of credit market includes loans and transfers. In developing rural economies, transfers from family 
and friends may be considered as credit if the receiver reciprocates when the donor is in need.
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households within the same network.17,18 We believe the program may have substan­
tial indirect effects in the credit market because most of the loans are informal: 70% 
of lenders are friends or relatives of the borrower (and a further 9% are local mon­
eylenders), and because the scale of these informal networks is limited by their being 
based on personal relationships. Thus, the positive effects of a liquidity injection are 
shared by a limited number of households.19
We have information on receipt of loans in the previous six months, of transfers 
(monetary and in kind) from family and friends during the previous month, but no 
information on the identity of lenders and donors, e.g. whether they are from poor or 
non-poor households. In order to understand the overall program indirect effect on 
the credit market, we need to observe these variables in all data waves. Unfortunately, 
this is possible only in November 1998, when very little money had been transferred 
to treated households.20 In the remaining waves, we observe loans in May 1999, and 
transfers in November 1999. We report means and standard deviations in Table 4.6. 
Only about 12 percent of the non-poor and 8 percent of the poor receive any resources 
in November 1998. The average monthly receipt amounts to some 400 pesos for the 
non-poor, and to 260 pesos for the poor households. Interestingly, this pattern  is 
common for all variables and semesters: a higher proportion of the non-poor receives 
resources, compared to the poor, and their average receipt is larger, both in treatm ent 
and in control villages. A possible explanation for loans may be th a t the non-poor
17Program recipients are unlikely to leave the network and not share their income increase, if they are sufficiently 
forward-looking, because the Progresa grants may stop in November 1999, and will certainly alm ost entirely end 
after all the children complete 9th grade.
18The direct effect on loans and transfers for poor households is ambiguous. Public transfers may crowd out private 
ones, as documented by Albarran and Attanasio (2002), and treated households may have less need to borrow. On 
the other hand, the higher liquidity in the village and the possibility of using the Progresa transfers as collateral may 
cause an increase in loans to these households.
19Another possible explanation is that the liquidity injection lowers the informal interest rate, resulting in an 
increase of current consumption levels.
20We also observe migrant remittances in November 1998 and November 1999. We add them  to  loans and transfers 
to  compute our measure of total credit resources. We separately estim ated indirect program effects on remittances, 
and found no significant effect. Results available upon request.
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have more assets, which can be used as collateral to borrow against, while the larger 
transfer size may suggest th a t the non-poor belong to a wealthier network, where 
people transfer more resources. In any case, the larger transfer size suggests once 
more that the so-called non-poor households are indeed not very wealthy, otherwise 
they would not be in need of transfers from family and friends. Lastly, note that, for 
the non-poor, both the proportion of recipients and the size of the receipt are larger 
in treatment than in control areas, while there is no differences for poor households.
We want to test whether Progresa has an indirect impact on both the probability 
of receiving loans and transfers, and the amounts received, measured in pesos per 
month. For this purpose, we estimate versions of equation (4.3) by probit and tobit, 
using loans and transfers measures as dependent variables. Table 4.7 provides esti­
mates of I T  E s  and A T T  s. There are no significant program effects in 1998: the I T  E  
point estimates are positive but very imprecisely estimated. This lack of significant 
effects is not surprising, as in November 1998 Progresa had only just started, and 
very little money had been transferred to the program recipients. Indeed, the effects 
are positive and significant in 1999, when Progresa had been operating for a t least 
one year. In May 1999, non-poor families in treated villages have a 1.5 percentage 
point higher chance of having a loan: this is 40% more than in control villages. They 
also borrow on average 3.8 more pesos per month, i.e. one third more than  non-poor 
in control communities. This evidence is consistent with our conjecture th a t the 
program liquidity injection may relax a constraint on the lender side, enabling them 
to lend more. In November 1999, transfers to the non-poor are significantly higher 
by 6.6 pesos, or one third, in treatm ent villages. These households have also a higher 
likelihood of receiving transfers, although the coefficient is imprecisely estimated. 
This evidence suggests tha t the liquidity injection caused by Progresa may benefit
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the non-poor through some resource redistribution. However, the proportion of non­
poor households receiving in-kind transfers decreases significantly in November 1999. 
This suggests tha t there may be a shift in the composition of transfers (e.g. from 
food and clothing to money), again consistent with the higher liquidity brought by 
Progresa.21 To conclude, note th a t there is a significant decrease in both loans and 
in-kind transfers to treated households, and no effect on monetary transfers. Our 
results are robust to different treatm ents of the outliers and to the use of different 
estimators.22
In sum, we found tha t both loans and family and friend transfers to the non-poor 
are significantly higher by one third in treatm ent villages in 1999. Assuming tha t 
the magnitudes of the effects are constant throughout the two 1999 semesters (since 
we observe loans in May and transfers in November), non-poor households receive on 
average an extra 10 pesos per month. This explains only part of the observed higher 
consumption, which amounts to about 100 and 70 pesos per household (in May and 
November 1999, respectively).23
4.5.5 Savings and investm ents
So far we have seen tha t the indirect program effect on consumption is not caused 
by increases in earnings and welfare receipt, and only partially caused by higher 
loans and transfers. The difference must be financed through a reduction in savings 
or investments, as shown in the accounting identity in (4.4).
21 Unfortunately we do not have any information on the value of in-kind transfers, so we cannot com pute the total 
value of transfers.
22We ran the above regressions on the entire sample, trimming the top percentile o f the positive values, and 
dropping the four largest amounts, respectively. We ran all regressions by OLS. In all cases, the point estim ates 
varied very little. We also found that the non-response rates, which vary between 0 and 5.4% for non-poor households, 
do not differ between treatment and control areas. This may have been an important issue, owing to the relatively 
small number of households reporting loans or transfers.
23Part of the consumption increase may be financed through a reduction in donations from non-poor households 
in treatment villages. This would be possible if, for example, the Progresa transfers to  the poor were crowding out 
private transfers from the non-poor. However, the difference in resources donated from the non-poor in treatment and 
control villages is never statistically significant. Note that only a total of 56 non-poor households donated resources 
to  family and friends in the November 1998 and November 1999 data.
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Rural households’ savings are primarily in the form of grains and livestock: fewer 
than one percent of non-poor households hold interest-bearing savings (although 
we do not explicitly observe their monetary value). We test for differences in the 
stock of grains and animals owned by the non-poor in treatm ent and control villages, 
comparing the tons of grains and number of animals owned. The change in stock 
may differ from the peso value of their net sales, which we showed in Table 4.4, if 
households start consuming part of their stock. This is exactly what we find: for 
grains, the peso value of the stock is lower for non-poor households in treatm ent 
villages, though imprecisely estimated. However, in May 1999 we find a significant 
effect on the likelihood of reducing the grain stock, which drops by 4.5 percentage 
points, and a 9 peso significant increase in consumption of own grains. We also 
find a decrease in livestock for the non-poor in treatm ent villages. In particular, 
the stock of chickens decreases significantly by 0.6 in 1998 (among households who 
own chickens), and the likelihood of owning pigs drops significantly by 3, 6, and 4 
percentage points in November 1998, May 1999, and November 1999, respectively. 
This is not surprising, as chickens and pigs are the most widely held animals (by 
61 and 34% of households in November 1998, respectively). At the same time the 
number of animals, and both the quantity and the value of the stock of grains owned 
by the poor in treatm ent villages increase substantially.24
These findings are consistent with both the empirical literature (e.g. Udry (1995) 
and Lim and Townsend (1998) show tha t households reduce their stock of grain in 
response to a shock) and with the predictions of models of incomplete risk sharing in 
which agents rely partially on self-insurance. These models predict th a t households 
hit by positive income shocks (the treated) increase their buffer stock, while house­
24Results available upon request.
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holds whose income has not changed (the non-poor) decrease savings because poor 
households’ higher income improves insurance against risk. The absence of signifi­
cant program effects on the peso value of grain stock and of net animal purchases 
suggests that part of the stock is now consumed (or used as productive input in the 
case of grains). At the same time, the positive program effect on loans and transfers 
suggests that households do share part of the risk.
Lastly, it is often difficult to separate investment from savings and production 
costs (as in the case of purchase of fertilizers). While there is no conceptual rea­
son why Progresa would indirectly decrease investment for the non-poor, one could 
interpret the drop in production costs in such a way.
4.6 Consumption smoothing and insurance against risk: idiosyncratic 
shocks
We have identified a positive indirect program effect on consumption for the non- 
poor; we have further shown th a t these households finance their extra consumption 
through increased loans and transfers, and through a reduction in both savings and 
sales of agricultural products. We suspect th a t one im portant reason for this con­
sumption increase and reduction in savings may be the improved insurance against 
risk caused by Progresa’s liquidity injection into treatm ent communities.25 One way 
to test this hypothesis is to estimate separate indirect program effects for households 
who have and have not been hit by a negative idiosyncratic shock. Consider non­
25There are additional explanations for the observed increase in non-poor consum ption. However, in general these 
additional explanations are consistent with some, but not all the observed I T E s .  One determinant of higher non-poor 
food consumption may be the effect of better information on the importance of an adequate nutrition: all households 
in treatment villages were strongly encouraged to  attend classes that covered health and nutrition topics, and such 
classes may have raised awareness on the importance of a nutritious diet, causing higher food expenditure. However, 
we have also seen an increase in non-food consumption. A further explanation may be the existence of “im itation” 
effects. Recent work by Bobonis and Finan (2005) and Lalive and Cattaneo (2005) analyze peer effects on schooling 
decisions in Progresa communities. Both papers show that the school enrollment of ineligible children is a positive 
function of the enrollment of treated children. Analogously, im itation effects may also increase consum ption. These 
additional causes for the increased consum ption explain the reduction in savings, but not the observed increase in 
loans and transfers.
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poor households only. Some fraction of the non-poor is hit by idiosyncratic negative 
shocks, S  =  1, in both villages. If Progresa improves insurance against risk, then we 
will observe all non-poor households in treatm ent villages increase their consumption 
through a mix of lower savings (because of the new access to loans and transfers if 
hit by a negative shock), and higher transfers and loans, compared to the non-poor 
in control villages. In addition, if shocks are random within village, we will see a 
larger increase in consumption and transfers for S  = 1 households than for S' =  0 
households in treatment areas: if Progresa improves risk sharing in treatm ent vil­
lages, the indirect program effect on S =  1 households consumption and loans and 
transfers will be proportionally higher than for households not hit by a shock. This 
occurs because households hit by a shock will need to smooth consumption more than 
households not hit by a shock, and they will partly do so by borrowing more (or by 
receiving more transfers). A clear prediction is tha t 5  =  0 households should run 
down on their savings since the need for self-insurance is reduced by the availability 
of credit in the network, while the double-difference effects on savings is ambiguous. 
For example, 5 = 1  households may reduce savings equally in treatm ent and control 
villages, and finance the extra change in consumption through increased loans and 
transfers.26 In other words, a test of whether the I T E s  on consumption, loans and 
transfers, and savings differ by shock between and within village type is an indirect 
test of the effect of the program on risk-sharing mechanisms.
26Suppose that in the absence of Progresa all non-poor households not hit by a shock would consum e 100, and 
households hit by a shock only 80. W ith Progresa, non-poor households not hit by a shock increase consum ption up 
to 110 through a mix of reduction in savings and higher transfers (each by 5). Households hit by an adverse shock, 
instead, further reduce their buffer stock, and receive even more assistance from their social network (each by 10), 
pushing their consumption from 80 to  100. In this case, the effect of Progresa on the change in transfers, savings, 
and consumption is higher for households hit by a negative shock.
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Formally, we define two new param eters of interest:27
(4.5) IT E S0 =  E(Y , f  -  y0?°|r, =  1,5, = 0, 1VP, = 1)
(4.6) IT E S1 =  £ (y ,f1 -  yof 1 \Ti =  1 ,5 ,=  1, NPi =  1)
where S'* is an idiosyncratic shock and the superscripts S I and SO stand for hit or 
not by the shock respectively. These param eters are the IT E s  for households who 
have and have not been hit by a shock. We want to test the following hypotheses:
ITE^1 > ITE^P >  0 
I T E l 1 > IT E [°  >  0 
ITE§°  < 0
where the subscripts C, L and S refer to consumption, loans and transfers, and 
savings, respectively. We can identify the above parameters exploiting the random­
ization by assuming the following:
ASSUMPTION (2):
2.1 E(Y£°\Ti =  1,5, =  0, NPi =  1) =  £(y<f |T, = 0, Si =  0, NPi =  1),
2.2 E(Y*'\Ti =  1,5, = 1, JVP, = 1) =  E iY^lT i =  0 ,S, = 1, JVP, = 1).
Assumption 2 implies tha t shocks are random between treatm ent and control villages. 
This assumption seems realistic because the village randomization is made within 
homogeneous geographic regions. For example, if one region is arid, its treatm ent 
and control villages are equally likely to suffer from droughts. However, in order to
27The structure of the identification problem could be also reformulated in the multiple treatm ent framework by 
defining 4 different treatments depending on the combination of T  and S.
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compare I T E S1 and I T E S0, we also need to assume tha t shocks are random within 
villages, conditional on household observable characteristics.28
We estimate the following equation both for non-poor and poor households:
(4.7) Yi =  a  +  f t  f t  +  f t f t  +  f t f t f t  + g(Xi)  +  Ui
The parameters of interest in this second step are:
ft  =  E(Yi\Ti =  1, ft =  0) -  £ ( * | f t  =  0, ft =  0)
ft  +  f t  =  [E(Yi\Ti =  1, ft =  1) -  £ ( * | f t  =  0, ft =  1)]
f t  -  [E(Yi\Ti =  1, f t  =  1) -  £ ( * | f t  =  0 , f t  =  1)]
- [ £ ( * | f t  =  1, f t  =  0) -  £ (* 1 7 ; -  0, f t  =  0)].
Under the above assumptions, f t  identifies I T E S0, i.e. the indirect program effect 
for households not hit by an idiosyncratic shock; f t  +  f t  identifies I T E S1, i.e. the 
effect for households hit by a shock; f t  the difference between the two IT E s .  The 
set of conditioning variables includes all the variables discussed earlier as well as the 
average shock intensity at the village level.29 We estimate (4.7) for both consumption 
and credit market outcomes.
In our data, we observe whether, in the six months preceding the interview, the 
household has been hit by any of the following types of natural disasters: drought, 
flood, frost, fire, plague, earthquake, and hurricane. This is our definition of shock. It 
is very specific, and it excludes other events th a t may cause income or wealth losses,
28To interpret the parameters in the way discussed above, we further need to assume that the extra liquidity 
injected by Progresa is sufficient to  borrow both to offset the shock and for additional reasons, and that households 
are willing to lend.
29Controlling for the intensity of the shock at the village level allows to net out the aggregate com ponent of 
the shock, which is uninsurable at the village level, while the village is the reference unit for our test of improved 
insurance. Once we fix the intensity of the shock in the village, the household-specific shock dumm y is then a measure 
of idiosyncratic shocks, where the parameter of interest is estim ated exploiting the within village variation. Note 
that the parameter is identified for villages where only a sub-set of households are hit by a shock.
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such as illness or death of household members. We discuss this variable in greater 
detail in the Appendix; we provide evidence tha t there is a substantial within-village 
variation (Figure 4.2), consistent with Townsend (1994), who shows tha t natural 
phenomena - rainfall in his case - are not uniform even within very small villages; we 
also show tha t shocks hit households randomly. The average incidence of the shock at 
the village level is 39, 55 and 30% in November 1998, and May and November 1999. 
This is a rough measure of how aggregate these shocks are. Note th a t the timing of 
the events and the way they are recorded in the data  is quite im portant: the shocks 
must precede (or be contemporaneous to) the observed outcome of interest. This 
requirement is satisfied in our data: both shock and loans refer to the 6 months 
before the interview, while consumption, transfers, and savings da ta  are provided for 
the previous week, month, and semester, respectively.
4.6.1 C onsum ption by shock
Table 4.8 provides means of food consumption by poverty status, village of res­
idence, and shock. Consider food consumption, for example. While the means are 
not different in November 1998, consumption is higher in treatm ent villages irre­
spective of shock status in the two 1999 semesters. The comparison of consumption 
levels for non-poor households with and w ithout the shock in the two villages types 
reveals the following: first, households hit by a shock in control villages tend to 
have the lowest average consumption levels. Second, consumption for households hit 
by a shock is higher in treatm ent than  in control villages, but almost always lower 
than consumption for households in treatm ent villages who have not been hit by a 
shock. However, the standard deviations are very large. We repeat this comparison 
by regressing non-poor log-consumption on these four categories, as in equation 4.7, 
adding the usual set of conditioning variables to take account of possible differences
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in observable characteristics by group, and to improve the precision of the estimates.
We now test the hypotheses th a t indirect program effects are positive irrespective 
of shock status, and tha t the indirect program effect on consumption is higher for 
households who suffered a shock. The first hypothesis requires only the standard 
randomization assumption, the second one also the other assumptions discussed in 
the previous section. The results are shown in Table 4.9. The estimates of the indirect 
program effects are positive and significant irrespective of shock status in both 1999 
semesters. Food consumption in May and November 1999 increases significantly by 
9.1% and 5.4% among households not hit by an idiosyncratic shock, and by 6.6% and 
14.4% for households who were hit by a shock. Furthermore, while in May 1999 there 
is no statistical difference between their magnitude, in November 1999 the effect is 9 
percentage points higher for households hit by a shock. The value of these changes 
in monthly pesos is 18.3 and 13.3 per adult equivalent (90 and 68 per household) for 
households without (5  =  0) and with a shock (5  =  1) in May 1999. The respective 
values for November 1999 are 10.7 and 27.7 per adult equivalent (or 55 and 152 
per household). The program effects for poor households are positive irrespective 
of shocks, they increase over time, as we saw in the previous consumption table, 
and never differ by shock status. The absolute value of these consumption changes 
is 20.3 (for 5  =  0 households) and 24.3 monthly pesos (for 5  =  1 households) per 
adult equivalent in May 1999, and 27.2 and 25.7 pesos in November 1999. There is a 
similar pattern for non-food consumption, although the positive trend is less marked. 
However, once we split non-poor households by shock, we do not find any significant 
indirect program effect for non-food consumption.30
30Results available upon request.
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4.6.2 Credit m arket by shock
We now proceed to estim ate separate I T E s  for households who have and have 
not been hit by a shock. Further, we test whether Progresa enables non-poor house­
holds hit by an idiosyncratic shock to borrow more (or receive more transfers) than 
households not hit by a shock. We perform such tests by estimating equation 4.7 for 
both the likelihood of receiving loans and transfers, and the amount received.
Table 4.10 reports means and proportion of credit resources by household and 
village type, and by shock occurrence. As we saw before, in general the indirect 
program effects on credit resources are larger over time. In addition, both the mag­
nitude of these effects and the likelihood of receiving loans and transfers are larger 
for non-poor households hit by a shock, consistent with our expectations. A notable 
exception are monetary transfers in November 1999, when the effect for households 
hit by a shock is negative, and certainly lower than  the effect for households not hit 
by a shock.
Table 4.11 provides estimates of the I T E s .  In November 1998, households hit 
by an idiosyncratic shock are 2.6 percentage points more likely to receive loans or 
transfers if they live in treatm ent villages. Moreover, they borrow and receive about 
22 pesos more per month. Instead, there is no significant effect for families not 
hit by a shock. It is striking th a t we detect these effects when Progresa had been 
implemented for a few months only. We interpret this fact as strong evidence tha t 
the program has an indirect effect on the credit market. We find the same type of 
effect for loans only, both in November 1998 and in May 1999. Once again, non-poor 
families who have been hit by a shock are about 2.5 percentage points more likely of 
borrowing money, and borrow 16.5 and 7.5 pesos more than their counterfactual in 
1998 and 1999. These results are consistent with our hypothesis th a t Progresa may
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enable households to insure against risk by borrowing more: the estimated I T E s  are 
larger for households hit by a shock. Interestingly, the effects for monetary transfers 
vary over time. In November 1998 the average transfer size is positive for both groups, 
and larger for households hit by a shock, but these effects are imprecisely estimated. 
In November 1999, instead, we find th a t the effect of the program on transfers is 
positive and significant, and averages about 12 pesos per month, only for households 
not hit by a shock. One possible explanation for this counterintuitive finding may be 
tha t higher loans are crowding transfers out. Alternatively, this finding is consistent 
with the hypothesis tha t transfers occur between “closer” individuals than the parties 
involved in loans. The former group’s geographic, as well as social higher proximity, 
results into shocks being positively correlated. Unfortunately, we do not have data  on 
loans for the same semester, nor complete da ta  on social networks, hence we cannot 
draw any conclusion regarding either effects. However, note th a t the finding th a t risk 
is shared through informal loans, rather than  through transfers, is consistent with 
the evidence provided by Fafchamps and Lund (2003) for the Philippines. Lastly, 
note tha t there is no clear pattern  for the likelihood of receiving in-kind transfers: 
the difference in I T E s  is negative in November 1998, and positive in November 1999. 
The magnitude of this difference is between 1.2 and 1.6 percentage points.31, 32 
In sum, the results presented in this section are consistent with our hypothesis 
of better risk-sharing through a more liquid credit market. Non-poor households 
in Progresa villages indirectly benefit from the program by receiving more credit 
resources when hit by a shock.
31 One potential limitation of this exercise is the sm all sam ple size: in each semester, there are no more than 500 
non-poor families receiving transfers or borrowing money, which we compare after dividing them  into four groups 
based on village type and shock occurrence. This number is even smaller when we consider loans and transfers 
separately.
32In the Appendix we report the effect of the program on the poor for comparative purposes.
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4.6.3 Savings
We finally test for indirect program effects on savings by shock. Our prediction 
is that the I T E  for households not hit by a shock is negative, while the effect on 
savings for S  =  1 households is not clear. We test for changes in the stock of corn and 
beans, staples of the Mexican diet and easily storable commodities. The prediction 
is confirmed by the data: while there is no change in the stock of beans, 5  =  0 
households reduce their stock of corn through a significant increase in the value of 
home consumption of about 10 pesos per month in May 1999. In the same semester, 
their likelihood of depleting agricultural stock is significantly higher by 8 percentage 
points in treated communities. Instead, there is no clear pattern  for households hit 
by a shock: we observe a shift in production from sugar cane to corn, and a significant 
increase in home consumption of the same magnitude as 5  =  0 households, but their 
total grain stock appears to be unchanged. As regards livestock, we found evidence 
of a significant depletion for both types of households, especially of chickens and 
pigs. The change in stock does not differ by shock.33
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the conjecture th a t non-poor households 
in treatm ent areas may indirectly benefit from Progresa by being able to  consume 
more because of changes in the credit and insurance markets.
4.7 Conclusions
Using the unique design of the experimental trial and the available data  for the 
evaluation of Progresa, we show th a t non-eligible households who live in treatm ent 
villages benefit indirectly from the program by increasing their consumption level. 
We further show tha t the consumption increase occurs through changes in the credit
33However, the effect on the value of net sales is negative and significant only for 5 = 1  households, a reduction of 
32 pesos in May 1999, and does not change for 5  =  0 households. It is possible that this latter group consumes part 
of its livestock, rather than selling it.
and insurance markets, which enable households to borrow more and to receive 
more transfers, perm itting them to reduce their savings. We conclude tha t this 
class of aid programs improves consumption smoothing for non-treated households 
living in treatm ent areas, consistent with the findings tha t, though the program 
increases consumption and loans, and decreases savings for all non-poor households 
in treatm ent villages, the effects on consumption and loans are larger for families hit 
by a negative idiosyncratic shock. These results are consistent with our knowledge 
of the credit and insurance markets in developing countries, which operate through 
social networks. A positive income shock to  any member is likely to benefit the whole 
network.
Our findings are interesting from several perspectives. They show how households 
in developing countries deal with credit market imperfections, and how a liquidity 
increase may have beneficial indirect effects on the local community at large, includ­
ing households whose current income does not change. Thus, this class of aid policies 
has important spillover effects which should not be neglected when evaluating the 
impact of the program.
In addition, this exercise is a striking example of circumstances in which the 
SUTVA, a key identifying assumption normally used in the program evaluation lit­
erature, fails. This assumption is often non-testable, when the experimental design 
consists of one treatm ent and one control group. However, its likelihood of being 
violated may be a function of observable characteristics of the programs and of the 
local economies where it operates. We suspect th a t the characteristics of Progresa 
which cause a significant indirect program effect are th a t this program targets a large 
proportion of the population of a local economy; has generously-sized transfers; re­
laxes some existing binding constraints (lending constraints in this case); operates
in areas where the treated and non-treated subjects are sufficiently “close” (from 
an economic, geographic, or social perspective); and has been ongoing for a suffi­
cient amount of time. Analyzing similar features of different programs may provide 
guidelines on the robustness of the SUTVA.
4.8 Tables and Figures
Table 4.1: Average monthly food and non-food consumption levels per adult equivalent
Food consumption Non-■food consumption
1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
NP control 203.25 201.50 195.99 76.55 72.47 74.22
(168.13) (197.00) (216.60) (87.92) (80.29) (80.86)
NP treatment 198.41 220.87 212.27 74.54 77.51 71.08
(160.43) (281.17) (263.19) (85.53) (90.13) (75.76)
P control 137.47 144.59 139.39 34.58 36.91 37.24
(103.10) (141.25) (116.05) (43.39) (41.99) (40.80)
P treatment 151.16 168.52 168.59 36.09 42.59 41.97
(122.17) (178.94) (191.25) (41.88) (46.02) (41.86)
Note: the amounts are in pesos; the exchange rate was roughly 10 pesos per USD.
Table 4.2: Average effect of Progresa on log-food and non-food consumption
Food consumption Non-food consumption
1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov. 1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
I T E -0.0213 0.0514 0.0669 0.0629 0.1384 -0.0602
[0.0256] [0.0257]** [0.0211]*** [0.0672] [0.0655]** [0.0623]
Obs. 4602 3824 4257 4771 4259 4443
A T T 0.1033 0.1699 0.1892 0.0959 0.1675 0.1128
[0.0236]*** [0.0219]*** [0.0211]*** [0.0651] [0.0613]*** [0.0540]**
Obs. 10879 9605 10508 11484 10630 10856
Note: Standard errors in [brackets] clustered at the village level. ***, **, * indicates significance 
at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
Table 4.3: Tobit estimates of program effect on per capita monthly household labor earnings
1997 Sept. 1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
ITE -9.58 14.21 -7.72 64.82
[46.99] [39.57] [44.63] [49.49]
Obs. 5095 4539 3806 4160
ATT -16.20 44.29 -38.83 72.09
[21.83] [18.87]** [20.20]* [20.90]***
Obs. 12370 10818 9590 10426
Note: Standard errors in [brackets]. ***, **, * indicates 
significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Costs Gross sales Net sales
1999 May 
Costs Gross sales
ITE -18.21 -8.87 -19.12 -35.95 -17.86 -41.25
[15.02] [3.15]*** [5.10]*** [21.58]* [6.24]*** [11.06]***
Obs. 4017 4100 4479 3469 3509 3763
ATT -3.72 3.19 -1.11 -3.90 1.67 -3.51
[1.84]** [0.75]*** [0.53]** [3.97] [1.27] [1.40]**
Obs. 9458 9595 10696 8666 
Animals
8759 8666
Net sales Purchases Gross sales Net sales Purchases Gross sales
ITE 1.99 -0.07 0.72 0.17 0.02 -0.59
[1.47] [0.41]*** [1.28] [0.77] [0.28] [0.53]
Obs. 4491 4541 4557 3736 3777 3779
ATT -0.17 -0.03 -0.03 -0.09 0.18 0.15
[0.27] [0.11] [0.13] [0.17] [0.08]** 0.10
Obs. 10640 9595 10760 9390 9493 9501
Note: differences in net sales estim ated by OLS, w ith standard errors clustered at the village level. 
Differences in gross sales and costs (purchases) estim ated by tobit MLE.
***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5, 10 % levels.
Table 4.5: Estimates of differences in participation to at least one alternative aid programs, in 
average number of programs benefits (for households who participate to at least one 





1999 May 1999 Nov. 97 1998 Nov.
Poor
1999 May 1999 Nov.
Overall:
At least one 0.033 0.013 0.043 0.013 -0.001 -0.089 -0.132 -0.078
[0.024] [0.029] [0.032] [0.031] [0.026] [0.025]*** [0.026]*** [0.032]**
5260 4615 3822 4259 12482 10911 9606 10516
How many if > 0 0.011 -0.023 0 -0.001 0.084 -0.114 -0.126 -0.115
[0.038] [0.028] [0.028] [0.030] [0.058] [0.019]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]***
1293 2177 1661 1827 4356 4582 3396 3613
Monetary n.a. 10.928 5.975 -3.336 n.a. -26.036 -19.178 1.133
transfer [16.633] [4.583] [5.354] [6.078]*** [2.321]*** [1.747]
4569 3784 4218 10803 9513 10411
Note: We estim ate the difference in the likelihood of participating to at least one program by probit, the difference 
in the number of programs participating to (if at least one) by OLS, and the total monetary receipt by tobit. 
Standard errors in [brackets] clustered at the village level (apart from the tobit specification). ***, **, * indicates
significance at 1, 5, 10 % levels.
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Tabic 4.6: Credit resources: mean, recipient proportion, and average amount obtained per recipient, 
by household type and semester
1998 N o v e m b e r 1999 M ay 1999 N o v em b er
M ean % A v g . r e c e ip t M e a n % A vg . re c e ip t M ean % A vg. re c e ip t
T o ta l c re d i t  re so u rces :
N P  c o n tro l 47 .795 11.91 404 .681
[235.436] [571.121]
N P  t r e a tm e n t 54 .073 12.94 4 2 3 .9 0 3
[249.015] [574.522]
P  co n tro l 21.651 8 .44 2 5 9 .9 3 9
[125.693] [357.858]
P  t r e a tm e n t 22.201 8 .59 26 0 .3 9 8
[125.184] [349.228]
L o a n s:
N P  c o n tro l 8 .218 2 .84 2 89 .264 11.165 3.71 3 01 .057
[79.402] [378.541] [105.302] [464.083]
N P  tr e a tm e n t 11.509 3 .28 35 8 .1 9 4 16.403 5 .30 3 14 .247
[116.847] [551.285] [123.282] [446.186]
P  c o n tro l 3 .955 2.73 147 .627 7 .653 4 .62 167.729
[37.238] [175.535] [57.777] [215.808]
P  tr e a tm e n t 4 .012 2.75 147 .324 7 .257 4 .30 170.541
[33.911] [145.677] [61.744] [248.944]
M o n e ta ry  tr a n s f e r s  fro m  fa m ily  a n d  frie n d s:
N P  co n tro l 29 .203 3 .89 7 5 1 .666 18.064 2.43 741.975
[246.713] [1018.716] [246.090] [1413.340]
N P  t r e a tm e n t 30 .212 4 .57 6 7 1 .9 2 8 26.991 3.74 737.183
[223.084] [825.028] [201.382] [768.112]
P  c o n tro l 11.480 2 .57 4 4 6 .9 9 0 3 .596 1.33 274.826
[110.974] [536.127] [43.101] [262.137]
P  t r e a tm e n t 10.198 2.61 3 9 7 .2 5 5 7.081 1.69 421 .680
[94.221] [439.463] [80.080] [457.063]
In -k in d  t r a n s f e r s  fro m  fa m ily  a n d  fr ie n d s:
N P  c o n tro l 1.120 1.623
[1.054] [1.261]
N P  t r e a tm e n t 1.921 0.964
[1.372] [9.743]
P  c o n tro l 1.492 1.607
[1.214] [1.255]
P  t r e a tm e n t 1.398 1.033
[1.171] [1.011]
Note:  A m o u n ts  a re  in  p e so s  p e r  m o n th ;  th e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w as ro u g h ly  10 p eso s  p e r  U S D . T h e  la s t  p e rc e n tile  
o f p o s itiv e  v a lu es  h a s  b e e n  tr im m e d  in  th e  c o m p u ta t io n  o f  th e  q u a n t i t i e s  b u t  n o t fo r th e  p ro p o r tio n s .
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Table 4.7: Program effects on credit resources
1998 Oct. 
Probit Tobit
1999 May 1999 Nov. 







ITE 0.0073 4.0375 0.0151 3.7937
[0.0064] [3.5252] [0.0076]* [2.0264]*
Obs. 4598 4595 3671 3802
Monetary transfers from family and friends:
ITE 0.0007 1.561 0.0074 6.562
[0.0057] [3.5437] [0.0048] [3.720]*
Obs. 4600 4525 4246 4194















ATT 0.0017 0.1068 -0.0084 -1.4556
[0.0042] [0.5072] [0.0061] [0.6294]***
Obs. 10893 10889 9478 9569
Monetary transfers from family and friends:
ATT -0.0007 -0.5267 0.0015 0.9958
[0.0027] [1.011] [0.0015] [0.8763]
Obs. 10894 10741 10500 10361




Note: Top 1% of positive values is trimmed in the Tobit.
Standard errors in [brackets] clustered at the village level
in the Probit regressions. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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Table 4.8: Average (std. dev.) monthly food consumption levels per adult equivalent, by shock
Food consumption 
1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
S = 0 
NP control 203.87 200.89 198.13
(165.61) (179.71) (175.01)
NP treatment 197.60 238.05 209.44
(160.32) (342.09) (211.19)
S = 1
NP control 202.39 201.94 191.68
(171.63) (208.55) (282.50)
NP treatment 199.62 208.42 217.77
(160.67) (226.36) (342.58)
S =  0 
P control 138.15 151.32 138.91
( 92.80) (123.51) (113.18)
P treatment 152.02 170.27 168.48
(131.40) (163.07) (207.15)
S =  1 
P control 136.59 140.13 140.54
(115.05) (151.73) (122.74)
P treatment 149.94 167.21 168.87
(107.84) (189.97) (143.66)
Note: Am ounts axe in pesos, the exchange rate was roughly 10 pesos per USD.
Table 4.9: Effect of progresa on poor and non-poor food consumption, by shock
1998 Nov.
Non-poor 
1999 May 1999 Nov. 1998 Oct.
Poor 
1999 May 1999 Nov.
I T E S0 -0.0235 0.0911 0.0544 0.0972 0.1347 0.1958
[0.0303] [0.0421]** [0.0277]* [0.0243]*** [0.0272]*** [0.0228]***
I T E S1 0.0168 0.066 0.1444 0.0991 0.1735 0.1832
[0.0360] [0.0350]* [0.0364]*** [0.0368]*** [0.0285]*** [0.0376]***
I T E SI -  I T E S0 0.0403 -0.0251 0.0900 -0.0019 0.0388 -0.0126
[0.0422] [0.0366] [0.0431]** [0.0140] [0.0317] [0.0309]
Obs. 4615 3825 4264 10911 9608 10517
Note: The standard errors in [brackets] are clustered a t the village level. The parameters estimate 
should read A T T  for poor. ***, **, * indicates significance 1, 5, 10 % respectively.
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Table 4.10: Mean [std. dev.], proportion, and average receipt of the available credit resources, by 
shock
M e A n
1 9 9 8  O c t .  
% A v g .  r e c e i p t M e a n
1 9 9 9  M a y
%  A v g .  r e c e i p t  M e a n
1 9 9 9  N o
% A v g .  r e c e i p t
T o t a l c r e d i t  r e s o u r c e s :
s=o
N P  c o n t r o l 5 9 . 6 9 1 1 2  6 1 5 5 4 . 7 0 7
[ 2 7 8 . 5 6 6 ] [ 8 8 5 . 9 3 1 ]
N P  t r e a t m e n t 5 2  2 7 3 1 2  1 9 5 3 8 . 3 1 2
S  =  1
[ 2 3 6  3 3 6 ] [ 9 1 7 . 8 4 6 ]
N P  c o n t r o l 3 1  5 2 1 0  9 5 2 8 7 . 8 6 1
[ 1 5 7 . 1 7 9 ] [ 3 9 1 . 6 3 7 ]
N P  t r e a t m e n t 5 6 . 7 9 1 1 4 . 0 7 5 5 1 . 7 4 2
[ 2 6 7 . 0 9 4 ] [ 1 4 1 3 . 6 4 ]
S = 0
P  c o n t r o l 2 3 . 7 6 9 8 . 1 7 3 1 8 . 5 0 7
[ 1 3 3 . 5 4 9 ] [ 4 4 6 . 0 0 5 ]
P  t r e a t m e n t 2 5  5 3 2 8 . 7 3 3 1 6 . 7 5 6
S =  1
[ 1 4 0 . 0 4 3 ] [ 4 4 9 . 4 7 9 ]
P  c o n t r o l 1 8 . 9 1 4 8 . 7 8 2 7 7 . 1 9 2
[ 1 1 4 . 7 2 8 ] [ 5 4 0 . 3 0 4 ]
P  t r e a t m e n t 1 7 . 5 0 9 8 . 4 2 3 5 . 6 8 2
[ 1 0 0 . 4 2 6 ] [ 4 0 4 . 8 9 7 ]
L o a n s :
S = 0
N P  c o n t r o l 1 0 . 6 1 3 3 . 0 8 3 4 4 . 2 7 1 1 6 . 2 9 5 4 . 6 3 3 5 2 . 3 1 8
[ 9 7 . 1 0 3 ] [ 4 4 3 . 6 7 ] [ 1 4 0 . 1 2 6 ] [ 5 6 2 . 4 7 2 ]
N P  t r e a t m e n t 7 . 9 9 4 2 . 3 4 3 4 0 . 9 5 1 1 . 9 1 2 4 . 5 3 3 8 6 . 8 2
S =  1
[ 8 4 . 8 7 9 ] [ 4 4 5 . 5 6 7 ] [ 8 4 . 1 8 5 ] [ 8 3 9 . 3 2 ]
N P  c o n t r o l 4 . 9 3 5 2 . 5 1 1 9 6 . 6 2 3 7 . 5 2 2 3 . 0 6 2 4 5 . 9 9 8
[ 4 4 . 8 2 1 ] [ 2 1 1 . 1 6 6 ] [ 7 0 . 7 3 4 ] [ 3 2 9 . 8 5 8 ]
N P  t r e a t m e n t 1 6 . 8 3 6 4 . 7 0 8 0 4 . 2 3 3 1 9 . 6 3 6 5 . 8 6 3 9 2 . 7 0 4
[ 1 5 2 . 9 4 5 ] [ 2 2 8 9 . 0 4 9 ] [ 1 4 4 . 9 8 3 ] [ 6 9 2 . 3 9 5 ]
S = 0
P  c o n t r o l 2 . 9 1 9 2 . 3 5 1 6 6 . 3 4 8 8 . 2 9 9 4 . 5 5 2 8 5 . 4 6
[ 2 9 . 2 8 5 ] [ 2 4 4 . 2 6 2 ] [ 5 7 . 5 7 2 ] [ 6 2 5 . 6 5 1 ]
P  t r e a t m e n t 4 . 8 4 8 2 . 7 4 1 7 6 . 7 5 8 9 . 7 7 2 4 . 5 8 2 4 9 . 6 5 3
S =  1
[ 4 0 . 2 1 5 ] [ 1 6 9 . 7 8 ] [ 7 3 . 9 8 2 ] [ 3 7 1 . 4 6 ]
P  c o n t r o l 5 . 2 9 4 3 . 2 1 1 6 5 . 0 1 4 7 . 2 2 7 4 . 6 6 1 5 5 . 2 3 9
[ 4 5 . 4 7 1 ] [ 1 9 6 . 7 9 9 ] [ 5 7 . 9 2 1 ] [ 2 2 2 . 5 7 3 ]
P  t r e a t m e n t 2 . 8 3 4 2  7 6 1 4 5 . 1 5 5 . 3 7 6 4 . 1 0 1 6 8 . 0 0 5
[ 2 2 . 1 2 ] [ 2 6 4 . 0 6 6 ] [ 5 0 . 6 2 8 ] [ 4 7 6 . 3 5 8 ]
M o n e t a r y  t r a n s f e r s  f r o m  f a m i l y  a n d  f r i e n d s :
S = 0
N P  c o n t r o l 4 0 . 3 7 3 4 . 4 6 9 0 5 . 7 6 1 1 2 . 1 7 9 2 . 1 4 5 6 9 . 8 5 4
[ 3 0 7 . 9 7 2 ] [ 1 1 7 1 . 2 3 8 ] [ 1 1 7 . 6 9 1 ] [ 5 8 6 . 5 8 8 ]
N P  t r e a t m e n t 3 3 . 4 4 1 4 . 9 7 8 1 6 . 6 2 6 3 2 . 3 6 3 . 9 7 1 1 7 6 . 2 8 5
g _ j
[ 2 5 4 . 1 7 9 ] [ 1 2 4 0 . 6 4 2 ] [ 2 2 9 . 9 7 9 ] [ 2 1 3 4 . 9 3 7 ]
N P  c o n t r o l 1 3 . 7 1 3 . 0 9 4 4 3 . 4 7 8 2 9 . 8 4 8 2 . 4 3 9 8 4 . 9 7 1
[ 1 1 5 . 6 9 4 ] [ 5 0 2 . 7 8 9 ] [ 3 9 2 . 4 8 7 ] [ 2 0 9 5 . 7 1 8 ]
N P  t r e a t m e n t 2 5 . 3 7 3 . 9 6 6 4 1 . 1 5 9 1 6 . 4 2 8 3 . 7 4 5 0 2 . 2 4 1
[ 1 6 5 . 8 4 8 ] [ 5 5 3 . 7 7 4 ] [ 1 2 7 . 0 9 4 ] [ 5 0 8 . 4 0 5 ]
S = 0
P  c o n t r o l 1 2 . 6 0 3 2 . 9 5 4 2 6 - 8 2 3 2 . 8 7 0 1 . 1 7 5 0 4 . 8 8 2
[ 1 1 3  4 6 6 ] [ 5 1 2 . 7 4 7 ] [ 3 8 . 2 5 1 ] [ 1 4 7 6 . 1 0 5 ]
P  t r e a t m e n t 1 2 . 9 8 6 2 . 7 3 5 3 1 . 4 7 7 7 . 6 1 4 1 . 7 4 5 4 6 . 0 0 7
[ 1 1 4  7 6 ] [ 6 1 4 . 3 7 2 ] [ 8 6 . 9 4 2 ] [ 1 0 3 8 . 7 4 4 ]
S =  1
P  c o n t r o l 1 0 . 0 3 4 2 . 0 7 4 8 4 . 0 5 4 5 . 3 4 5 1 .7 2 3 1 1 . 6 2 8
[ 1 0 7 . 6 9 ] [ 5 8 2 . 1 3 ] [ 5 2 . 9 6 9 ] [ 2 6 7 . 5 1 1 ]
P  t r e a t m e n t 6 . 2 7 4 2 . 4 4 3 1 7 . 0 5 9 5 . 7 3 7 1 . 5 9 3 6 0 . 8 1 6
[ 5 3 . 0 3 5 ] [ 5 1 7 . 0 0 4 1 [ 5 9 . 3 1 2 ] [ 3 1 0 . 3 9 6 ]
I n - k i : n d  t r a n s f e r s  f r o m  f a m i l y  a n d  f r i e n d s  ( % ) :
"g=o
N P  c o n t r o l 0 . 7 7 1 . 7 5
N P  t r e a t m e n t 2 . 2 8 0 . 7 0
S =  1
N P  c o n t r o l 1 . 4 5 1 .0 6
N P  t r e a t m e n t 1 . 6 8 1 .4 9
S = 0
P  c o n t r o l 1 . 4 5 1 .7 8
P  t r e a t m e n t 1 . 4 8 0 . 9 6
S =  1
P  c o n t r o l 1 . 2 7 1 . 1 7
P  t r e a t m e n t 1 . 2 7 1 2 9
N o t e :  A m o u n t s  a r e  i n  p e s o s  p e r  m o n t h / t h e  e x c h a n g e  r a t e  w a s  r o u g h l y  1 0  p e s o s  p e r  U S D .  T o p  1 %  o f  p o s i t i v e  v a l u e s  i s  t r i m m e d  
i n  t h e  c o m p u t a t i o n  o f  t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  b u t  n o t  f o r  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n s .
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Tabic 4.11: Effect of Progresa on credit for the non-poor, by shock
1998 Oct. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
Probit Tobit Probit Tobit Probit Tobit
Total credit resources:
IT E S0 -0.0117 -5.679
[0.0173] [7.3795]
IT E S1 0.0263 22.039
[0.0195] [8.9567]**




IT E S0 -0.0057 -4.2357 0.0063 -0.2219
[0.0079] [4.3411] [0.0127] [2.7923]
IT E S1 0.0264 16.6777 0.0249 7.5166
[0.011]*** [4.976]*** [0.0139]** [2.6014]***
IT E S1 -  IT E S0 0.0321 20.9134 0.0186 7.7385
[0.0109]*** [7.5773]*** [0.0163] [4.1162]*
Obs. 4598 4595 3671 3802
Monetary transfers from family and friends:
IT E S0 0.0013 0.9502 0.0125 11.8295
[0.0069] [20.8995] [0.0072]* [4.3498]***
IT E S1 -0.0004 4.3990 -0.0009 -1.9762
[0.0076] [5.7945] [0.0074] [5.8670]
IT E S1 -  IT E S0 -0.0017 3.4488 -0.0134 -13.8057
[0.0089] [6.0505] [0.0098] [7.5441]*
Obs. 4600 4525 4246 4194
In-kind transfers from family and friends:
IT E S0 0.0102 -0.0078
[0.0052]** [0.0033]**
IT E S1 -0.0027 0.0083
[0.0044] [0.0070]
IT E SI -  IT E S0 -0.0129 0.0161
[0.0063]** [0.09]*
Obs. 4479 3973
Note: Top 1% of positive values is trimmed in the Tobit.
The standard errors in [brackets] are clustered at the village level in the Probit regressions. 
***, **, * indicates significance at the 1,5, 10 % level respectively.
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Figure 4.2: Fraction of households hit by a shock at the village level
125
4.9 APPENDIX
In this Appendix we describe how we created some of the relevant variables for 
our analysis: consumption, transfers and loans, school enrollment, hours of work, 
earnings, and prices.
4.9.1 Food consum ption
We consider the three d a ta  waves collected after the program begins, in November 
1998, May 1999, and November 1999. Considering food consumption first, house­
holds report both the expenditure in food purchased during the last week and the 
quantity bought. If expenditure on a particular item is missing, but we know the 
amount purchased, we consider the village median price. We compute the village 
price in the following way: we create household-specific prices by dividing the ex­
penditure in food purchased during the last week by the quantity bought. If we have 
at least 20 household-specific prices per village, we use this information to compute 
median prices at the village level. Otherwise, we use either median municipality or 
state price (we use the lowest level of aggregation with at least 20 price observations). 
Once we have household-specific prices, we multiply them  by quantity consumed. We 
do this because households produce part of the consumed food. Considering only 
food expenditure would underestim ate the am ounts actually consumed.
We use November 1998 prices to  com pute consumption values in May and Novem­
ber 1999 also. Unlike in 1998, in 1999 we know both how much food is purchased 
and how much is consumed, bu t we have no direct information on home-produced 
food. Hence, in order to be consistent between the three waves, we assume tha t in 
1999 all food purchased is consumed if to tal consumption is smaller or equal than 
food purchased. If to tal consumption is greater than purchased goods we apply me­
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dian prices to the difference, this means th a t either home-produced food, or food 
given as a present is evaluated a t market prices. Since we could not convert different 
measurement units in a single one, we only consider those who have bought and 
consumed food in the same unit (Kilo, Liter or Units). We believe tha t the absence 
of measurement conversion does not pose any m ajor problem, since only about 1% of 
the sample has different measurements for the same food. Lastly, we compute adult 
equivalents for both food and non-food data. For this purpose, we use the adult 
equivalence conversion estim ated by Di Maro (2004) using Progresa data. According 
to Di Maro, children consume on average 73% of adults. For example, to estimate 
individual consumption per adult equivalent for a household with one child and one 
adult, we divide household consumption by 1.73.
An additional issue is how to trea t missing observations. We noted th a t some 
aliments, which are not staples for rural Mexicans, have a large number of missing 
observations. Thus, we create three different food expenditure variables, each time 
dropping all households w ith missing observations. The first variable is aggregate 
expenditure in food consumption for all available categories (hence the one with 
the highest number of missing observations). In this way, we drop about 5% of the 
sample. The second one excludes industrially produced food (pastelillos en bolsa, 
soft drinks, coffee, sugar, vegetable oil). The th ird  food consumption variable ex­
cludes industrially produced food, sliced bread (pan de caja), breakfast cereals, fish, 
and seafood. The results we show in the paper use the first consumption variable. 
However, they are robust to the use of these alternative variables.
The food consumption variable we use in the paper has the following number of 
non-missing observations for non-poor: 5004 in November 1998, 3857 in May 1999, 
and 4286 in November 1999. 371 (i.e. about 7%) households have zero food con­
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sumption in November 1998. Only 14 and 3 households have zero food expenditure 
in the May and November 1999 data, respectively. 10 households have a food con­
sumption level larger than  10000 pesos per adult equivalent per month in the 1999 
waves. We consider these extrem e values to be due to measurement error, and we 
omit the corresponding observations from our sample. After these trimmings, we are 
left with the following sample sizes for non-poor households: 4633, 3839, and 4277 
in November 1998, May 1999, and November 1999, respectively. We do the same for 
poor households, whose final samples have 10943, 9631, and 10547 households for the 
three waves.34 There is a drop in the valid household size in May 1999, supposedly 
due to a higher proportion of non-responses (this drop is not limited to the consump­
tion variables). However, the proportion of households in treated and control areas 
is roughly constant over tim e (for non-poor, this proportion ranges from 38.8% living 
in control areas in November 1998 to 39.9% in November 1999). Because of this, we 
believe tha t the smaller sample size in May 1999 does not pose attrition  problems.
4.9 .2  N on-food con su m p tion
For non-food consumption, we also consider the three waves used above. The 
variable on non-food consumption is only available as expenditure on particular 
categories of non-food items. Our measure of monthly non-food consumption is the 
sum of expenditures in: transport both  for adults and children; tobacco; personal 
and house hygiene; drugs and prescriptions; doctor visits; heating (ie. wood, gas, 
oil); electricity; clothing and shoes; school items (ie. pencils, books).35 As for food
34Note that the sam ple sizes from the regressions m ay differ from the aforementioned ones because some condi­
tioning variables may have missing observations.
35Information on expenditure on durable goods such as household appliances or home improvement is not included 
in our measure of non-food consum ption because we observe these data only in the 1998 wave. For that year, we 
com pute measures of both durable goods consum ption and agricultural expenditure. We consider durable goods all 
home appliances purchased (ranging from blenders to vans), and all expenditures to improve the house. Our measure 
of agricultural-related expenditures refer to  cost o f seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, machinery, and labor, excluding land 
rental costs. Both measures refer to  the previous 12 m onths.
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consumption, we trim  the extreme values because of possible measurement error. The 
value of the expenditure is then converted in real term s by applying the monthly CPI 
(Bank of Mexico, 2005).
When estim ating the I T E  on consumption, we perform a variety of robustness 
checks. First, we test for pre-program differences in consumption between non­
poor households in trea tm ent and control villages using March 1998 data.36. These 
differences are never significant. Second, since abou t 2.9% and 1.5% of non-poor 
households report zero food and non-food consumption, respectively, we re-estimated 
equation (4.3) using consumption levels (including zeros), rather than logs, and in­
terpreting zero consumption as measurement error or infrequent purchases, in which 
case OLS estimates are consistent.37 We find a  significant increase in both food and 
non-food consumption for non-poor households in trea ted  areas in both 1999 waves 
also when we include these additional households. As further robustness checks, we 
test whether these results are robust to  a different type of trimming: for example, 
rather than dropping households who report a m onthly food consumption larger than 
10000 pesos per adult equivalent, we om it the largest percentile: the significance of 
the results does not change (although the point estim ates are slightly different, of 
course). Moreover, we also estim ate IT E s  using the  alternative measures of food con­
sumption (described in the Appendix). Again, the  m agnitude and the significance 
of the estimates do not vary considerably.38
Table 4.12 provides estim ates of average durable expenditure differences for the 
whole sample, the probability of having positive expenditures, and the difference in
36March 1998 consum ption data are not d irectly com parable w ith  th e  other data  waves, given that only aggregate 
expenditure categories are available, and that aggregate expenditure information often results in under-reporting 
(Deaton (1997)). For exam ple, there are only four food categories: vegetables and fruit; aliments of animal origin; 
processed foods; grains and cereals.
37Note that the 2.9% zero food consum ption com es m ainly from Novem ber 1998, where about 7% of non-poor 
households have zero food consum ption.
38Results available upon request.
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average expenditures for households with positive expenditure levels.
Table 4.12: Durable expenditure: house appliances/improvements and agricultural produc­
tion/investm ent
House appliances and improvements 
OLS Probit OLS if >0
Production costs/investments 



























Note: The standard errors in [brackets] are clustered at the village
level. ***, **, * indicates significance 1, 5, 10 % respectively.
4.9 .3  H ours o f  work and labor earnings
The 1998 and 1999 surveys report hours of work for the sole sub-set of individuals 
who have a paid job, unlike the 1997 pre-program one, which collects working hour 
information for all individuals. In 1997 there is no explicit distinction between paid 
and unpaid jobs. Thus, in order to create a consistent measure, we excluded self- 
employed, business owners and ejidatarios from the computation of hours of work. 
We considered as unemployed all individuals who reported not having a job in the 
previous week (unlike those who said th a t they have a job but could not work). In 
case of disagreement (i.e. individuals reporting they do not have a job, but having a 
positive number of hours worked) we included the reported work time.
These variables are very noisy measures of work time and earnings, as at times 
we have to im pute monthly earnings from daily, weekly or annual wages. To reduce 
measurement error, we trim  the top and bottom  percentile. However, we do not ex­
pect the type of error in measurement to differ systematically between households in 
treatm ent and control villages. Moreover, when used as dependent variable, classic 
measurement error affects only the precision, but not the consistency of the coeffi­
cient estimates. We try  to offset this lack of precision by including a large set of 
conditioning variables.
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4 .9 .4  Prices
Prices refer to the food and non-food goods used to compute the value of con­
sumption. There are 57 different goods, but only food prices are available before 
the program begins, in March 1998. Thus, we use the 36 food prices available both 
before and during the program  implementation to provide DD estimates of the effect 
of Progresa. In November 1998 and May 1999 we have up to two prices for each 
good. W hen two different prices for the same good are available, we compute the 
mean village price. Table 4.13 provides a list of the goods used in the DD analysis 
of the program effect.
We find a small positive effect on some food prices in November 1998. Prices 
of onions (p2), lemons (p8), eggs (p26), and coffee (p34) are significantly higher in 
treatm ent than  in control areas. At the same time, though, the price of fish (p23) 
is significantly lower. Despite the fact th a t onions, eggs, and coffee are commonly 
consumed foods (Hoddinott et a l, (2000)), we do not expect these price changes to 
increase the cost of the food basket substantially, because prices of staples such as 
rice, beans, corn, and chicken do not change. Second, there is no price change in the 
later waves. Third, if we consider the pooled waves, the prices of 6 items increase, 
while the prices of 3 goods decrease in the observed time, out of a total of 36 items 
by 3 waves. This am ounts to  roughly a change in 8% of good prices. We believe 
tha t, perhaps with the exception of a minor price increase for some goods in the end 
of 1998, Progresa does not significantly change prices of treatm ent areas.39
As a further robustness check, we considered all 57 different (food and non-food) 
goods available in the 3 waves collected after the beginning of the program. We
39There is a large number of m issing observations. Since there are 506 villages observed in 4 different points in 
time, each price should have about 2000 observations. Instead, the non-missing observations range between 313 and 
1375.
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Table 4.13: Food prices used to  compute DD estimates of program effect on prices









plO nixtam al masa (kilo)
p l l corn grains (kilo)
p l2 Bread (unit)
p l3 Bread “de caja” (unit)
p l4 wheat flour (kilo)
p l5 soup (200 grs.)
p l6 rice (kilo)
P17 Tortillas (kilo)
p l8 corn “hojuelas” (unit)











p30 soft drink (bottle)
p31 Sardines (150 grs. in 98m, 400grs. after)
p32 Tuna can (175 grs.)
p33 aguardiente (liter)
p34 coffee (small pack)
p35 sugar (kilo)
p36 vegetable oil (liter)
132
pooled prices, creating a price basket th a t gives equal weight of one to each good. We 
then regressed this synthetic price indicator on a dummy for treatm ent and control 
villages, obtaining cross sectional estimates of the effect of Progresa on prices. Also 
in this case we reject the hypothesis th a t prices differ significantly between the two 
village groups.40
 Table 4.14: Difference in differences estimates of the effect of Progresa on village prices_____
p i  p2  p3  p4  p5 p6  p 7  p 8  p9
T  0 .0 8 2 6  -1 .1 7 8 2  -0 .0 4 3 5  -0 .5 4 6 2  0 .1246  -0 .0443  -0 .0414  -1 .3424  -1 .6077
[0.2582] [0 .4387]***  [0.2357] [0.4391] [0.2012] [0.1677] [0.3895] [0.9675] [1.2532]
T * 1 9 9 8  N ov. 0 .0 9 5  1 .2498  0 .0 6 0 9  0 .8 7 7  -0 .5583  0 .2174  -0 .2832  1 .8117 1.6452
[0.3840] [0 .4985]** [0.3974] [0.6473] [0.3953] [0.2851] [0.6732] [1.0401]* [1.2807]
T * 1 9 9 9  M ay  0 .0 8 0 4  0 .781  -0 .3 8 1 8  0 .1531  0 .0866  -0 .3466  -0 .1483  1 .1914 1.2465
[0.7453] [0 .5417] [0.3099] [0.5599] [0.2987] [0.2831] [0.7589] [1.0111] [1.2876]
T * 1 9 9 9  N ov . -0 .8 1 7 3  1 .3505  -1 .3 7 7 9  1 .5488  -1 .6462  -1 .1732  -0 .325  3 .2171 2.0641
[0 .3489]** [0.8422] [0.8913] [2.5669] [0.6641]** [1.4749] [0.5746] [2.2543] [1.3830]
O b s. 1034 9 9 0  94 8  369 678 698 426  548 413
p lO  p l l  p l 2  p l 3  p l4  p l5  p l 6  p l 7  p l8
T  -0 .5 0 3 9  0 .0 0 5 7  -0 .3 1 4 8  -1 .6 9  0 .0501 -0 .3291 -0 .1483  0 .0265  0.8105
[0.3412] [0 .2665] [0.3250] [1.3105] [0.1785] [0.4101] [0.1409] [0.1299] [0.9233]
T * 1 9 9 8  N ov . 0 .4 9 9 8  0 .2 0 3 4  0 .3 9 1 3  1 .4979  -0 .0945  0 .2555 -0 .1047  0 .0531  0.1171
[0.4262] [0 .3482] [0.3511] [1.3912] [0.2497] [0.4202] [0.1859] [0.1758] [1.3075]
T * 1 9 9 9  M ay  0 .2 9 5 8  -0 .4 2 8  0 .0 8 6 4  2 .0122  -0 .2671  0 .264  0 .1945  0 .3573  0.694
[0.4109] [0 .3291] [0.6539] [1.3717] [0.3055] [0.4162] [0.2806] [0.3769] [1.5655]
T * 1 9 9 9  N ov. 0 .8 7 8 9  2 .5 9 0 7  4 .0 2 3 2  0 .4 8 5 2  9 .1043  -0 .3298  -0 .5 6 9  -0 .4 8 1 7  -1 .6231
[4.4228] [1 .7468] [9.9232] [1.4638] [9.2109] [0.5394] [0.5809] [0.4022] [1.1575]
O b s. 365 6 4 0  750  390 678 1233 1375 424  565
p l 9  p 2 0  p21 p22  p23  p2 4  p25  p2 6  p27
T  -0 .2 2 5 5  -0 .5 7 6 5  -0 .1 6 3 4  -1 5 .4 5 0 5  -1 .6939  -0 .15  -0 .3617  -0 .9393  -0 .34
[0.6422] [0 .9607] [1.2435] [9.0361]* [2.0772] [0.2455] [0.1621]** [0.3405]*** [0.2410]
T * 1 9 9 8  N ov. -1 .8291  -1 .8 3 1 7  -1 .3 5 8 9  13 .7839 -6 .8775  0 .1938  0 .0172  1.1282 0.3435
[1.3035] [1 .6762] [3.2008] [11.1087] [3.9947]* [0.2641] [0.3141] [0.4336]*** [0.3052]
T *  1999 M ay  -0 .5 1 1 3  0 .9 3 4 3  1 .1377  12 .0755  5 .714  0 .129  0 .3623  0 .5862  0 .3434
[0.8389] [1 .2960] [1.7734] [11.5156] [5.6679] [0.2637] [0.2650] [0.4429] [0.4402]
T * 1 9 9 9  N ov . -1 .2 3 0 3  0 .9 2 9 4  -0 .0991  15 .3242 3 .4506  0 .1216  -0 .2 7 8 7  0 .4151  -2 .3614
[2.2299] [1.1187] [1.2644] [9.0350]* [2.7004] [0.4785] [0.4876] [0.7810] [3.3976]
O b s. 486  5 66  313  334 344 1375 1194 1206 833
p 2 8  p 2 9  p3 0  p31 p32  p33  p3 4  p35  p36
T  -0 .0 6 8 9  -0 .1 5 5 2  0 .0 9 1 6  -0 .0645  -0 .0312  -0 .3793  -1 .5319  -0 .1483  -0 .1349
[0.3556] [0 .1894] [0.2142] [0.1266] [0.0939] [0.7805] [0 .5373]*** [0.0950] [0.1196]
T * 1 9 9 8  N ov . -0 .0 6 3 4  0 .1 6 8 4  -0 .151  0 .1084  -0 .0026  1 .2379 2 .2448  0 .1084  0 .1579
[0.5199] [0 .2163] [0.2647] [0.1734] [0.1331] [1.1330] [0.7657]*** [0.1324] [0.1828]
T * 1 9 9 9  M ay  -0 .3 0 6 7  -0 .0 6 8  -0 .3 1 5 2  0 .542  0 .2061 1.5668 0 .3668  0 .1521  0 .1635
[0.5517] [0 .3063] [0.3013] [0 .2638]** [0.1485] [1.5627] [0.7374] [0.2031] [0.1800]
T * 1 9 9 9  N ov . 0 .5 7 8 8  0 .6 9 3 1  6 .3 9 7 8  -0 .4 7 2 9  -0 .3143  0 .3309  -0 .0825  0 .6451  2 .5376
[0.7721] [0 .9239] [10.4329] [0.5949] [10.0995] [0.8828] [6.4283] [0.7407] [2.2574]
O b s. 63 4  48 8  922 1272 1021 757__________636____________1431_________1219
Note:  S ta n d a r d  e r ro r s  c lu s te r e d  a t  th e  v il la g e  level. ***, **, * in d ic a te s  s ig n ifican ce  a t  th e  1, 5, 10 % level re sp ec tiv e ly .
4.9 .5  A ltern ative  program  receipt
Table 4.15 shows estim ates of differences in participation to alternative aid pro­
grams. The first 4 rows of the Table present estimates of the differences in the
40Results available upon request.
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1999 May 1999 Nov. 97 Sept.
Poor
1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
Overall:
At least one 0.033 0.013 0.043 0.013 -0.001 -0.089 -0.132 -0.078
[0.024] [0.029] [0.032] [0.031] [0.026] [0.025]*** [0.026]*** [0.032]**
5260 4615 3822 4259 12482 10911 9606 10516
How many if > 0 0.011 -0.023 0 -0.001 0.084 -0.114 -0.126 -0.115
[0.038] [0.028] [0.028] [0.030] [0.058] [0.019]*** [0.021]*** [0.022]***
1293 2177 1661 1827 4356 4582 3396 3613
M onetary n.a. -26.005 5.827 -8.186 n.a. -27.328 -24.914 -2.291
transfer [33.063] [7.757] [12.531] [13.978]* [5.789]*** [4.794]
OLS 4569 3784 4218 10803 9513 10411
M onetary n.a. 10.928 5.975 -3.336 n.a. -26.036 -19.178 1.133
transfer [16.633] [4.583] [5.354] [6.078]*** [2.321]*** [1.747]
tobit 4569 3784 4218 10803 9513 10411
Cash transfers (participatiion):
Solidaridad 0.005 0.009 0.018 0.011 0.013 -0.096 -0.087 -0.04
[0.008] [0.007] [0.006]*** [0.006] [0.013] [0.010]*** [0.010]*** [0.007]***
5232 4426 3812 4246 12469 10911 9606 9193
INI 0 -0.001 — — -0.001 0 — —
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]
5046 2696 10593 9214
Probecat 0.001 -0.002 — — 0 -0.002 — —
[0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001]**
5048 2621 12175 9867
Em pleo temporal 0.003 0.002 — 0.001 0 — —
[0.001]** [0.001] [0.000]* [0.001]
5046 2860 12175 10521
Procampo n.a. 0.018 0.004 -0.001 n.a. 0.061 0.029 0.053
[0.030] [0.032] [0.031] [0.024]** [0.026] [0.026]**
4615 3822 4259 10911 9606 10516
Transfers in kind (participation):
DIF food 0.032 -0.021 0 -0.005 -0.005 -0.067 -0.083 -0.093
[0.021] [0.016] [0.018] [0.020] [0.022] [0.014]*** [0.015]*** [0.018]***
5258 4560 3822 4259 12469 10677 9606 10516
Desayuno DIF 0.001 n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.003 n.a. n.a. n.a.
[0.008] [0.013]
4459 12306
Tortilla 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.001 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001]** [0.000]
4185 3840 2854 1872 12030 8465 9297 8312
Milk -0.005 -0.002 0.007 -0.003 0 -0.001 -0.005 -0.001
[0.007] [0.006] [0.003]** [0.003] [0.006] [0.006] [0.003] [0.002]
5194 4600 3812 3438 12179 10911 9591 10500
Note-. The likelihood of receiving individual program transfers is estim ated by Probit. The total monetary transfer 
received is estim ated both by OLS and by tobit. Standard errors in [brackets] are clustered at the village 
level (apart from tobit estim ates). ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively.
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aggregate measures. The following 8 rows show estimates of the differences in par­
ticipation to  the five cash transfer programs, and the three in kind programs. All 
these variables are a t the household level, and refer to the month before the interviews 
took place. We find th a t there are no differences in alternative welfare receipt in 1997, 
with the exception of a slightly higher participation to the temporary employment 
program in treatm ent areas (for both  poor and non-poor households). Thus, we rely 
on cross-sectional estim ates of the differences for the remaining three data  waves.
It is possible th a t non-poor participation to alternative welfare programs may 
have increased for all control villages: for example, households in control villages 
know of the existence of Progresa and may feel deprived, hence participate more to 
alternative programs. Alternatively, program officials may become more “generous” 
in communities excluded from Progresa. This increase in welfare receipts in control 
villages would be compatible with the results presented in Table 4.15. For instance, 
the absence of significant differences for non-poor may be consistent with equally 
increased participation rates in both  types of villages. Similarly, part of the apparent 
decrease in receipt for treatm ent poor may actually be due to increased participation 
in control villages. In any case, note th a t if non-poor alternative program take-up 
increased equally in both  treatm ent and control areas, it still would not explain why 
non-poor consumption is higher in treatm ent than in control villages.
One way to  observe whether alternative programs take-up surged in both types of 
villages is to  compare trends in these programs’ pre- and during-Progresa participa­
tion rates. If we observed a substantial peak in 1998 and 1999 non-poor participation, 
compared to the 1997 levels, we may suspect th a t this is partly an indirect effect of 
Progresa in both  treatm ent and control villages. Of course the supposed increase in 
welfare participation may as well be due to exogenous reasons. Table 4.16 compares
average participation rates over time for Solidaridad, DIF food, Liconsa milk, and 
Tortilla. These are the only programs we observe for all 4 data  waves. The com­
parison of program take-up rates over time clearly shows tha t there is no surge in 
participation in control areas after the beginning of Progresa. In fact, participation 
rates seem to slowly decrease over time.
Table 4.16: Average (std. dev.) monthly participation rates to selected alternative aid programs
1997 Sept. 1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
Solidaridad
NP control 0.081 0.074 0.053 0.040
(0.273) (0.262) (0.224) (0.197)
NP treatment 0.079 0.077 0.079 0.052
(0.270) (0.266) (0.269) (0.222)
P control 0.141 0.136 0.121 0.049
(0.349) (0.343) (0.326) (0.216)
P treatment 0.153 0.026 0.005 0.003
(0.360) (0.160) (0.071) (0.057)
DIF food
NP control 0.112 0.099 0.100 0.094
(0.316) (0.299) (0.300) (0.292)
NP treatment 0.136 0.072 0.092 0.090
(0.343) (0.259) (0.289) (0.286)
P control 0.153 0.116 0.112 0.144
(0.360) (0.321) (0.315) (0.351)
P treatment 0.140 0.044 0.025 0.024
(0.347) (0.206) (0.156) (0.154)
Tortilla
NP control 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.022) (0.024) (0.026) (0.034)
NP treatment 0.002 0.006 0.009 0.004
(0.039) (0.077) (0.095) (0.059)
P control 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.027)
P treatment 0.001 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.030) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045)
Liconsa milk
NP control 0.037 0.027 0.012 0.012
(0.189) (0.162) (0.109) (0.108)
NP treatment 0.029 0.028 0.017 0.009
(0.166) (0.164) (0.130) (0.096)
P control 0.034 0.034 0.016 0.009
(0.181) (0.182) (0.124) (0.097)
P treatment 0.032 0.034 0.010 0.008
(0.176) (0.180) (0.099) (0.088)
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4.9 .6  Shocks
We observe two different measures of shock in our sample. The data  record 
whether, in the six m onths preceding the interview, the household has been hit by 
any of the following types of natural disasters: drought, flood, frost, fire, plague, 
earthquake, and hurricane. We also know whether any of these natural disasters 
caused a damage to the household, such as: loss of land, harvest, housing, property, 
tools, animals, and household members; casualties, and members migrating to find 
jobs elsewhere. We create two different dummy variables. One records whether the 
household has been hit by any natural disaster. The second one, instead, considers 
whether the household suffered from any of the above losses. The natural disaster 
dummy may include households who did not incur any loss because of the natu­
ral disaster. However, we suspect it is more likely to be unrelated to household 
characteristics than  the second variable. For instance, loss of land and animals are 
conditional on their ownership by the households, while the decision to migrate is 
constrained by the availability of savings to  finance the trip. The results showed in 
the paper use our preferred shock variable, the natural disaster dummy. However, 
our estimates do not vary substantially when we use the loss dummy.41 One po­
tential shortcoming of this variable may be shocks hitting entire villages, leaving no 
within-village variation. For example, it is unlikely tha t an earthquake may hit only 
half a village. However, Figure 4.2 shows tha t this is not the case: when we plot 
within-village proportions of households hit by shocks, we notice th a t only in very 
few cases the entire village is hit.
In order to compare indirect program effects for households hit and not hit by 
a shock, we require th a t shocks are random both between and within villages. To
41 Results available upon request.
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Tabic 4.17: Tests of the Randomness of Idiosyncratic Shocks
1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.
Difference in average shock level by village type
ALL -0.0029 -0.0254 0.0138
[0.0239] [0.0255] [0.0311]
Obs. 14953 12979 14264
NP 0.0159 0.0028 0.0483
[0.0294] [0.0308] [0.0366]
Obs. 4407 3667 4082
P -0.0126 -0.0353 0.005
[0.0267] [0.0282] [0.0331]
Obs. 10546 9312 10182
Difference in pre-program consumption by shock status
Food Non-Food Food Non-Food Food Non-Food
ALL -0.0008 0.017 -0.007 -0.0189 0.004 0.030
[0.010] [0.018] [0.120] [0.021] [0.012] [0.022]
Obs. 13981 13794 12130 11974 13297 13135
NP -0.011 0.005 -0.002 -0.035 -0.008 -0.025
[0.019] [0.037] [0.021] [0.044] [0.023] [0.038]
Obs. 4209 4145 3502 3448 3890 3838
P 0.001 0.021 -0.012 -0.015 0.009 0.051*
[0.012] [0.023] [0.014] [0.024] [0.014] [0.027]
Obs. 9772 9649 8628 8526 9407 9297
Difference in pre-program consumption by shock status and village type
Food Non-Food Food Non-Food Food Non-Food
NP 0.56 0.10 2.56* 2.41* 0.15 0.53
Obs. 4196 4132 3493 3493 3879 3827
P 0.12 1.00 0.25 1.31 0.14 1.67
Obs. 9757 9634 8614 8512 9393 9283
Note: The usual set of pre-program controls, including average shock 
intensity at the village level, is added to all regressions (but the upper panel). 
Standard errors clustered at the village level.
***, **, * are 1, 5, 10 % significance levels.
138
insure th a t this is the case, we perform three tests. First, we check whether shocks hit 
treated and control areas differentially, for all households, and for non-poor and poor 
families separately. The top panel of Table 4.17 presents the partial effects from a 
probit on the probability of being hit by a shock on village area dummies, and shows 
tha t the estim ates are never statistically significant. Second, to test whether more 
vulnerable households are more likely to suffer from adverse shocks, we check whether 
households with lower pre-program consumption are more likely to suffer future 
shocks. We regress March 1998 log food and non-food consumption on the November 
1998, May 1999, and November 1999 shock dummies, alternatively. We repeat this 
exercise for both  the whole sample and for poor and non-poor separately. The middle 
panel in Table 4.17 presents the estimates of the shock dummy coefficients, which 
are never significant. Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis tha t the average pre­
program consumption levels are the same for households hit and not hit by adverse 
shocks. Lastly, we want to test whether average pre-program consumption levels are 
the same for the four groups defined by village of residence (treatm ent or control, 
i.e. T  =  1 or T  =  0) and shock status (hit or not hit, i.e. 5  =  1 or 5  =  0). We 
consider non-poor and poor households separately, and regress log consumption on 
dummies th a t group households accordingly (one dummy for T  =  1 and 5  =  0, one 
for T  =  1 and 5  =  1, a th ird  one for T  =  0 and 5  =  0) and test the hypotheses tha t 
the coefficients of these three dummies are jointly equal to zero, interpreting the null 
as evidence of the randomness of the idiosyncratic shocks. As before, we repeat this 
exercise three times, since we have shock data  for each of the three semesters we 
consider. We report the values of the F-tests in the lower panel of Table 4.17. We 
add the usual set of pre-program controls, including average shock intensity at the 
village level, to all regressions in the Table. Note tha t the weak significance of the F
test for May 1999 shocks disappears as we change the set of conditioning variables. 
Thus, also this third test confirms tha t these adverse shocks hit the households in 
our sample in a random way.
Table 4.18: Effect of Progresa on credit for the poor, by shock
1998 Nov. 1999 May 1999 Nov.










ATTS0 0.0048 0.7434 -0.0058 -0.7343
[0.0059] [0.6643] [0.0062] [0.9255]
ATTS1 -0.0018 -0.6332 -0.0095 -1.7928
[0.0053] [0.7313] [0.0066] [0.7903]**
ATTS1 -  ATTS0 -0.0066 -1.3766 -0.0037 -1.0585
[0.0073] [0.9627] [0.0059] [1.1142]
Obs. 10893 10889 9478 9569
Monetary transfers from family and friends:
ATTS0 -0.0020 -0.7036 0.0031 1.839
[0.0031] [1.2475] [0.0018]* [1.031]*
ATTS1 0.0015 -0.147 -0.0018 -0.7363
[0.0041] [1.574] [0.0022] [1.5037]
ATTS1 -  ATTS0 0.0035 0.5566 -0.0049 -2.5753
[0.0047] [1.9193] [0.0027]* [1.7884]
Obs. 10894 10741 10500 10361





ATTS1 -  A TTS0 0.0005 0.0064
[0.0033] [0.0033]*
Obs. 10894 10500
Note-. Top 1% of positive values is trimmed in the Tobit. The
standard errors in [brackets] are clustered at the village level in the Probit regressions. 
***, **, * indicates significance at 1, 5, 10 % respectively.
Table 4.19: Difference in differences estimates of the effect of Progresa on the stock of animals
T * 9 8 N
T * 9 9 M
T *9 9 N
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T -0 .007 -0 .461 0.021 -0 .216
[0.020] [0.220]** [0.018] [0.310]
T * 9 8 N 0.05 0.501 -0 .01 0.228
[0.020]** [0.228]** [0.008] [0.308]
T * 9 9 M 0.056 0.723 -0 .002 0.481
[0.021]*** [0.243]*** [0.008] [0.347]
T *9 9 N 0.063 0.611 0.001 0.89
[0.022]*** [0.246]** [0.011] [0 .320]**:
O b s. 46199 29900 46196 5495
Poor
-0 .027 -0 .115 -0 .005 -0 .15 0 -0 .043
[0.026] [0.112] [0.003]* [0.112] [0.013] [0.039]
0.028 0.033 0.006 0.265 0.018 0.028
[0.020] [0.114] [0.004] [0.152]* [0.010]* [0.040]
0 .025 0.234 0.001 0.363 0.017 0.037
[0.021] [0.122]* [0.004] [0.183]** [0.011] [0.042]
0 .035 0.053 0.003 0.045 0.026 0.01
[0.021]* [0.106] [0.004] [0.166] [0.011]** [0.038]
46197 16724 46198 594 46196 6406
0.012 -0 .026 0.002 -0 .273 0.003 0.063
[0.017] [0.036] [0.013] [0.142]* [0.002] [0.057]
0 .009 -0 .01 0.01 0.101 0.004 0.036
[0.013] [0.030] [0.010] [0.139] [0.003] [0.102]
0 .007 -0 .036 0.017 0.122 0.003 -0 .085
[0.013] [0.035] [0.010]* [0.186] [0.003] [Q -ijg]
0 -0 .006 0.021 0 .558 -0 .002 - 0 .EB2
[0.014] [0.033] [0.012]* [0.177]*** [0.002] [0.106]
46193 8487 46195 6347 46189 814
Note: Odd columns are estim ates from probits on likelihood of holding any animal. Even columns are estim ates from OLS regressions for households holding at least one 
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